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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report investigates the international law and policy challenges
to the determination of the international shipping industry’s
contribution to climate change mitigation efforts through
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized
agency of the United Nations and the competent international
organization with respect to shipping in international law. The
report sets out the international legal framework that serves as
the context for the IMO initial strategy, the challenge of regulating
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international shipping,
and the process and issues in determining the industry’s “fair
share” of mitigation efforts and potential legal pathways. The
report concludes with general, policy and legal considerations
that have a bearing on the current and possible future directions
of the nascent IMO strategy and potential legal pathways.
General considerations include the observation that the complexity
and uncertainty underscoring the development of the IMO strategy
call for a long-term planning instrument that is integrated and
systemic in scope, flexible in approach and adaptive in application.
As other regimes and sectors progress in developing and delivering
on mitigation efforts, care should be exercised in considering lessons
and tools from other sectors for application to shipping, given its
uniqueness and that other sector experiences emanate from different
contexts and considerations. Given continuing significant differences
on GHG issues in the IMO, it is vital for the long-term IMO strategy to
be advanced and maintained on the basis of the culture of consensus
that has helped shape the IMO as a successful regulatory body.
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The policy considerations explored include the
overall long-term goal, key milestones toward the
goal, measures and timelines to achieving the goal,
and reporting and review. A critical starting point
will be the determination of the industry’s fair
contribution to the goals of the Paris Agreement
and the overall climate mitigation effort expected
from the sector. Key milestones include the
peak year, the rate of emissions reduction after
emissions have peaked, and a timeline for full
decarbonization, explored in the context of short-,
medium- and long-term targets and a combination
of measures that work together effectively
toward the long-term goal and interim targets.
Technical and operational regulations, marketbased mechanisms (MBMs), and mechanisms to
review and adjust both the targets and role of the
measures to achieve them are among the potential
tools considered. A key consideration is the
opportunity to synchronize the efforts of the IMO
with commitments, review cycles, mechanisms
and institutions under the Paris Agreement.

measures and possible linkages with other global
and regional regimes may be needed. While the
International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), as the leading
IMO instrument on prevention of marine pollution,
can be expected to continue to play a major role,
the future introduction of an MBM will require
careful consideration in maritime regulation.
Future IMO regulation of GHG emissions is likely
to be challenged to be consistent and coherent
with the current industry regulatory system. While
maritime regulation has well-developed principles
and procedures, it will be important to harmonize
mitigation regulation with other maritime
regulatory concerns. Further considerations include
whether states should be encouraged to extend
international rules and standards to domestic
shipping to facilitate GHG regulatory consistency
across all forms of shipping. Finally, the finalized
IMO strategy will need to give thought to how it
will facilitate compliance with its spirit and letter.

Legal considerations are underscored by the global
nature of maritime regulation, the necessity to
anticipate the steps needed to secure universal
acceptance and uniform application of the
measures adopted in or under the IMO strategy,
and the relationship with other global and regional
regimes. The potential relationship to other treaty
regimes needs to be studied. It is likely that
traditional maritime regulation alone will not be
sufficient for the mitigation effort and that novel

2
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to investigate the international law and
policy challenges in determining the international shipping industry’s
contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through
the efforts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and to
identify issues and possible legal pathways to address these challenges.
In its seminal resolution adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development in 2015, the United Nations General Assembly underscored
the need for “urgent action on climate change, so that it can support
the needs of the present and future generations.”1 In recognizing climate
change as one of the greatest challenges of our times, the resolution
recognized the wide range of impacts and that many least-developed
countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) will be
seriously affected.2 It called for “the widest possible international
cooperation aimed at accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse
gas emissions.”3 There is a commitment to adopt policies to promote
sustainable transport systems.4 Several goals address the global climate
change response directly or indirectly.5 The expectation is for a planetary
response under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)6 as the primary international and intergovernmental
forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.7
The legal context of this report is the scope, functions and interactions
of a number of major global regimes, namely and primarily: the Paris
Agreement,8 pursuant to the UNFCCC with respect to the global efforts
1

Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, GA Res 70/1, UNGAOR,
70th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/70/1 (2015), Preamble [SDG].

2

Ibid at para 14.

3

Ibid at para 31.

4

Ibid at para 27.

5

For example, Goal 7 aims at ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy
for all and, among other goals, calls for doubling the global rate of improvement of energy efficiency
and enhancement of international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and
technology by 2030. Also relevant are Goal 12 to ensure sustainable consumption and production
patterns and Goal 13 to take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. Ibid.

6

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, 31 ILM
849 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [UNFCCC]. The UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are
referred to collectively in this report as the UN climate regime. Article 4.1(c) of the UNFCCC requires
parties to promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion of technologies,
practices and processes that reduce or prevent GHG emissions from the transport sector.

7

In addition to the UNFCCC, the SDGs expressly recognize this primary role. SDG, supra note 1 at para 31.

8

Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, Dec CP.21, 21st Sess, UN Doc FCCC/
CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (entered into force 4 November 2016) [Paris Agreement].

Shipping and Climate Change: International Law and Policy Considerations

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274

5

to address climate change generally; the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),9
with respect to atmospheric emissions from ships
resulting in pollution of the marine environment;
the IMO system of global maritime regulation and,
most especially, the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973/78
(MARPOL),10 with respect to the regulation of air
emissions from ships on international voyages.
To a lesser extent, the framework instruments
of the World Trade Organization (WTO)11 and the
EU policy and regulation concerning monitoring,
reporting and verification of carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from maritime transport are also set out
as part of the larger context.12 While international
shipping emissions are not included in any of the
current individual state party commitments under
the Paris Agreement, they could be included in the
future at the discretion of individual parties, and
are captured under the collective goals and the
global stocktake. The international expectation is
that the IMO will facilitate the determination of the
shipping industry’s fair contribution consistently
with the spirit of the Paris Agreement.
Of special and central significance for this report is the
interaction of the Paris Agreement and IMO regimes.
The Paris Agreement provides the framework for the
adoption of national contributions determined at the
national level,13 establishes the collective goals and
takes stock of progress toward the collective goals
through five-year review cycles.14 The expectation of
the IMO is that the shipping industry’s contribution
will be determined at the intergovernmental
organization level because the industry is globalized
and transnational. The two regimes are guided by
9

The IMO has been working on GHG emissions from
ships for well over a decade. International shipping
was the first industry to actually adopt measures with
respect to such emissions at a global sectoral level,
consisting mainly of technical (energy efficiency),
operational (vessel management) and more recently
fuel-related measures. At this time, it is unclear
whether technical and operational measures,
although essential, may be insufficient on their own
to enable the industry to achieve the long-term goal
of decarbonization and hence parallel discussions on
MBMs have been conducted. In 2014, the divisions and
controversies over the discussion on MBMs prompted
suspension from further formal discussion by the
IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee
(MEPC),18 although the topic was considered again
by the first two meetings of the Intersessional
Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions
from Ships (ISWG-GHG) in June and October 2017
for possible inclusion in the comprehensive IMO
strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from ships,
referred to in this report as the IMO Strategy.19 The
Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions
from Ships, representing the path for the industry’s
share and its delivery, was adopted by MEPC 72

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 397, 21 ILM 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [LOSC].

10 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
2 November 1973, 1340 UNTS 184, 12 ILM 1319, as amended by
the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61, 17
ILM 546 (entered into force 2 October 1983) [MARPOL].
11 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 (entered into force 1 January
1995); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994,
1868 UNTS 120 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [TBT]; General
Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183, 33 ILM
1167 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [GATS].
12 EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: Integrating maritime transport
emissions in the EU’s greenhouse gas reduction policies, COM (2013)
479 final (28 June 2013); EC, Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring,
reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime
transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC, [2015] OJ, L 123/55.
13 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13.
14 Ibid, art 14.2.

6

different principles that shape how the respective
contributions will be made, particularly “common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities” (CBDR-RC) under the UNFCCC and with
the addition of “in the light of the different national
circumstances” (CBDR-RCNC) in the Paris Agreement
on the one hand,15 and “no more favourable treatment”
(NMFT) under the IMO conventions16 and related
enforcement arrangements on the other hand.17

15 Ibid, art 2.2. The principle is discussed in more detail below in this report.
See also Yubing Shi, Climate Change and International Shipping: The
Regulatory Framework for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
(Leiden, Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2017) at 81.
16 See e.g. MARPOL, supra note 10, art 5(4).
17 NMFT is the basis of regional arrangements for port state control, i.e.:
Europe and the North Atlantic (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo
MoU); Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean
MoU); West and Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region
(Black Sea MoU); the Mediterranean (Mediterranean MoU); the Indian
Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU) and the Persian Gulf (Riyadh MoU). For links
to each MoU, see IMO, “Port State Control” (2017), online: IMO <www.
imo.org>. See also Shi, supra note 15 at 91.
18 Report of the MEPC on its 65th Session, IMO Doc 65/22 (24 May 2013)
at 44 [MEPC 65 Report].
19 Report of the First Meeting of the Intersessional Working Group on
Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG 1), IMO Doc MEPC
71/WP.5 (30 June 2017) [ISWG-GHG 1 Report]; Report of the Second
Meeting of the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG
Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG 2), Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc
MEPC 72/7 (3 November 2017) [ISWG-GHG 2 Report].
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in April 2018 and will be revised and adopted in
2023, in accordance with an agreed road map.20
This report’s ultimate focus on the legal aspects of the
expected contribution of the international shipping
industry necessitates comparative consideration of
initiatives at other levels. First, the experience in the
determination of contributions of other industries,
most especially civil aviation as another globalized
industry, may be informative. The parallel regime of
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
provides an opportunity to understand analogous
opportunities and constraints in determining the
international shipping industry’s contribution.
Second, the European Union’s efforts to regulate
GHG emissions at the regional level have pressured
the IMO to produce an effective strategy, failing
which there is the very real prospect of an EU
approach to reduce European-related shipping
emissions.21 Third, the prospect that the UN climate
regime will conclude, through its global stocktake
exercise, that the international shipping sector is
not making an adequate contribution to the global
effort, potentially warranting parties to the UNFCCC
and the Paris Agreement to engage more actively on
this issue, provides important context for the longterm work of the IMO. At the same time, there are
significant opportunities for cooperation between
international regimes, such as with the UN climate
regime on transparency, technology and MBMs.22
In exploring the constraints and opportunities in
determining the shipping industry’s contribution,
this report considers the principles and methods
of maritime regulation and explores the tools
and procedures available to the IMO. The IMO’s
mandate and traditional approach to maritime
regulation will be tested to their limits. The
report discusses the technical nature of maritime
regulation and considers legal pathways for
adopting an MBM measure, should it be needed.
20 Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, MEPC
Resolution MEPC.304(72) (13 April 2018) [Initial IMO Strategy]. For a
report on the debate that led to its adoption, see Report of the MEPC
on its 72nd Session, IMO Doc 72/17 (3 May 2018) [MEPC 72 Report],
33–45. The roadmap was adopted earlier at MEPC 70. Report of the
MEPC on its 70th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 70/18 (11 November 2016)
at 50–51 [MEPC 70 Report]; Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session,
IMO Doc MEPC 70/18/Add.1 (11 November 2016), annex 11.
21 For a study exploring possible EU unilateral action on GHGs from the
maritime sector on the basis of the sovereignty enjoyed by member states in
their ports, see Aoife O’Leary, David Holyoake & Marta Ballesteros, Legal
Implications of EU action on GHG Emissions from the International Maritime
Sector (ClientEarth, 2011), online: ClientEarth <www.documents.clientearth.
org/wp-content/uploads/library/2011-11-01-legal-implications-of-eu-actionon-ghg-emissions-from-the-international-maritime-sector-ce-en.pdf>.
22 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 6 (Market-based Mechanisms), 10
(Technology Mechanism), 14 (Global Stocktake).

The consideration of how the international shipping
industry’s fair contribution might be achieved
also calls into question the relationship between
multilateralism and unilateralism, including
regionalism, in law making. Maritime regulation
aspires to achieve global uniformity in state practice,
in contrast to the flexibility inherent in national
or regional approaches endorsed under the Paris
Agreement. Historically, maritime regulation has
experienced instances of unilateralism that at times
appeared to undermine global efforts at achieving
uniformity and at other times actually triggered the
eventual adoption of higher global standards.23 The
European Union’s position, albeit at the regional
level, will be important to consider in this respect.
This report starts by setting out the international
legal framework, with particular focus on the UN
climate regime, international law of the sea and
international maritime law on pollution prevention
from ships, and also considers legal issues with
respect to international trade law and EU regulation.
The latter two are considered only in general terms,
as they could potentially constitute separate lines
of inquiry in their own right and are not the focus of
this report. The report next addresses the challenge of
regulating GHG emissions from international shipping
by explaining the commercial and operational life of
the ship, implications of its mobility, consequential
global governance of the industry, how maritime
regulation works, IMO efforts in regulating GHG
emissions, and the range of actual and potential
measures for GHG regulation from ships that have
been considered to date. Discussion of lessons from
other sectors follows, in part to illustrate the efforts
undertaken in these sectors, and in part to explore
whether there are useful experiences for international
shipping to draw upon. Thereafter, the discussion
addresses the core purpose of the report, namely the
key issues for the determination of the “fair share” and
potential legal pathways, including the management
of uncertainty, prospective vision and timeline, role
of maritime regulation, potential role of market
measures, equity issues, compliance system, interregime consistency and complementarity, and IMO
leadership. The report concludes with observations
on general, policy and legal considerations for near
future and long-term work on the IMO strategy.

23 See Stuart Hetherington, “The Elusive Panacea of Uniformity: Is It Worth
Pursuing?” (Paper presented at the AMTAC Annual Address 2013,
Sydney, 18 September 2013), online: AMTAC <https://amtac.org.au/
publications-papers/>.
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THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
FRAMEWORK

Evolution of the UN Climate Regime
The origins of the international climate change regime can be traced
back to a series of United Nations General Assembly resolutions
adopted in the late 1980s. These resolutions resulted in the negotiation
of the UNFCCC, which was adopted at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, entered
into force in 1994 and established the architecture for subsequent
climate change agreements. The General Assembly resolutions also
resulted in the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) to give scientific and technical advice to
negotiators and policy makers. Since 1990, the IPCC has prepared
five comprehensive assessment reports on the state of the science
on climate change, each at critical junctures of the development
of the climate change regime as well as, on request, more focused
reports on issues ranging from land use change and forestry issues
to carbon capture and storage. The most recent synthesis report was
released in 2014 to inform the negotiation of the Paris Agreement.24
The UNFCCC continues to serve as the foundation and provides
important institutions, goals and principles for the climate regime.
The overall goal of the UNFCCC, described in article 2, is to stabilize
GHG concentrations at levels that prevent dangerous human
interference with the climate system, to ensure that the rate of
change allows nature to adapt, to not threaten food production
and to allow sustainable development to take place. This overall
goal is refined through additional principles set out in article 3,
including equity for present and future generations, CBDR-RC,
and the need to take precautionary measures to anticipate and
mitigate, prevent or minimize the effects of climate change.
The UNFCCC is the ultimate source of the mandate of the UN
climate regime over the GHG emissions from international shipping.
The foundations for this mandate include the goal in article 2, the
principles in article 3 and reference to efforts to reduce emissions
from transportation in article 4.1(c), in combination with the powers
24 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC 2014].
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of the COP set out in article 7. Key among these
powers is the general power to implement
measures to meet the article 2 goal and to more
broadly ensure the effective implementation of
the convention. The need to mobilize finance is
specifically referenced, providing the basis for
carbon levies and other economic measures. A
key potential limitation of the specific mandates
set out in article 7 is the focus on parties rather
than private actors, although measures directed
at private actors are not specifically excluded.
The first substantive agreement following the
UNFCCC was the Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in
1997.25 While the key principles of the international
climate change regime were accepted in 1997,
the rules for implementation took much longer
to develop. Most of these rules were finalized at
the Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP 7) in
November 2001 in Marrakech. The package of rules
required to implement the Kyoto Protocol was
then formally adopted at the first meeting of the
parties to the protocol in Montreal in 2005. Upon its
entry into force in 2005, the Kyoto Protocol became
the heart of the international climate change
regime. It established the first binding emissions
reduction targets for each of the “developed
countries” listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC for
2008 to 2012, the first commitment period.26
At the core of the Kyoto Protocol are the GHG
emissions reduction targets for developed states.
Each Annex I country was assigned a negotiated
combined emissions reduction target for the six
gases covered in the protocol. The target was
expressed relative to emissions in that state in
1990, and presented in tonnes of CO2 equivalent
emissions. This emissions reduction target was
then translated into emissions permits assigned to
each Annex I party for the five years of the 2008 to
2012 commitment period. These permits are called
assigned amount units, and are the foundation of
the emissions trading system under the protocol.
The flexibility mechanisms established in the
Kyoto Protocol are the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), Emissions Trading and Joint
25 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 148, 37 ILM 22 (entered into
force 16 February 2005) [Kyoto Protocol].
26 Joanna Depledge, “Chapter 2A: The Legal and Policy Framework of the
United Nations Climate Change Regime” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The
Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2017) 27; Meinhard Doelle, From Hot Air
to Action? Climate Change, Compliance and the Future of International
Environmental Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2005).
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Implementation. They were included in the
Kyoto Protocol, at least in part in recognition that
the state-specific targets for Annex I countries
provided only a crude tool for balancing the relative
responsibility, capacity and potential of parties to
the protocol to reduce emissions. In that respect,
the mechanisms provide a degree of flexibility to
ensure that if meeting one party’s target through
reductions turned out to be disproportionately
expensive or technically difficult to achieve, that
party had the option to delay reductions in its own
country and instead support reductions in another
country by using the flexibility mechanisms.
A further objective of one of the flexibility
mechanisms, the CDM, was to address capacity
concerns in developing countries (those not
listed in Annex I). Some developing countries
were in the process of making major capital
investments in energy-producing and consuming
technologies, and the flexibility mechanisms
reflected the parties’ recognition that there would
be significant long-term benefits to find ways
to influence the choices made by developing
countries at this stage of their development.
The dual purpose of the CDM, therefore, was to
offer Annex I parties a compliance alternative
where domestic emissions reduction has become
too expensive, while at the same time providing
developing countries with assistance in the
form of technology transfer to encourage a more
sustainable lower emissions development path.
The parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed that if
reductions could be achieved more cost effectively
in a developing country that has no reduction
target, that country should be able to join forces
with an Annex I party to achieve those reductions.
In return for providing this assistance, an Annex I
party would receive CDM credits that it could
apply toward its emissions reduction targets.
The form of assistance was left somewhat open,
but to receive the credits the Annex I party had
to demonstrate that the emissions reductions
achieved were additional to those that would
have been achieved if the assistance had not
been granted. The term used to describe this
requirement is “additionality.” It means that the
assistance provided in return for the credits must
enable the reductions. The assistance will usually
take the form of financial support through the
purchase of the CDM credits. It could, however,
take the form of providing access to technologies in
return for CDM credits, or the transfer of expertise
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needed to implement a CDM project. The Kyoto
Protocol’s Emission Trading system establishes the
rules under which the various forms of emission
credits or units created under the protocol can
be traded, taken out of circulation, used for
compliance or saved. Through emissions trading,
Annex I parties can make use, in meeting their
emissions targets, of credits or units held by other
Annex I parties, or generated under the CDM.27
Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol were
designed to ensure that decisions about compliance
and the use of the mechanisms are based on
accurate, reliable and consistent information from
all parties. To this end, article 5 requires Annex I
parties to put in place a system for national
emissions estimations on an annual basis in
accordance with agreed-upon methodologies.
Parties are required under article 5 to include
emissions from domestic shipping in their national
systems, but not those from international shipping.
Article 5 allows for adjustments to be made to the
emissions estimation if approved methodologies
are not followed. Article 7 requires parties to use
those national systems to report annually on
emissions by source and removal by sink, again in
accordance with approved methodologies. Article
8 provides for review, verification and adjustment
of the information provided by expert review
teams to ensure that parties’ annual reporting on
emissions and carbon sinks is accurate, consistent
and complies with the agreed-upon methodologies.
The Kyoto compliance system is unique among
compliance systems for multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs). On the one hand, it built
on a long tradition among MEAs to facilitate
compliance through capacity building, dialogue
and transparency. On the other hand, it recognized
the need for strong and consistent enforcement
to establish a carbon market and to ensure that
parties will make the investment needed to meet
their emissions reduction targets. The result was a
compliance system that seeks to facilitate and to
enforce, using parallel processes where required.
This meant that compliance issues that are deemed
important for the functioning of the trading system

27 There has been much criticism of the environmental integrity of the
CDM, with a recent study by the Institute for Applied Ecology in Berlin
suggesting that most of the credits granted were for projects that
would have proceeded without the support from the CDM mechanism.
See Martin Cames et al, How Additional is the Clean Development
Mechanism? (Corvallis, Oregon: Institute for Applied Ecology, 2016),
online: IAE <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/docs/
clean_dev_mechanism_en.pdf>.

are subject to enforcement and facilitation, whereas
matters not considered critical for the carbon
market are subject only to facilitation. Facilitation
and enforcement are carried out by separate
branches of the compliance committee. Only the
enforcement branch can impose penalties.28
Decision 2/CP adopted by the Third UNFCCC
Conference of the Parties alongside the decision
adopting the Kyoto Protocol, requests further
elaboration on the inclusion of emissions from
international shipping to individual parties.
However, parties have not yet agreed on this
elaboration. In parallel, article 2.2 of the Kyoto
Protocol requests Annex I parties to pursue
limitation or reduction of emissions from that
sector, working through the IMO. No elaboration
on the inclusion of emissions from international
shipping to individual parties was included in the
Kyoto rulebook, nor agreed under in negotiations
on the implementation of the first commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol. This resolution
followed an effort to include international shipping
within the emissions reduction commitments
parties agreed to take on under the protocol.29
The effort to include international shipping had
been initiated with a UNFCCC Secretariat report
that identified eight options, which were then
reduced to five options through deliberations by
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice (SBSTA).30 The five options selected by the
SBSTA included the “no allocation” option, as well
as allocation to the state where the bunker fuel
is sold, allocation to the state of registration or
ownership of the vessel, allocation to the state of
origin or destination of the vessel, and allocation
to the state of origin or destination of the cargo or
passengers.31 No options have been selected from
these five, and all remain open for adoption in the
future. Addressing the emissions from this growing
sector remained important for the achievement
of the ultimate objectives of the UNFCCC, and
28 See Meinhard Doelle, “Early Experience with the Kyoto Compliance
System: Possible Lessons for MEA Compliance System Design” (2010)
1 Climate L 237. See also Jutta Brunnee, Meinhard Doelle & Lavanya
Rajamani, Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Change Regime
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
29 The implication of the reference to the IMO in article 2.2 has been the
subject of considerable debate within the climate regime as well as the
IMO. For an overview, see Shi, supra note 15 at 94.
30 Methodological Issues, Decision 4/CP.1, Report of the Conference of the
Parties on its First Session, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (7 April
1995), art 1(f) at 16.
31 See Sebastian Oberthür, “Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse
Gas Emissions from International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto
Protocol“ (2003) 3:3 Climate Pol’y 191 at 193.
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therefore resurfaced once the attention of parties to
the UNFCCC turned to the post-2012 negotiations.

ensure that collective long-term goals are met. This
section offers a brief overview of these elements.

Informal efforts to start negotiations on the post2012 regime commenced once the rulebook for
the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol was
negotiated in 2001. By 2002 in New Delhi, the
European Union started to focus on post-2012
negotiations. However, the United States was not
willing to allow a formal negotiating process to be
started and the developing world was unwilling
to discuss emissions reductions outside the
developed world because, in its view, Australia,
Europe, Japan, New Zealand and North America
had failed to lead by example, and insufficient
progress had been made on adaptation.32

The first of the key elements of the Paris Agreement
is its set of long-term goals. The objective of keeping
global average temperature increase to “well
below” 2°C, and the aspiration to limit this increase
to 1.5°C, are at the heart of the Paris Agreement.35
The temperature goal is supplemented with a
commitment to ensure emissions peak as soon
as possible, and to reach a balance of emissions
removals in the second half of the century.
Arguably, 1.5°C has now become the ultimate
standard against which the success of collective
mitigation efforts under the UNFCCC will be
measured, and it seems likely that 1.5°C scenarios
being explored by the IPCC will conclude that
GHG emission neutrality will have to be reached
before 2050.36 This ambitious set of long-term goals
provides an important foundation for each state’s
future nationally determined contributions (NDCs),
their justification on the grounds of equity, and the
five-year cycles of NDC communication and the
global stocktake. Over time, as the IPCC completes
its scenario work, the “well below 2°C” and “1.5°C”
goals can be expected to shape further discussions
on elements of the long-term ambition, such as
specific time frames for the expressed need for
global emissions to peak as soon as possible and
for reaching a balance of emissions and removals.37

Negotiations for the post-2012 regime did not
formally proceed until the Eleventh Conference of
the Parties/First Meeting of the Parties (MOP 1) in
December 2005 in Montreal. It took a decade for
these negotiations to be concluded successfully
in Paris in December 2015. Emissions from
international shipping and aviation remained
on the agenda throughout these negotiations.
Efforts to bring international shipping under the
UNFCCC initially took place under the Bali Action
Plan (2007–2012), and then under the Durban
Platform (2012–2015) that provided the basis for
negotiating the Paris Agreement.33 It is worth noting
that the Bali Action Plan specifically provided
for international transport under Cooperative
Sectoral Approaches, the only item under the
plan that resulted in no agreed outcome.34

The Paris Agreement
The key elements of the approach to climate
mitigation in the Paris Agreement consist of
collective long-term goals, accompanied by a
number of elements: nationally determined
mitigation efforts; five-year review cycles of
progress in implementing individual efforts toward
the collective goals; and a commitment to increase
ambition as part of the five-year review cycles to

The long-term temperature goal also provides
important context for other key elements of
the Paris Agreement, in particular, adaptation
and finance.38 Meeting the long-term goal is an
essential pre-condition for successful adaptation
efforts, and finance, in turn, is critical for meeting
both the mitigation and adaptation goals of the
Paris Agreement. Important connections are
made to poverty eradication and sustainable
development. Through the process to be
designed for the global stocktake under article
14, the long-term goal articulated in article 2 is

35 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 2.1.
32 Meinhard Doelle, “The Cat Came Back, or the Nine Lives of the Kyoto
Protocol“ (2006) 16 J Envtl L & Prac 261.
33 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the
Parties on its Thirteenth Session, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14
March 2008) at para 1b(iv) [Bali Action Plan].
34 Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, Decisions 1-10/
CP.18, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighteenth Session,
held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012, UN Doc FCCC/
CP/2012/8/Add.1 (28 February 2013).
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36 Andreas Fischlin, “Chapter 1A: Background and Role of Science” in Klein
et al, supra note 26 at 3. For updates on progress on the IPCC Special
Report on Global Warming of 1.5ºC, online: IPCC <www.ipcc.ch>.
37 Halldór Thorgeirsson, “Chapter 7: Objective (Article 2.1)” in Klein et al,
supra note 26 at 123.
38 Irene Suárez Pérez & Angela Churie Kallhauge, “Chapter 12:
Adaptation” in Klein et al, supra note 26 at 196; Jorge Gastelumendi
& Inka Gnittke, “Chapter 14: Climate Finance (Article 9)” in Klein et al,
supra note 26 at 239.
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expected to become the ultimate guide for the
implementation of the Paris Agreement.39
The starting point for mitigation in the Paris
Agreement is the overall mitigation effort, largely
represented by the individual NDCs measured
against the long-term temperature goal, but
supplemented by efforts outside the UN climate
regime, such as efforts of the IMO and ICAO, and
initiatives under the ozone regime to eliminate
the use of HFCs.40 Parties recognized in Paris that
the initial NDCs would not add up to an adequate
collective effort in light of the long-term goal.
NDCs are therefore to be strengthened, informed
in 2018 by the Talanoa Dialogue (a facilitative
dialogue under the UNFCCC on ways to increase
ambition),41 and then every five years starting in
2025, following a global stocktaking exercise carried
out two years before each updated NDC is due.42
The Paris Agreement offers important guidance
on how parties are to determine the adequacy
of their NDCs with respect to mitigation.43
Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement provides
that parties will aim to reach global peaking of
emissions as soon as possible, and to undertake
rapid reductions thereafter based on science and
equity. Parties recognize that it will take longer
for developing country emissions to peak, putting
pressure on developed countries to accelerate their
emissions reductions to achieve a global peaking as
soon as possible. Parties are to achieve a collective
balance between emissions and removals of GHG
from the atmosphere in the second half of the
century, suggesting that GHG concentrations should
stabilize and start to decline some time after 2050.44
These provisions offer some clarity on the scale
and allocation of mitigation efforts, and create a

39 Jürgen Friedrich, “Chapter 19: Global Stocktake (Article 14)” in Klein et
al, supra note 26 at 319.
40 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Hydro Fluorocarbons,
15 October 2016 (not in force), online: Montreal Protocol <http://conf.
montreal-protocol.org/meeting/mop/mop- 28/crps/SitePages/Home.
aspx>.
41 Established by COP 23 in November 2017, the Talanoa Dialogue now has
an active online platform that enables submission of inputs by parties and
stakeholders. “Talanoa Dialogue”, online: UNFCCC <talanoadialogue.
com>. The Talanoa Dialogue is intended to encourage parties to increase
the ambition of their 2020 mitigation and finance commitments and to
increase ambition more generally, and is expected to serve as a dry run
for the first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement in 2023.
42 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, refers to highest ambition and the need
for progression (art 4.3), and new NDCs every five years (art 4.9)
informed by the global stocktake (arts 4.9, 14).
43 Harald Winkler, “Chapter 9: Mitigation (Article 4)” in Klein et al, supra
note 26 at 141.
44 Ibid.

number of procedural obligations, but they provide
neither a method for determining appropriate
NDCs for individual parties nor a legal obligation
to fully implement NDCs and meet targets. It
is noteworthy that the long-term mitigation
goals are framed in technology-neutral language
and thereby leave open how much specific
technologies, from renewable energy to carbon
capture and storage and the enhancement of sinks,
should contribute to the effort. The additional
guidance for parties on what is expected of them
takes on added significance as the Paris outcome
explicitly recognizes that there is an ambition
gap between commitments made by parties to
date and the long-term goal. The ambition gap
is quantified in Decision 1/CP.21 to be upward of
15 gigatonnes by 2030, based on the 2°C goal.45
The Paris Agreement affirms the importance of
the enhancement and conservation of sinks, and
specifically mentions forests in this context.46 The
agreement confirms that international emissions
trading and other market mechanisms are
acceptable tools for parties to meet their emissions
reduction goals, as long as they increase the level
of ambition.47 The agreement sets out general
principles for the use of market mechanisms,
such as the avoidance of double-counting,
environmental integrity, robust accounting and
transparency. The Paris Agreement also makes
provision for non-market approaches to assist
parties with the implementation of their NDCs.
Detailed rules for these various mechanisms
will have to be established before a thorough
assessment of their environmental integrity
and their potential to contribute to the ultimate
objective of the Paris Agreement can be carried
out. These provisions of the agreement offer
possible tools for addressing GHG emissions from
international shipping, should the results of the
Talanoa Dialogue or the global stocktake under
article 14 lead parties to conclude that insufficient
progress on this issue through the efforts of the
IMO risks undermining the goals of the Paris
Agreement. They also offer important avenues
for collaboration between the UN climate regime

45 Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 1/CP.21,
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-first Session, held
in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, Addendum, UN Doc
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016) at para 17 [Decision 1/
CP.21].
46 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 5.
47 Ibid, art 6.
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and the IMO, such as on transparency, technology
and implementation of an MBM for the sector.48
The transparency rules apply to all parties,
with some modest differentiation, mainly
through a commitment to flexibility and support
for developing countries. For all parties, the
information they submit will be subject to a
technical expert review and a multilateral,
facilitative consideration of progress. Importantly,
flexibility with respect to transparency is
specifically linked to capacity, not to the broader
concept of CBDR-RC. Special accommodations are
included for the LDCs and SIDS.49 Transparency
is a focus of capacity-building efforts under the
Paris Agreement, a signal that developed state
parties are motivated to help build capacity
in developing countries in order to minimize
differentiation on transparency.50 This signal to
a nuanced approach to differentiation should
facilitate discussions under the IMO to resolve
the relationship between CBDR and NMFT.51
The Paris Agreement signals the intention to build
on and enhance transparency arrangements under
the UNFCCC, including national communications,
biennial reports and update reports, international
assessment and review and international
consultation and analysis.52 It specifically calls for
more regular and comprehensive reporting, a more
harmonized verification process,53 and common
modalities, procedures and guidelines.54 The Paris
Agreement offers a surprising level of detail on
accounting and reporting in the 15 paragraphs
of article 13. This is further supplemented with
specific references to transparency in key
provisions on mitigation, adaptation, finance
and capacity building.55 Detailed rules are
currently being negotiated. It is unclear at
this point whether the transparency rules will
include any obligation to report on emissions
from the international shipping sector beyond
48 Andrew Howard, “Chapter 11: Voluntary Cooperation (Article 6)” in
Klein et al, supra note 26 at 178.
49 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 13.7–13.10; Decision 1/CP.21, supra
note 45 at paras 89–90.
50 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 11, 13.15; Decision 1/CP.21, supra
note 45 at paras 84–88.
51 Yamide Dagnet & Kelly Levin, “Chapter 18: Transparency (Article 13)” in
Klein et al, supra note 26 at 301.
52 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 13.4.

The establishment of a five-year review and
ambition cycle, including the Talanoa Dialogue in
2018 and the global stocktake process starting in
2023, constitute another core element of the overall
effort to ensure the goals of the Paris Agreement
are met through the collective efforts of parties
in cooperation with other regimes. The global
stocktake set out in article 14 covers mitigation,
adaptation, means of implementation and support.
The first global stocktake is to take place in 2023,
in time for the revision of parties’ NDCs by 2025.
The goal of the global stocktake is to enhance both
national action and international cooperation,
a clear signal that international shipping will
be an area of focus for the global stocktake. The
Talanoa Dialogue, an initial stocktaking process
among parties, originally called the “facilitative
dialogue,” is scheduled for 2018 and will serve
as a first experiment with this review and
ambition cycle under the Paris Agreement.56
The compliance mechanism is to be facilitative,
non-adversarial and non-punitive in nature,
and applies to all parties.57 The compliance
committee is to consist of 12 members with
relevant technical expertise, with membership
determined in a manner similar to the facilitative
branch of the compliance committee under
the Kyoto Protocol.58 The committee is directed
to be sensitive to national capabilities and
circumstances of parties in carrying out its work.59
The transparency provisions with respect to parties’
implementation of their NDCs, in combination
with the global stocktake and the compliance
system, are at the heart of the process put in place
under the Paris Agreement to ensure progression
of individual and collective ambition toward
the long-term goal. The basic elements are in
place in the form of articles 13 to 15, and they
appear sound. However, the detailed rules have

56 Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45 at para 20. See also Friedrich, supra
note 39.
57 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 15.

54 Ibid, art 13.13.

58 Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45 at para 102. Interestingly, there is no
reference back to the detailed rules of procedure developed for the
Compliance Committee under the Kyoto Protocol.

55 Ibid, arts 4.8, 4.13, 6.2, 7.5, 9.7, 11.1. Transparency is referenced
throughout Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45; Dagnet & Levin, supra note
51.

59 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 15.2. See also Yamide Dagnet &
Eliza Northrop, “Chapter 20: Facilitating Implementation and Promoting
Compliance (Article 15)” in Klein et al, supra note 26 at 301.

53 Through a technical expert review; see ibid, arts 13.11–13.12.
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the current guidelines for preparing national
inventories. Parties, of course, are free to include
international shipping in their NDCs in some form
and can report on emissions from the sector.
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yet to be finalized. Furthermore, the success
of the transparency, review, stocktaking and
compliance approach in the Paris Agreement
in increasing ambition sufficiently to meet the
long-term goal will ultimately depend on many
factors outside the purview of the new climate
regime, most notably the economic, political
and social circumstances in key state parties.

SIDS and countries in Africa heavily
reliant on tourism and international
transport of traded goods.61

The Paris Agreement does not repeat the call in
the Kyoto Protocol for parties to work through the
IMO to address GHG emissions from international
shipping. The legal status of the Kyoto Protocol,
and with it the status of article 2.2, are unclear at
this time. This raises interesting questions about
the potential impact for the mandate of the IMO
in case of the formal and complete replacement
of the Kyoto Protocol with the Paris Agreement.
Furthermore, it is important to point out that the
draft negotiating text of the Paris Agreement did
include proposals from some parties for specific
reference to international shipping and aviation.
The draft text included the following options:
23bis. [In meeting the 2˚C objective,
Parties agree on the need for global
sectoral emission reduction targets for
international aviation and maritime
transport and on the need for all Parties
to work through the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
International Maritime Organization
(IMO) to develop global policy
frameworks to achieve these targets].60
…
47.5 Option (a):
…
b. Encourage the International
Civil Aviation Organization and the
International Maritime Organization to
develop a levy scheme to provide financial
support for the Adaptation Fund.

These proposals were not included in the
final version of the Paris Agreement. For now,
international shipping has not been included
in the emissions reduction commitments of
parties in the form of their NDCs. There has also
been no change in the emissions that parties
have to account for under the Kyoto Protocol.
Reporting obligations under the Paris Agreement
are still being negotiated. Of course, as indicated
above, there is nothing in the Paris Agreement
to prevent a party from reporting on emissions
from international shipping, or from including
international shipping in some form in its NDC.
While the Paris Agreement does not mention
emissions from international shipping, and the
IMO is continuing its efforts to develop a strategy
to address them, the absence of any reference to
this mandate in the agreement has the potential
to strengthen the hand of the UN climate regime
going forward. If it had made specific reference to
the IMO, the result may have been to discourage
parties to the UN climate regime from taking
responsibility for these emissions. Because the
Paris Agreement is silent on the efforts of the IMO,
the extent to which the UN climate regime can be
taken to have endorsed the mandate of the IMO or
to have delegated the issue to it remains uncertain.
This may also affect the relevance of CBDR in
the IMO’s efforts to regulate emissions from the
sector.62 In practice, and for practical purposes,
the IMO is using its treaty mandate to lead the
shipping industry’s efforts and it has reported to
the UNFCCC process and structures. What is clear
is that the UN climate regime will continue to
monitor progress as part of the Talanoa Dialogue
in 2018, and the global stocktake under the Paris
Agreement thereafter. Pressure to act will remain
on parties to the UN climate regime, who are also
IMO member states, in case of inadequate progress
at the IMO as it continues work on the strategy.
So what avenues are there in the Paris Agreement
to become more actively involved in efforts to
reduce emissions from international shipping
and aviation? Most importantly, perhaps,
unlike the Kyoto Protocol with its focus on
the emissions of developed country (Annex I)

c. In establishing the levy scheme, ICAO
and IMO are encouraged to take into
consideration the needs of developing
countries, particularly the LDCs,

60 Outcomes of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences held in
Lima in December 2014 and in Geneva in February 2015, Note by the
Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 68/5 (18 February 2015) at 3.

61 Ibid at 4.
62 See Shi, supra note 15 at 94.
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parties, the overall focus of the Paris Agreement
is on global emissions and a global temperature
goal of “well below” 2°C while striving for 1.5°C.
Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement refers to all
emissions and does not exclude emissions from
international shipping. Article 4(4) refers to
developed countries “undertaking economywide absolute emission reduction targets.”
The expectation is that both the Talanoa Dialogue
and the global stocktake under article 14 (including
the science input from the IPCC) will include
emissions from international shipping. In addition,
the issue remains on the agenda of the SBSTA,
the subsidiary body of the UN climate regime
mandated to provide information and advice on
scientific and technological matters. This provides
the possibility, if all else fails, of revisiting, and
taking a decision on the five options identified by
the SBSTA in the lead-up to Kyoto, and thereby
clarifying and standardizing the allocation of
emissions from international shipping to parties.
Finally, article 6, dealing with market and nonmarket mechanisms, may provide avenues for
measures under the Paris Agreement to address
emissions from international shipping.63
All this means that, at a minimum of every five
years, starting in 2018 with the Talanoa Dialogue,
and in 2023 in the form of the global stocktake
under the Paris Agreement, parties should receive
reports on emissions from international shipping
as part of the overall exercise to determine progress
toward the temperature goal. In cases where parties
are meeting or exceeding their individual mitigation
commitments, but the collective effort continues to
fall short due in part to insufficient efforts to reduce
emissions from international shipping, the pressure
for the UN climate regime, or parties thereto, to
take charge of these emissions will be immense.
A critical element in ensuring the international
shipping sector will do its part will be full
transparency. One option would be for the IMO,
or state parties as part of their NDC submissions,
to report on emissions from these sectors as part
of the Talanoa Dialogue and the global stocktake.
Equally important will be reporting on efforts
63 As discussed below in the section entitled “Determination of the
International Shipping Industry’s ‘Fair Share’ and Potential Legal
Pathways,” the potential under article 6 of the Paris Agreement is, of
course, not limited to situations where the parties to the UN climate
regime conclude that efforts by the IMO are inadequate. There is every
opportunity for a cooperative approach, certainly with respect to MBMs
under article 6, technology under article 10, transparency under article
13 and the global stocktake under article 14.
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and targets going forward, and consistency of
methodologies for estimating and reporting on
emissions from shipping between the IMO and the
UNFCCC. For the Talanoa Dialogue, a particularly
important question will be the contribution of
the sector to closing the 2030 emissions gap. Of
course, individual parties can also be asked to
report on emissions from these sectors in their
inventories under article 13. Either way, it will be
critical that accurate and consistent information
about emissions trajectories in the international
shipping sector be made available every five
years starting in 2018. Ideally, this would lead to
an assessment of the approaches that have been
implemented, which have been effective and
which have not. This will allow parties to the UN
climate regime to determine, in the context of
the overall five-year review and stocktake cycles,
whether adequate efforts are being made outside
the regime (or collaboratively), or whether it is
time to take additional measures either within the
UN climate regime or collaboratively between the
UN climate regime and the IMO. In practice, since
parties to the climate regime and IMO member
states are the same actors, consistency should be
expected. In addition, as discussions on sources
of funding for climate mitigation, adaptation
and loss and damage continue under the UN
climate regime, the idea of imposing a levy on
emissions from international transport is likely to
continue to surface in the climate negotiations.64
In short, the effort to influence, control and
eventually eliminate GHG emissions from
international shipping and aviation within the
climate regime or in coordination with it is far
from over. Full transparency during the review
and stocktake cycles will be critical to ensure
these sectors contribute their fair share to the
global effort. Since states are parties to both the
climate and maritime regimes, they would benefit
from exploring opportunities for consistency and
cooperation, including the possibility to utilize
institutions and instruments under the Paris
Agreement for market mechanisms, finance and
technology to help with speedy and effective
implementation of measures negotiated under
the IMO process. In the short and medium term,
until technology breakthroughs point to a clear
zero-emissions path for shipping and aviation,

64 The sharing of proceeds under article 6, for international transfers of
emissions obligations, provides a sound basis for implementing such a
levy.
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these sectors may need to take further efficiency
measures, take measures to accelerate technology
breakthroughs, or both, to make a fair contribution
to the global effort. A more controversial option
would be to fund emissions reductions outside
the international shipping sector in some
form. Aviation has taken tentative steps in the
latter direction. In the long term, the science is
clear that meeting the temperature goal set in
Paris will require a “balance of emissions and
removals,” and very likely significant net negative
emissions, making anything short of a zeroemissions solution for these sectors untenable.65

The LOSC
With 168 state parties66 at the time of writing and as
the “constitution for the oceans,”67 the LOSC plays
an important role in providing the jurisdictional
framework applicable to international shipping
and substantive rules for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment. In Part
XII of the Convention, article 192 establishes a
generic duty for all states to protect and preserve
the marine environment.68 In a recent Annex VII
arbitration under the LOSC, it was held that the
“obligations in Part XII apply to all States with
respect to the marine environment in all maritime
areas, both inside the national jurisdiction of States
and beyond it.”69 Article 192 concerns “the positive
obligation to take active measures to protect and
preserve the marine environment, and by logical
implication, entails the negative obligation not to
degrade the marine environment.”70 The tribunal
observed that there is a body of international
environmental law that informs article 192 and
it is generally to the effect that states should
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and
control should respect the environment within
their jurisdiction and beyond. Consequently,

states have a positive duty to prevent or at least
mitigate environmental harm. As an integral part
of the corpus of international environmental
law, the Paris Agreement serves to inform the
content of article 192. The consequence is that the
positive duty concerning atmospheric emissions
is not territorially bound and applies equally to
all states with respect to the airspace under their
sovereignty and to their ships in any location.
More specifically with respect to shipping, the LOSC
stipulates a duty to take measures to minimize
pollution from vessels.71 It further provides for all
states to “adopt laws and regulations to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from or through the atmosphere,
applicable to the air space under their sovereignty
and to vessels flying their flag or vessels,” bearing
in mind “internationally agreed rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures.”72 This
duty extends to taking other necessary measures
“to prevent, reduce and control such pollution.”73
For these purposes, states are encouraged “to
establish global and regional rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures to prevent,
reduce and control such pollution” through the IMO
or diplomatic conference.74 LOSC state parties have
performed these responsibilities through the IMO
with the adoption of MARPOL Annex VI in 1997 and
its numerous amendments, as discussed below.
The extent to which and the manner in
which state parties may regulate and enforce
atmospheric pollution from ships is subject
to the jurisdictional provisions in the LOSC.
The flag state has primary jurisdiction over its
ships, irrespective of location, and on the high
seas that jurisdiction is exclusive, with very
few exceptions.75 The flag state’s jurisdictional
rights are subject to the duty to exercise effective
jurisdiction and control over its ships76 and to
ensure compliance by its ships with applicable
international rules and standards adopted by the

65 IPCC 2014, supra note 24.
66 UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological
Lists of Ratifications, Accessions and Successions (3 April 2018),
online: <www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_
ratifications.htm>.
67 “A Constitution for the Oceans”, Remarks by Tommy B Koh, President of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in The Law
of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United
Nations, 1983) at xxxiii, online: <www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf>.
68 LOSC, supra note 9, art 192.
69 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, The Philippines v
People’s Republic of China, Award, 12 July 2016, PCA Case No 2013-19
at para 940.
70 Ibid at para 941.

71 LOSC, supra note 9, art 194.3(b).
72 Ibid, art 212.1.
73 Ibid, art 212.2.
74 Ibid, art 212.3.
75 For example, the duty to cooperate for the suppression of piracy on the
high seas; ibid, art 100.
76 Ibid, art 94.1. Under article 94.5, the flag state also has to act in
conformity with “generally accepted international regulations, procedures
and practices” and it is “to take any steps which may be necessary to
secure their observance.”
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IMO for the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution of the marine environment.77
Coastal states enjoy limited jurisdiction over
foreign ships as they exercise their navigation rights
in accordance with the LOSC. In the territorial sea,
they may adopt laws and regulations with respect
to the exercise of innocent passage, including for
“the preservation of the environment of the coastal
state and the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution thereof.”78 In theory, this legislative
power could apply to atmospheric emissions from
ships. However, “[S]uch laws and regulations shall
not apply to the design, construction, manning or
equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving
effect to generally accepted international rules
or standards.”79 The logical consequence is that
unilateral rules and standards on atmospheric
emissions inconsistent with MARPOL Annex VI
may not be legislated and enforced. The coastal
state has a duty not to hamper navigation by
imposing requirements on foreign ships “which
have the practical effect of denying or impairing
the right of innocent passage.”80 In turn, foreign
ships exercising innocent passage have a duty
to comply with coastal state laws.81 Passage that
involves “any act of wilful and serious pollution
contrary to this Convention” is not innocent and
is “considered to be prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State,”82
potentially entailing enforcement consequences.83
An analogous regime applies to passage in
archipelagic waters in the absence of archipelagic
sea lanes.84 Where archipelagic sea lanes are
established through the IMO, foreign ships are
required to observe the sea lanes and routeing
measures that are adopted for that purpose.85
During transit passage through straits used for
international navigation, the coastal state enjoys
less jurisdiction over foreign ships. The power to
legislate is limited to “the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution, by giving effect to applicable
international regulations regarding the discharge
of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances

in the strait.”86 Atmospheric emissions from ships
could be characterized as noxious substances
because of their environmental and public health
impacts. Foreign ships are expected to comply with
such laws.87 A separate provision requires foreign
ships to observe the broader duty to “comply
with generally accepted international regulations,
procedures and practices for the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution from ships.”88
In general, port entry is a privilege, not a right,89
and when a vessel enters into port voluntarily,
it is implicitly submitting itself to local law
and jurisdiction. In turn, the port state, which
enjoys sovereignty over its internal waters
(including port waters), has the sovereign right
to exercise jurisdiction and enforce its laws and
regulations.90 Under the Convention and Statute
on the International Regime of Maritime Ports,
1923,91 state parties undertake to grant access to
the ships of other state parties to the ports under
their sovereign authority on the basis of reciprocity
and equality of treatment, including dues and
charges of all kinds.92 And under the Convention
on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic,
1967,93 state parties have further committed to
adopt “all appropriate measures to facilitate
and expedite international maritime traffic and
to prevent unnecessary delays to ships and to
persons and property on board.”94 State parties
“undertake to co-operate in securing the highest
practicable degree of uniformity in formalities,
documentary requirements and procedures
in all matters in which such uniformity will
facilitate and improve international maritime
traffic and keep to a minimum any alterations
in formalities, documentary requirements and
procedures necessary to meet special requirements
of a domestic nature”95 and for this purpose to
cooperate through the IMO.96 As will be seen
below, port states play an important role in the
86 Ibid, art 42.1(b).
87 Ibid, art 42.4.
88 Ibid, art 39.2(b).
89 AV Lowe, “The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law”
(1977) 14 San Diego L Rev 597.

77 Ibid, art 217.1.
78 Ibid, arts 21.1(f), 211.4.

90 LOSC, supra note 9, art 2.

79 Ibid, art 21.2.
80 Ibid, art 24.1(a).

91 Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, 9
December 1923, 58 LNTS 285 (entered into force 2 December 1926).

81 Ibid, art 21.4.

92 Ibid, art 2.

82 Ibid, arts 19.1, 19.2(h).

93 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 9 April 1965,
591 UNTS 265 (entered into force 5 March 1967).

83 “The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to
prevent passage which is not innocent.” Ibid, art 25.1.
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94 Ibid, art I.

84 Ibid, art 52.

95 Ibid, art III.

85 Ibid, art 53.11.

96 Ibid, art IV.
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enforcement of air pollution rules under MARPOL
Annex VI. A port inspection regime has been
designed for this purpose through the IMO. Further,
under the LOSC, port states have an important role
in assisting a coastal state to pursue proceedings
against a foreign ship within whose jurisdiction it
may have discharged pollutants into the marine
environment, including atmospheric emissions.97
The enforcement of atmospheric pollution from
ships is couched as a duty for all states “within the
air space under their sovereignty” (i.e., internal
waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters)
and for flag states with respect to their ships on
the basis of the international rules and standards
for such pollution adopted through the IMO.98
States have a duty to adopt laws and regulations
and take other measures necessary to implement
the IMO rules.99 The performance of this duty
is effected through the implementation and
enforcement of MARPOL Annex VI, an optional
annex. By and large, and considering some textual
ambiguities or inconsistencies, the jurisdictional
and substantive atmospheric pollution
provisions described above are complementary
to the development of the MARPOL Annex VI
regime with respect to GHG emissions.100

The International Convention
for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships
The International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as amended by and
incorporated in the protocol of 1978 (MARPOL),101
is the most important international maritime
convention for the prevention of vessel-source
pollution. MARPOL consists of a framework
convention, as amended by the protocol of
1978, and six annexes, the first two of which are
mandatory, while the rest are optional. There
are 155 state parties to the convention proper
and mandatory annexes (oil pollution; noxious
liquid substances in bulk), representing 99.14

percent of global tonnage.102 Optional annexes III
(harmful substances carried in packaged form),
IV (sewage), and V (garbage) also enjoy high
subscription levels.103 Annex VI was introduced
into MARPOL through the protocol of 1997.104
Although optional, Annex VI has 88 state parties
representing 96.16 percent of global tonnage. Annex
VI is the regulatory vehicle for GHG emissions
from international shipping. In principle, states
that are not parties to Annex VI are under no legal
obligation to implement and enforce those rules.
The technical regulation of shipping in MARPOL
occurs in the annexes, as well as ancillary codes
(which may be mandatory or voluntary) and
guidelines. The implementation and enforcement
of MARPOL standards is a responsibility of all
state parties. In addition to the jurisdiction of
the flag state, port states play an important role
in enforcing MARPOL as guided by the NMFT
principle that guides inspections of all ships,
irrespective of flag and irrespective of whether
the inspected ship is flagged in a MARPOL state
party or not. Thus, although a state may not be
under a legal Annex VI obligation because it is
not a party to that instrument, in practice the
owners of ships registered in that state have
to consider that Annex VI standards would
still be applied to their ships while trading in a
foreign port where Annex VI is applicable law.
MARPOL is a key convention enforced in regional
memoranda of agreement on port state control
between national maritime administrations.
With adoption facilitated by the IMO, these
regional agreements are potentially vital for the
enforcement of GHG regulations under Annex
VI. Ships voluntarily calling into a MARPOL state
party port or anchorage are inspected regularly
for compliance with the international rules and
standards of selected maritime conventions,

102 IMO, “Status of Treaties” (13 September 2017), online: IMO <www.imo.
org> [IMO, “Status of Treaties”].

97 LOSC, supra note 9, art 218.
98 Ibid, art 222, with reference to the international rules and standards
adopted by the IMO under art 212.3.

103 The number of state parties and representation of global tonnage are as
follows: Annex III – 147/98.54 percent; Annex IV – 141/96.28 percent;
Annex V – 152/98.72 percent. Ibid.

99 Ibid, art 222.
100 See Shi, supra note 15 at 288.
101 MARPOL, supra note 10. Annexes I and II entered into force on the same
date as the convention. The other annexes entered into force on different
dates as described in table 2.

104 Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of
1978 relating thereto, 26 September 1997, Can TS 2010 no 14 (entered
into force 19 May 2005) [Protocol of 1997].
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including MARPOL.105 Inspectors make note of
and report deficiencies and the ensuing sanction
could be a reprimand, a requirement to rectify the
deficiency and, in the case of serious deficiencies,
can include port detention until the deficiency is
rectified. Occasionally, a ship may be permitted
to embark on a restricted voyage to another
port to rectify the deficiency. Port detention is
a powerful incentive for ships to comply with
international standards. Port detentions can be
very costly for any shipowner or charterer, as
it could entail loss of charter days, loss of lay
time potentially incurring demurrage charges
(liquidated damages as a penalty), additional
berth costs and late delivery of cargo in violation
of applicable just-in-time delivery terms.
In actuality MARPOL is not solely focused on the
prevention of pollution of the marine environment.
The definition of “harmful substances”
includes “any substance subject to control by
the present Convention,”106 and “discharge”
includes “emitting,”107 thus including Annex
VI emissions. Annex VI addresses air pollution
through emissions of ozone-depleting substances,
sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx),
volatile organic compounds, particulate matter
and shipboard incineration.108 Relevant to the
reduction of GHG emissions, pertinent measures
include mandatory technical and operational
energy efficiency measures, namely the Energy
Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and Ship Energy
Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP),109 both
discussed below in this report, as well as new fuel
reporting requirements. Developing countries are
assisted with respect to the implementation of

105 See e.g. Paris Memorandum on Port State Control, 26 January 1982,
21 ILM 1982 (entered into force 1 July 1982), online: Paris MoU <www.
parismou.org/inspections-risk/library-faq/memorandum>. Amended
40 times, with the latest update in 2017, the Paris MoU covers 17
international maritime instruments, including MARPOL, with each national
authority applying the instruments to which the state is party. A ship that
has had multiple detentions may be refused port entry.
106 MARPOL, supra note 10, art 2(2).
107 Ibid, art 2(3)(a).
108 Ibid, annex VI, c III, regs 12–16, 18. Of course, some of these substances
are also GHGs. Nitrous oxide, for example, is one of the six gases
controlled under the UN climate regime, and some ozone-depleting
substances controlled under the Montreal Protocol also contribute to
climate change.

Annex VI places restrictions on atmospheric
releases in designated emissions control areas
(ECAs) designated by the MEPC on the basis
of proposals by state parties.112 ECAs are areas
“where the adoption of special mandatory
measures for emissions from ships is required to
prevent, reduce and control air pollution from
NOx or SOx and particulate matter or all three
types of emissions and their attendant adverse
impacts on human health and the environment.”113
To date, ECAs have not been adopted for the
regulation of GHG emissions and it remains to
be seen whether they could constitute tools
for this purpose at the regional level. The above
definition of ECA appears generic enough to
support a proposal for the designation in specific
marine regions to achieve regional environmental
goals, presumably also for GHG emissions.
The comprehensive approach to vessel-source
pollution is a major strength of the MARPOL
system. However, there appears to be a disconnect
between, on the one hand, the optional character
of most of its annexes, including Annex VI, and, on
the other hand, the general obligations under the
LOSC for the protection of the marine environment
at the global and regional levels without excluding

110 For example, through the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnerships
(GloMEEP) technical assistance project, supported by the IMO in
cooperation with the Global Environmental Facility and United Nations
Development Programme to support subscription and implementation
of energy efficiency measures in shipping and thus reduce GHG
emissions. The participating countries are Argentina, China, Georgia,
India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Morocco, Panama, Philippines and South
Africa. GloMEEP, online: <http://glomeep.imo.org/>. Also relevant
is the Global MTCC Network (GMN): Capacity Building for Climate
Mitigation in the Maritime Shipping Industry, funded by the European
Union and executed by the IMO, promoting networking of marine
technology centres to promote energy efficiency in shipping and
whose main beneficiaries are developing countries and especially LDC
and SIDS states. GMN, online: <http://gmn.imo.org/about-gmn/>.
Recently, a memorandum of understanding to establish the Global
Maritime Technology Centre Network, linking centres in Africa, Asia,
the Caribbean, Latin America and the Pacific, was adopted at the IMO.
See “IMO Rolls Out Global Maritime Technology Cooperation Centre
Network” (4 December 2017), online: IMO <www.marinelink.com/news/
cooperation-technology431795?utm_source=MT-ENews-2017-12-05&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=MT-ENews>.
111 As of January 1, 2020, the global sulphur cap in fuel content will be
lowered from 3.5 percent m/m to 0.50 percent m/m. See IMO, Press
Briefing, “IMO sets 2020 date for ships to comply with low sulphur fuel
oil requirement“ (28 October 2016), online: IMO <www.imo.org>. As of
January 1, 2015, this cap had already been lowered to 0.10 percent for
ECAs.
112 MARPOL, supra note 10, annex VI, c III and App III; 2013 Guidelines
for the Designation of Special Areas under MARPOL, IMO Doc A28/
Res.1087 (21 February 2014) at para 3.
113 MARPOL supra note 10, annex VI, c I, reg 2(8).

109 Ibid, annex VI, c IV.
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these technical rules.110 Annex VI also regulates
the sulphur content permitted in bunkers.111
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particular sources of pollution.114 In practice, and
for the purposes of this report, although not all
IMO member states are parties to Annex VI, the
annex applies to state parties representing the
bulk of global tonnage. It is conceivable that
tonnage may be moved to registers of non-state
parties, but, as observed earlier, those ships
will still be subject to port-state inspections
enforcing Annex VI standards in foreign ports.

products, and stipulates that foreign products
should not be provided with less favourable
treatment than domestic products (i.e., a measure
that modifies the conditions of competition to the
detriment of an imported product).122 Freedom of
transit entails passage through the territory of WTO
members, without discrimination with respect
to flag or origin, and including no less favourable
treatment in relation to charges, regulations and
formalities.123 This amounts to identical levels of
access and equal conditions during transit.124

WTO Rules
While it is unclear to what extent the rules of
world trade could potentially have a bearing
on aspects of the discourse on the regulation of
GHG in international shipping, it is appropriate
to provide a brief overview of the topic, as some
IMO member states have flagged a potential
relationship between prospective MBMs in
shipping and WTO rules. In responding to a request
for clarification by the IMO Council, the WTO
Secretariat identified several rules in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947/1994 (GATT
1994),115 the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, 1994 (TBT),116 and General Agreement on
Trade in Services, 1994 (GATS),117 that may be
taken into account in the discourse on MBM.118

The GATT permits exceptions, which could
serve to justify an MBM that might otherwise
be found in violation of the MFN and national
treatment principles.125 These include measures
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health”126 and measures “relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if
such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.”127 If a measure is captured under
either of those specific exceptions, it can be
justified, provided that it is not “applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade.”128

GATT rules that appear to be relevant for MBMs
include: general most-favoured nation treatment
(MFN); national treatment on internal taxation and
regulation; freedom of transit; non-discriminatory
administration of quantitative restrictions (article
XIII); and general exceptions (article XX). As a
key principle in trade law, the MFN principle is
not only in the GATT119 but is to be found also in
the TBT120 and GATS121 agreements. It prescribes
non-discrimination between like products and
services from different trading partners. The GATT
national treatment principle prohibits tax or charge
discrimination between domestic and foreign

The TBT Agreement has many underlying
principles in common with the GATT 1994,
but it is less stringent, and its articles contain
several built-in exceptions. The three relevant
obligations under the agreement are described
in brief. They comprise a non-discrimination
obligation closely resembling those found in the
GATT; a requirement that technical regulations
“not create unnecessary barriers to trade or be
more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill
a legitimate objective”; and a requirement that
domestic standards mirror international ones
wherever international standards are present.129

114 LOSC, supra note 9, arts 192, 194, 197.
115 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS
194, TIAS 1700 (entered into force 1 January 1948), followed by
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 187,
33 ILM 1153 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [GATT 1994].

It is noted that unlike significant portions of
air transport, maritime transport services are
not excluded from the scope of GATS. Further,

116 TBT, supra note 11.

122 GATT 1994, supra note 115, art III.

117 GATS, supra note 11.

123 Ibid, art V.

118 World Trade Organization’s Views on Document MEPC 64/5/4
Submitted by India and Saudi Arabia, Note by the Secretary-General,
IMO Doc MEPC 65/INF.18 (21 February 2013), annex [MEPC 65/
INF.18].

124 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 3.

119 GATT 1994, supra note 115, art I.

127 Ibid, art XX(g).

120 TBT, supra note 11, art 2.

128 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 3.

121 GATS, supra note 11, art II.

129 Ibid, annex at 5–6; TBT, supra note 11, arts 2.1, 2.2, 2.4.

125 GATT 1994, supra note 115, art XX.
126 Ibid, art XX(b).
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GATS has a broad application covering measures
that directly govern the supply of services, as
well as those designed to govern other areas
but that nevertheless affect trade in services
peripherally.130 Relevant GATS provisions include
MFN treatment,131 national treatment,132 market
access133 and additional commitments.134 Unlike
GATT, GATS allows members to unilaterally
opt out of certain provisions by attaching a
list of exemptions as a special schedule to the
agreement. This opt-out mechanism applies to
the MFN, national treatment and market access
provisions in GATS. The additional commitments
provision allows further customization of the
agreement for member states.135 It should also
be noted that GATS includes an exception
provision identical to that found in GATT, namely
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health,” and is subject to a similar test.136
Maritime transport services are temporarily subject
to different treatment under GATS, given that
negotiations are still under way. Accordingly, the
four relevant provisions of GATS are inoperative
until negotiations have concluded. Members
are free to undertake their own commitments
in the meantime, but they will be allowed to
withdraw or revise these commitments up to
60 days before the close of negotiations. They
must also finalize their unique exemptions by
that time. Finally, no members are permitted to
adopt any measures affecting trade in maritime
services while negotiations are ongoing, unless
those measures are in response to other measures
adopted by other nations and are adopted with
a view to maintaining or improving the freedom
of maritime services. Further, no measures
that would improve a member’s “negotiating
position and leverage” are permitted.137

between the two regimes.138 Reporting primarily
with respect to the WTO rules and dispute
settlement procedures applicable to international
trade in goods and the potential relationship to
national measures adopted in response to climate
change, the study observed that the two regimes
appear to be headed toward a collision.139 This
would occur where a Paris Agreement state party
and WTO member adopts a climate response
measure that potentially conflicts with the MFN
clause. As noted earlier, under the Paris Agreement,
state parties will make NDCs and it appears that
45 percent of these could consist of trade measures
likely to be based on process and production.140
It is arguable that a similar concern could arise
with respect to services that, while governed by
the GATS, are subject to analogous principles.
Bacchus further comments that in the case of
inconsistencies between the two regimes, such as
where a trade dispute arises, the WTO rules and
dispute settlement procedure are binding on the
WTO member state. This is to be contrasted to
the NDCs under the Paris Agreement, which are
voluntary, and the absence of a dispute settlement
system under that agreement. To avoid looming
conflicts, and in the absence of a carbon adjustment
measure, the study makes a compelling argument
that WTO member states should consider adopting
a climate waiver to the regime’s rules.141 Clearly, this
study and others142 call for integration, or perhaps
better coordination, between the two regimes,
and argue that conflict between the two regimes
with respect to international shipping, if it arises,
should not stand in the way of a fair contribution
of the sector to GHG emissions reductions.

A recent study by James Bacchus has observed that
the regulation of the response to climate change
and world trade have proceeded predominantly in
silos, with no consideration of issues of consistency

130 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 6.
131 GATS, supra note 11, art II.
132 Ibid, art XVII.
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133 Ibid, art XVI.

138 James Bacchus, “The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver” CIGI, Special
Report, 2 November 2017 at 1.

134 Ibid, art XVIII at 6.

139 Ibid.

135 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 6–7.

140 Ibid at 2.

136 Ibid, annex at 8; GATS, supra note 11, art XIV(b).

141 Ibid at 20ff.

137 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 7–8. See also Decision on
Maritime Transport Services, GATS Council for Trade in Services Decision
S/L/24 (3 July 1996).

142 María Pía Carazo & Daniel Klein, “Chapter 23: Implications for Public
International Law Initial Considerations” in Klein et al, supra note 26 at
383.
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EU Regulation of GHGs
A longstanding fear of shipping industry operators
has been the prospect of having to cope with a
variety of different unilateral national or regional
mechanisms for GHG reduction in the sector.
Such an approach, according to an industry
view, would fly in the face of the aspiration of
uniformity in maritime regulation, potentially
throwing international shipping into disarray,
and distorting trade and world markets.143 The
European Union has worked for some time to
advance the debate on global regulations for the
reduction of GHG emissions from shipping. It
has also exerted pressure on the IMO to progress
with its deliberations on GHG reduction in the
sector. The progress in the IMO has been perceived
as being too slow. Convinced that pressure on
the IMO is needed to encourage progress, the
European Parliament has recently suggested
incorporating shipping into the European Union’s
existing land-based emissions trading scheme
(ETS). In turn, this initiative has raised significant
concern at the IMO, especially because the
concerned parties feared this could undermine
efforts to establish a global solution for reducing
GHG emissions from international shipping.144
A European Commission communication issued
in 2013 starts out by indicating a strong preference
for global regulations to address GHG emissions
from international shipping. The European
Commission then proceeds to propose a systematic
and gradual three-step approach for integrating
maritime GHG emissions into the European Union’s
existing commitments.145 The first step involved the
creation of an emissions monitoring, reporting and
verification (MRV) system for ships using EU ports.
The second step foresaw the creation of reduction
targets in the maritime sector. The third step
contemplated the eventual introduction of some

143 See the remarks of Simon Bennett, International Chamber of Shipping
(ICS) Director of Policy and External Relations, quoted in Jonathan Saul,
“Shipping Faces Threat from EU of Unilateral Levy on Carbon Emissions”,
Reuters (21 December 2016), online: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/usclimate-shipping-eu-idUKKBN14A15T>.
144 IMO, Press Briefing, “IMO Secretary-General Speaks Out against
Regional Emission Trading System” (9 January 2017), online: IMO
<www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/3-SG-emissions.
aspx>.
145 EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: Integrating maritime transport
emissions in the EU’s greenhouse gas reduction policies, COM (2013)
479 final (28 June 2013).

form of MBM.146 At the same time, and on different
occasions since then, EU institutions have indicated
a preference that the IMO be the body to set targets
and to adopt measures for the maritime sector.
The purpose of the MRV system is to provide
reliable data on vessel emissions that can be
tracked and used to assess operator contributions.
While bunker delivery notes tracking individual
vessel fuel consumption were already being issued
in 2013, at the time there existed no mechanism
for reporting or verification. This was essential
to combat fraud and increase accessibility of
information, while not placing an unreasonable
burden on operators. The European Commission
thus sought to introduce a regional system as a
pilot project that could be tweaked and eventually
projected onto the global stage.147 In addition,
it could facilitate integration into the carbon
market, should international shipping either
be integrated into the EU carbon market or a
dedicated MBM be developed for the sector.
The EU MRV system covers all ships over 5,000
gross tonnage (GT) calling at EU ports, including
those in Norway and Iceland.148 Operators of such
ships are required to submit their own monitoring
plans for approval before the first year-long
emissions reporting period149 beginning in 2018.150
These monitoring plans will take into account types
of fuel used and must contain a mechanism for
tracking consumption.151 Data from each reporting
period will be published by the commission in
June of each year.152 Vessels making fewer than 300
voyages during each reporting period are required
to submit a single aggregate report, with detailed
information on each voyage undertaken during
the year. Vessels making more than 300 voyages
during a reporting period are permitted to submit
a simplified report, provided they visit only EU
ports.153 All emission reports must be approved by
an accredited verifier154 before they are submitted
to the European Commission in April of each year,
146 Ibid at 4–5.
147 Ibid at 5–6.
148 EC, Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring, reporting and verification
of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending
Directive 2009/16/EC, [2015] OJ, L 123/55, art I.1 [EU MRV].
149 Ibid, art 6.1.
150 Ibid, art 8.
151 Ibid, arts 6.3(f), 6.3(g).
152 Ibid, art 21.
153 Ibid, art 9.2.
154 Ibid, arts 13–16.
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via a dedicated online information system that
became operational in July 2017.155 Beginning in
2019, all participating vessels will be required to
carry on board a document of compliance.156
The MRV implementation appears to be making
good progress, which bodes well for the eventual
adoption of a similar system at the global level
that would be administered by the IMO. Some
industry players, however, remain skeptical about
the feasibility of the MRV, in particular with regard
to the verification mechanism.157 There are concerns
that the EU MRV, which is more demanding in
terms of data recording and reporting than current
IMO requirements, will run parallel to the IMO
system, thus causing unnecessary duplication.
Whether the EU initiatives will be embraced
in whole or in part by the IMO, and despite the
peer pressure exerted on the organization, the
MRV system should be considered a useful pilot
project that will aid IMO efforts in developing
an effective and transparent monitoring
system for GHG emissions. The European Union
certainly has expressed readiness to consider the
appropriateness of an alignment of the EU MRV
to the IMO model once the latter is adopted. Since
the adoption of the IMO Data Collection System
for emissions from ships and of the remaining
guidelines on functioning of the system in July
2017, the European Commission has started work
on the comparison of the two systems with a
view of alignment, as foreseen in the EU MRV
Regulation. The commission is expected to adopt
a proposal in 2018, which will then be considered
by the European Parliament and the Council.
Looking to the second and third steps of its
proposed approach depicted in 2013 by the
European Commission, and using the opportunity
of the revision of the ETS directive, a proposal
to the European Parliament envisaged the
incorporation of shipping to and from EU ports
into an arrangement for a Maritime Climate Fund
(as a modification to the existing ETS Directive)
by 2023, if the IMO does not adopt a “comparable

system” by 2021.158 In its amendment, Parliament
recognized that the existing ETS is the primary
tool for achieving long-term climate and energy
targets, but that this tool must be “complemented
by equivalent additional actions taken in other legal
acts and instruments dealing with greenhouse
gas emissions from sectors not covered [under
it].”159 It was implied that the IMO, as a key body
responsible for one of those sectors, was expected
to adopt effective measures in a timely manner. 160
Assuming no “comparable system” to the ETS
is developed by the IMO by 2021, the European
Union proposed to determine an allowance for
the maritime sector in line with other land-based
continental sectors by August 1 of that year. This
allowance would then be added to the total EU
quota, thus gradually integrating shipping trading
in EU ports into the emissions allowance auctions.
Of the revenues generated from such auctions,
20 percent would be allocated to a Maritime
Climate Fund, the purpose of which would be
enhancement of in-sector technological and
operational innovation with an eye to reducing
CO2 emissions. The EU scheme contemplated the
eventual adoption of some form of international
agreement regulating GHG emissions in the
maritime sector, at which point “amendments in
to ensure alignment with [such an] agreement”
will be proposed, considered and voted upon.161
It is difficult to assess the substance of the proposed
ETS on shipping, for a variety of reasons. The
proposal was cast in general terms and contained
no specific emissions allowance for shipping,
but merely a broad statement that one would
be set in accordance with other sectors. Its 20
percent revenue allocation to a Maritime Climate
Fund appeared to be borrowed from proposals
discussed at the MEPC. Thus, the only assessment
of including shipping in the ETS would have been
a comparative assessment with other sectors.

158 EC, On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective
emission reductions and low-carbon investments (COM(2015)0337 –
C8-0190/2015 – 2015/0148(COD)), [2017] OJ, Annex 8-0003/2017
[Proposal to Amend Directive 2003/87/EC], amendment 36 [Amendment
36].
159 Amendment 36, ibid [emphasis added].

155 Ibid, arts 11, 12.
156 Ibid, arts 11, 17, 18.
157 See statement of ICS Chairman Esben Poulsson in ICS, Press Release, “EU
Must Align Shipping CO2 Rules with International Community, Says ICS”
(6 June 2016), online: ICS <www.ics-shipping.org>.
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160 In comparison, CO2 emissions from aviation have been part of the EU
ETS since 2012, but with limited application to flights within the European
Economic Area until 2016 to support the development of an ICAO
global MBM, which has now been adopted in the form of CORSIA. All
airlines are required to monitor, report and verify their emissions. EC,
Commission, “Reducing Emissions from Aviation” (21 November 2017),
online: EC <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation_en>.
161 Amendment 36, supra note 158.
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Unsurprisingly, the IMO’s and shipping industry’s
responses have been critical of the EU initiative
for the reasons already touched upon.162 There
was even concern expressed in the European
Parliament, albeit by a minority, that the proposed
measures would encroach upon the mandate
of the IMO.163 The proposed amendment was
not accepted by the Council, but the underlying
concerns appear to have been taken on board.164
Following tripartite negotiations involving
the European Parliament, the Council, and the
European Commission, a compromise text
was proposed as a recital in the amended ETS
Directive, providing that action either at the
IMO or European Union should start from 2023,
including the preparatory work on adoption and
implementation of emissions reduction measures.
Effectively, the European Union appears to be
expressing some degree of deference to continued
IMO efforts in pursuing its road map, but leaves
open the possibility of EU regional action if progress
at the IMO is deemed insufficient in the next few
years. In this respect, it is relevant to acknowledge
that the European Union, to be able to deliver on
its commitments under the UNFCCC, depends on
aviation and shipping to deliver. If somehow these
sectors would be less involved in the realization
of the necessary reduction of emissions, other
industries within the European Union would be
faced with a situation that they have to compensate
and do more. These other industries will pressure
the EU institutions to take action, knowing there
is much more that can be done cost effectively
to reduce GHG emissions from shipping.

162 Andrew Spurrier, “European Parliament Votes to Bring Shipping into
EU Emissions Trading Scheme”, Fairplay (15 February 2017), online:
Fairplay <www.fairplay.ihs.com>.
163 Proposal to Amend Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 158, Minority
Opinion.
164 “Threat of Shipping’s Inclusion in EU Emissions Trading Scheme Recedes”,
Seatrade Maritime News (10 November 2017), online: Seatrade <www.
seatrade-maritime.com/news/europe/threat-of-shipping-s-inclusion-in-euemissions-trading-scheme-recedes.html>.
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THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING
GHG EMISSIONS FROM
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING
How, why and in what respects is the governance of international
shipping different from other industries, and with what significance
for determining mitigation contributions? The answers help to
explain why the task of developing the international shipping
industry’s contribution to the global response to climate change was
not directly addressed by the Paris Agreement and deferred to the
IMO as the competent international organization on the matter. The
questions further provide insights into the problématique of maritime
regulation and the issues that will need to be navigated by the IMO
in developing an appropriate regulatory approach to GHG emissions.

Commercial and Operational
Life of the Ship
The diversity of actors involved in the operational life of a ship
poses challenges in distributing the load of emissions reductions.
A ship’s energy use and efficiency starts with its construction to
standards designed to achieve cargo-carrying capacity, optimal
fuel use and emissions outcomes. Construction of a new ship will
be guided by international rules and standards applicable to its
class, including prospective standards with effectiveness at a later
date, as well as market demand and finance.165 The duration of a
ship mortgage will vary and will usually have lengthy amortization
periods followed by a balloon payment.166 Thus, to meet new energy
use and efficiency standards, a new build will have to consider
mortgage costs in addition to crewing, operations, maintenance,
insurance and other expenditures. Moreover, during the ship’s life
cycle it is likely that newer equipment standards will have to be
implemented, requiring retrofitting and incurring new mortgage
costs. A shipowner will tend to take actions to optimize the
earning capacity of the ship throughout its life, or at least during its
ownership, until its withdrawal from service and eventual recycling.

165 See Aldo Chircop et al, eds, Canadian Maritime Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) at 288ff.
166 OECD Council Working Party on Shipbuilding (WP6), Report on Ship Financing, “Average loan
amortization profiles are approximately 15 to 18 years for a new vessel and loan tenors are typically
8 to 10 years for a new vessel, leaving borrowers with a balloon repayment that must be refinanced
at the maturity of the initial loan” (June 2007) at 7 [OECD 2007], online: OECD <www.oecd.org>.
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The ship is composed of a cluster of technologies
relevant for air pollution and GHG regulation.167
The hull will have a hydrodynamic design to
maximize the use of its propulsion and energy
savings. The propulsion machinery and propeller
will vary and will potentially be operable, with
modifications, to use different types of fuels. The
propeller itself will be engineered to overcome
resistance and generate adequate thrust. From
an operational perspective, the higher the speed
employed to expedite the movement of the vessel,
the greater the fuel consumption. Some ships will
have scrubbers to help filter particularly harmful
emissions, such as particulate matter. The master,
officers and crew will be trained and certified
in accordance with international standards to
navigate the ship in a safe, environmentally
responsible and economically efficient manner.
Ships cannot all be regulated in the same manner.
There is a wide variety of classes of ships to service
a range of general and specialized trades or to
perform specialized functions and services.168 Each
type of ship is classed separately, and while there
are safety and environmental rules of general
application, there are also requirements specific to
the type of ship and its operations. For example,
not all ships are able to perform safely and as
intended simply by reducing speed or changing
fuel. A ship needs to maintain a minimum speed,
depending on its class, purpose and navigational
conditions, to ensure manoeuvrability, engine
considerations and safe operation. While low speed
results in lower emissions per ton mile (amount
of cargo carried by mile),169 the consequence is
longer voyages and, in turn, more ships or voyages
by the same ship to carry the cargo of the trade
route concerned. Another concern of slow speed
in a voyage charterparty is that it might militate
against early arrival in a congested port to factor
potential waiting times for a berth. The carrier
will have contractual obligations to arrive and
discharge cargo in the specified time (called “lay
time”); exceeding lay time results in demurrage
(liquidated damages for exceeding lay time). In
practice, these risks would likely be addressed

167 For an overview of the technology of shipping, see Chircop et al, supra
note 165 at 18–58.
168 Ibid at 82–95.
169 For a cost-benefit analysis of the use of speed to control emissions, see
Jasper Faber et al, Regulated Slow Steaming in Maritime Transport: An
Assessment of Options, Costs and Benefits (Delft: CE Delft, 2012), online:
CE Delft <www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/media/Slow%20
steaming%20CE%20Delft%20final.pdf>.
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by industry model clauses (for example, virtual
arrival clause170) or adjustment of contract terms.171
Opportunities to control emissions may not
necessarily be in the owner’s control. The ship
may be operated by a management company or
perhaps even chartered. Indeed, a vessel may
be chartered and further sub-chartered. On a
bareboat charter, the owner parts with possession
and control of the ship (without passing title) and
the charterer is responsible for hiring the crew,
operating the vessel, insuring it and securing its
necessaries, including bunkers. Thus, it is often
the responsibility of the charterer to operate the
vessel in an environmentally efficient manner and
the charterer is responsible for securing cargo to
earn freight, purchasing fuel, operating it at various
speeds and ultimately producing emissions. A
charterer, whether bareboat or on-time charter
(lease of a ship for a specific period), will want
to maximize the earning power of the ship by
contracting as many voyages as possible. Speed is
an important consideration and fewer cargo runs
for a ship may reduce the value of its time charter.
The typical ship used for international shipping is
an instrument of international trade. It remains
in business as long as it services maritime trade.
The extent of the fleet, ship composition and
size are all factors determined by the current or
expected volume of global and regional trade.
Over the course of the 20- to 25-year average life
span of a ship, market and technological factors
intervene to determine how that ship is managed.
The downturn of various trades in recent years
saw many ships, including container vessels, sent
to recycling well in advance of the average life
span. Their operation was no longer commercially
viable.172 A ship remains in business and recovers
its costs if its shipowner, operator or charterer
secure cargo for carriage on a frequent, if not
continuous, basis. Cargo brokerage, another aspect
170 INTERTANKO and OCIMF, Virtual Arrival: Optimising Voyage
Management and Reducing Vessel Emissions — An Emissions
Management Framework (London, UK: OCIMF, 2010), online:
INTERTANKO <www.intertanko.com/upload/virtualarrival/
virtualarrivalinformationpaper.pdf>. Virtual arrival is defined as “[A]
process that involves an agreement to reduce a vessel’s speed on voyage
to meet a Required Time of Arrival when there is a known delay at the
discharge port” (ibid). BIMCO has a similar Virtual Arrival Clause for
Voyage Charter Parties, online: BIMCO <www.bimco.org/contracts-andclauses/bimco-clauses>.
171 For a discussion on charterparty clauses, see Erik Røsæg, “A System for
Queuing in Ports” (SSRN 2009), online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697404>.
172 “With Scrapping Rates on the Up, Containership Owners Weigh Anchors
in Lay-up”, The Loadstar (17 January 2017), online: <https://theloadstar.
co.uk/scrapping-rates-containership-owners-weigh-anchors-lay/>.
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of the international shipping industry, plays an
important role in supplying business. Often, the
carriage of goods by sea is simply one leg of a
multimodal voyage. Hence the emissions for the
ton mile may include other forms of transportation
such as road and rail, as well as carriage on
board other vessels providing feeder services to
regional and smaller ports. The contract of carriage
integrates the various modes into a unified service.
Contemporary transport is largely guided by justin-time delivery to reduce warehousing costs.
The ship itself performs the function of a floating
warehouse. Indeed, cargo may be sold at sea,
perhaps more than once, and its delivery may be
directed to different ports where the consignees
(buyers) are located. Hence, the operators of ships
will value flexibility to maximize use of their
ships in the service of trade between states.
Not all ships are engaged in maritime trade and
the carriage of passengers by sea. The wide variety
of classes of ships mentioned earlier includes
other vessels that service shipping generally, as
well as other specialized services to maintain
navigation aids and support other ocean uses
such as aquaculture, the offshore oil and gas
industry, and wind farms. These vessels may
consume more fuel per mile than other ships
because they are workhorses of the industries
they service, such as offshore service vessels that
depend on high torque power. In general, while
ships provide trade and specialized services,
they also receive a range of other services from
supporting vessels and ports. Some of these vessels
may not be engaged in international shipping.
Thus, there is a wide range of international
and domestic shipping emission sources.
All ships are subject to construction, equipping,
crewing, and fuel standards and rules. These
include not only those adopted by the IMO, but
also those adopted at the national level and
sometimes at the subnational level.173 There are
usually requirements at the industry level as well.
For example, independent classification societies,
which play a critical role in ensuring that ships
are built, equipped and operated according to
international standards, also have class rules.

173 For example, in California: with respect to sulphur emissions, Fuel Sulfur
and Other Operational Requirements for Ocean-Going Vessels within
California Waters and 24 Nautical Miles of the California Baseline, 13
CCR § 2299.2; with respect to vessels calling into state ports, Biofouling
Management Regulations to Minimize the Transfer of Nonindigenous
Species from Vessels Arriving at California Ports California, 2 CCR §
2298.1ff.

There are several such societies, the major ones
being members of the International Association
of Classification Societies (IACS), and from time
to time member associations produce and update
unified requirements.174 These are vital because
they frequently provide the necessary level
of detail (i.e., harmonized definitions), which
the original IMO rule or standard might not
possess or upon which an IMO rule depends.
All ships currently require bunkers for their
operation, although the types of fuel used vary
substantially according to IMO standards, class
rules and expected operations. The bunker industry
is yet another aspect of the international shipping
industry. There is a complex multi-party production
chain leading to the availability of bunker fuel. The
bunker industry relies on the refining industry to
produce the wide range of fuels needed, including
heavy bunker C (tar like), a range of heavy and
light diesels, biodiesels, liquefied natural gas
(LNG) and so on. In turn, refineries rely on oil and
gas producers from developed and developing
countries. Not all refineries are equipped to produce
the wide range of fuels needed by the bunker
industry. Refineries receive heavy to light crudes
and process these according to their capacities. It
has been reported that LNG, modified diesel and
biodiesel could cost respectively 20 percent, 70
percent and 480 percent more than regular low-cost
bunker fuel.175 A recent report indicates that the LNG
bunkering market, although facing infrastructure
challenges, is expected to grow exponentially as a
low-cost alternative to reducing shipping’s carbon
and air emissions footprint, and in particular to
meet sulphur emissions requirements by 2020.176
While LNG is an increasingly popular fuel of
choice for these reasons, there are concerns. First,
infrastructural challenges restrict the trade of LNGpowered ships to ports where LNG is in supply.
Second, there is risk that LNG-powered ships
could become stranded assets as decarbonization
efforts are ratcheted up. Third, LNG is associated
with methane leakages into the atmosphere from

174 See e.g. Requirements Concerning Polar Class, IACS Req. 2016
[Requirements Concerning Polar Class], online: IACS <www.iacs.org.uk/
media/3780/ur_i_pdf410.pdf>.
175 Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, “Marine Shipping” (March
2010), online: Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions <http://
research3.fit.edu/sealevelriselibrary/documents/doc_mgr/483/Global_
Marine_Shipping_Emission_Mitigation_-_Pew_Center_2010.pdf>.
176 “LNG Bunkering to Grow at CAGR of 62.5% to reach USD 24.684 bln
in 2023”, Marine Link (3 November 2017), online: Marine Link <www.
marinelink.com/news/bunkering-reach-grow430960>.
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venting, leakage and slippage.177 This is worrisome,
as methane is a far more powerful GHG than CO2,
potentially undermining general efforts to reduce
GHG emissions from international shipping. In
any case, LNG should be considered a transitional
fuel on the road toward decarbonization.
A further point concerning bunkers is that
historically the maritime sector (as well as aviation)
has benefited from tax-free fuels and frequently
also other privileges, such as no excise taxes,
turnover taxes, value-added tax and low corporate
tax rates.178 This privileged fiscal status has been
explained “in large measure from these sectors’
international status: they do not naturally belong
to any one particular country. Nor are they part of
any international agreements that limit taxation in
aviation or extreme tax competition in shipping.”179
Further explanation includes the high risk
undertaking to provide shipping services and their
essential role in global logistics and supply chains.

Mobility of the Ship
Ships are very mobile property, both as instruments
of trade and as objects of trade themselves. Ships
have the nationality of the state where they are
registered. While there are several states that
own national shipping companies, the majority
of commercial ship ownership is private and
structured in a manner to facilitate its finance and
risk distribution. Ownership is divided into shares,
each one of which may have multiple owners. In
traditional registers, the ship must be beneficially
owned in the state of registration. In contrast, in
open registers (also known as flags of convenience),
ownership may be held by foreign interests. The
registration of the ship may be changed with ease
so that over the course of their lives, and until
deregistration for recycling, most ships will have
had different nationalities.180 Registration usually
changes because of change of ownership, a ship has
been chartered, or an owner’s desire to cut down
costs. Crewing cost savings feature prominently
because open registers permit the hiring of
international crews; however, other cost-saving

incentives play a role as well, such as expenditures
incurred in complying with flag state regulations
and taxation. Accordingly, a ship may be owned
by interests in one or more states, uses another
state as a base or is operated from it, and services
the trade of other states around the world without
necessarily ever calling into the port of registry.
While servicing international trade, a ship will
traverse ocean spaces subject to the jurisdiction
of other states and call into numerous foreign
ports. In between, it will navigate the high seas.
The mobility of ships has long been protected
as the traditional freedom of navigation, which
emerged early in the international law of the sea
and today remains one of the most protected (and
regulated) ocean uses. The freedom of navigation
consists of a cluster of international navigation
rights depending on the marine space traversed,
such as innocent passage through the territorial
sea181 and archipelagic waters,182 archipelagic sea
lanes passage in archipelagic waters,183 transit
passage through straits used for international
navigation,184 and the freedom of navigation in the
exclusive economic zone and on the high seas.185
Accordingly, in the interests not only of unimpeded
international regulation, but also maritime trade, it
is considered essential that the rules and standards
for ships and their operations be global in nature
and application. When desirable, regional rules
that find general acceptance tend to concern
specific considerations to a particular geographical
area, such as load line requirements for particular
trading regions.186 The rules for a region may
also be set in an IMO maritime convention.187 If
individual states or states at the regional level were
to adopt rules for emissions from international
shipping outside of the IMO, there could be
adverse consequences for the general expectations
of universality and uniformity of international
maritime regulation, the protection of international

181 LOSC, supra note 9, art 17.
182 Ibid, art 52.
183 Ibid, art 53.

177 Methane Emission from LNG Carriers, Submitted by the Republic of
Korea, IMO Doc MEPC 71/INF.23 (28 April 2017).

184 Ibid, art 38.

178 Jon Strand, “Fuel charges in International Aviation and Shipping: How
High; How; and Why?” (17 April 2013) Let’s Talk Development (blog),
online: World Bank <http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/fuelcharges-in-international-aviation-and-shipping-how-high-how-and-why>.

186 International Convention on Load Lines, 5 April 1966, 640 UNTS 133,
art 25 (entered into force 21 July 1968). Special regional rules on ship
load lines have to be communicated to the IMO for circulation among
other state parties.

179 Ibid.
180 Chircop et al, supra note 165 at 322–28.
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185 Ibid, arts 58, 87.

187 Such as the rules for and emission control areas under MARPOL, supra
note 10, annex VI, c I, reg 2(8).
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navigation rights, and potentially the availability
of shipping to service maritime trade.188

Governance of
International Shipping
In addition to the global and transnational nature of
international shipping, a further justification for the
IMO’s development of the industry’s contribution
to climate change response is its competence and
work record. Based in London, United Kingdom,
the organization was conceived by an international
convention in 1948 as an intergovernmental
technical consultative organization189 and first
convened in 1959, a year after that instrument
entered into force. Since then its mandate
has evolved substantially as an international
regulatory body.190 Although the IMO is not the
only international organization with competence
in shipping matters, it is widely recognized as the
leading body for the regulation of international
shipping.191 At the time of writing, the IMO has
172 member states and three associate members,
representing 97.28 percent of global tonnage.192
The LOSC designates the IMO as the competent
international organization with respect to
international shipping in numerous provisions.193
Its core mandate is more fully set out in its
constitutive instrument as the provision of
“machinery for co-operation among Governments
in the field of governmental regulation and practices
relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting
shipping engaged in international trade” and “to
188 Aldo Chircop, “The International Maritime Law Response to
Climate Change: The Quest for the Shipping Industry’s ‘Fair
Share’ of GHG Emissions Reduction” in J Guifang Xue & Jie
Zheng, eds, The Law of the Sea and Emerging Issues (Beijing:
China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House, 2018).
189 Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, 6 March 1948, 289 UNTS 3 (entered into force 17 March
1958), as amended and renamed the Convention on the International
Maritime Organization [IMO Convention].
190 Aldo Chircop, “The International Maritime Organization” in Donald
R Rothwell et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015) 416.

encourage and facilitate the general adoption
of the highest practicable standards in matters
concerning the maritime safety, efficiency of
navigation and prevention and control of marine
pollution from ships.”194 The IMO is responsible
for more than 50 conventions and agreements,
and the number of subsidiary instruments it has
adopted (codes, recommendations, guidelines and
other instructions) exceeds 160,195 easily making
international shipping the most regulated ocean use.
Although GHG regulation is not expressly
mentioned in the IMO’s constitutive instrument,
the powers of the assembly (the organization’s
highest decision-making structure) include
“adoption of regulations and guidelines concerning
maritime safety, the prevention and control of
marine pollution from ships and other matters
concerning the effect of shipping on the marine
environment assigned to the Organization by or
under international instruments, or amendments
to such regulations and guidelines which have
been referred to it.”196 These other instruments
include MARPOL, for which the IMO provides,
among others, secretariat functions. More broadly,
the current strategic plan of the IMO is geared
to the pursuit of “sustainable” shipping.197 An
important focus in Strategic Direction 3 aimed at
the development of “appropriate solutions to reduce
the shipping industry’s contribution to air pollution
and its impact on climate change” and including
the development of “a comprehensive IMO strategy
on reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from
ships which will be ambitious and realistic.”198
Meeting biennially, the assembly may recommend
to members the adoption of new regulations and
guidelines.199 The secretariat has also provided
support in generating and disseminating
important information and discussion documents,
such as the three studies concerning GHG
emissions from ships, considered below. The

194 IMO Convention, supra note 189, art 1(a).

191 Several UN bodies and other organizations have competence in some
aspect of shipping, such as UNCTAD with respect to liner conferencing,
the UN Commission on International Trade Law in regard to carriage
of goods by sea, the World Meteorological Organization in respect of
weather forecasts and broadcasting and the International Hydrographic
Organization with respect to charting.

195 List of Codes, Recommendations, Guidelines and other Environmentrelated Non-mandatory Instruments, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc
70/INF.7 (10 August 2016).
196 IMO Convention, supra note 189, art 15(j).

192 IMO, “Status of Treaties”, supra note 102.

197 Strategic Plan for the Organization (2018 to 2023), IMO Assembly
Resolution A.1110(30), 6 December 2017, IMO Doc A 30/Res.1110 (8
December 2017) [IMO Strategic Plan].

193 See LOSC, supra note 9, arts 211.1–211.2, 211.5, 211.7, 217.1–217.4,
218.1, 219, 220.1–220.3, 220.7, 226.1, 228. See also UN, Division
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs,
“‘Competent or Relevant International Organizations’ under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” in Law of the Sea Bulletin No
31 (New York, NY: UN, 1996) at 79–95.

199 IMO Convention, supra note 189, art 15(j). For example, in 1991,
the assembly adopted a resolution that, among others, requested the
MEPC to consider a range of emission issues. Prevention of Air Pollution
from Ships, IMO Assembly Resolution A.719(17), 6 November 1991
[Resolution A.719(17)].

198 Ibid at 9.
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IMO Council, the organization’s executive body,
has also stepped in on the GHG issue as needed.
However, the structure directly responsible for
the environmental aspects of shipping is the
MEPC, established in 1973 following the Torrey
Canyon casualty in 1967. Its terms of reference
encompass regulatory responsibilities assigned
by maritime conventions (for example, MARPOL),
consideration of enforcement measures, technical
assistance and cooperation on marine pollution, and
cooperation with other regional and international
organizations.200 The MEPC coordinates closely with
other IMO structures, including the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) and Legal Committee. Whenever
issues arise that require legal interpretation,
the MEPC refers such questions to the Legal
Committee. The MEPC and MSC are assisted by
a complex system of sub-committees.201 On air
pollution generally, and the GHG issue, the MEPC
has conducted much of the in-depth work through
working groups and expert groups that meet both
during and in between committee sessions.
While IMO rules and standards may be adopted
on majority voting, in practice, decisions are
generally adopted by consensus, thus frequently
achieving a high degree of support. There have been
instances when consensus was not achieved and
instead a proposed resolution containing new rules
and standards was put to a vote. As will be seen
below, this was the case during development and
adoption of GHG regulations under MARPOL Annex
VI. At times, new regulatory initiatives have been
proposed by such organizations. The regulations are
adopted and eventually enforced with NMFT for
any flag state authority or industry actor expressly
recognized by national maritime administrations.
After all, flag states and industry actors are engaged
in global competition while deriving commercial
benefits from international maritime trade.
Since the establishment of the IMO, the process of
maritime regulation making has evolved from one
characterized by dominant diplomatic processes,
under the tight control of member states (and state
parties to conventions), to a more inclusive one. In
the contemporary setting, the process enables the
participation of non-governmental organizations
200 IMO Convention, supra note 189, art 38.
201 Namely: Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping;
Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments; Sub-Committee on
Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue; Sub-Committee on
Pollution Prevention and Response; Sub-Committee on Ship Design and
Construction; Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment; and SubCommittee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers.
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(NGOs) that are granted consultative status. On the
basis of criteria set out in an assembly resolution,202
the council grants consultative status to applicant
NGOs that are able to make a substantial
contribution to IMO work, usually through the
provision of information and expert advice.203
Consultative status requires an undertaking to
support IMO activities and disseminate its work,
as well as granting reciprocal privileges to the
IMO.204 While organizations with consultative
status have no voting power, they enjoy a broad
range of participatory privileges, including the
ability to submit documentation for consideration
in the various structures of the organization, as
well as addressing meetings on being recognized
by the chair.205 The list of NGOs with consultative
status is reviewed periodically and over the years
it has grown to include organizations from all
sectors of the shipping industry, maritime labour,
environmental organizations and other NGOs.
A former chair of the Legal Committee observed
that “active industry participation in the work of
the committee is evidenced by the presence of a
large number of observer delegations representing
every sector of the maritime industry,” with
these observer organizations “given wide latitude
to intervene and contribute to the work of the
Committee.”206 There are numerous examples where
shipping industry organizations played critical roles
in the development of international standards.207 As
observed elsewhere in this report, the proposal for
a road map for IMO regulation of GHG emissions
originated from industry organizations. One view
is that “the shipping sector have been shown to be
more influential in affecting the views of decisionmaking state delegations than those representing
environmental interests.”208 This has been evident
in the development of the Polar Code, in which
the instrument’s environmental provisions
202 Rules and Guidelines for Consultative Status of Non-governmental
Organizations with the International Maritime Organization, Relations
with Non-governmental Organizations, Note by the Secretary-General,
IMO Doc A 28/21(d) (28 August 2013), annex.
203 Ibid, rule 1.
204 Ibid, rule 4.
205 Ibid, rule 6.
206 Alfred Popp, “The Treaty-Making Work of the Legal Committee of
the International Maritime Organization” in A Chircop et al, eds, The
Regulation of International Shipping: International and Comparative
Perspectives (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 209 at
224.
207 See e.g. Requirements Concerning Polar Class, supra note 174. The IACS
polar-class requirements are a basic standard of the Polar Code.
208 MN Tsimplis, “Shipping and the Marine Environment in the 21st Century”
in M Clarke, ed, Maritime Law Evolving: Thirty Years at Southampton
(Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2013) 95 at 107.
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were narrowly focused on pollution prevention,
whereas environmental NGOs advocated for a
broader environmental protection approach so
as to include anti-fouling systems and ballastwater concerns in polar waters.209 Similar NGO
concerns have been expressed in the deliberations
on GHG emissions from ships and, more generally,
on transparency in the governance of the IMO.
Regulation theory suggests that tripartism in
responsive regulation (that is, involving a public
regulating authority, a regulatee and public interest
groups) provides for better cooperation and checks
on regulatory capture.210 In practice, the degree
of influence exerted in the IMO by organizations
with consultative status may be more nuanced.
Delegations of member states are in control, and,
while some may include industry representatives,
most do not. Perhaps the degree of influence
exerted by organizations with consultative
status in any IMO structure or process depends
on issue sensitivity and willingness of member
delegations, or at least some of them. On some
environmental issues, such as particularly sensitive
sea areas, the contributions of environmental
organizations played a key role in informing the
development of an international standard.211
In general, international rules and standards
adopted by the IMO apply to ships on international
voyages. Indeed, IMO technical regulation
generally targets ships rather than states. In
exercising effective jurisdiction and control, states
are expected to apply international standards
developed for ships. The regulation of GHG
emissions from international shipping poses the
most difficult challenge. Ships also operate on
purely domestic trades, known as cabotage, where
the ports of departure and destination are in the
same state, and also when ships provide services
from ports to an offshore activity in waters within
the jurisdiction of the same state. The distinction

is important because NDCs under the Paris
Agreement capture the latter, but not the former.
The consequence is that not all ship emissions will
necessarily be addressed by IMO regulation. In
addition to cabotage, other potentially excluded
vessels include fishing and recreational vessels.
However, in other areas of maritime regulation,
some states have extended the application of IMO
regulation to domestic shipping in the interests
of consistent safety, security and environmental
regulation. This can again be expected with
respect to GHG regulation of ships on domestic
trades and, as observed earlier, their emissions
can be expected to be captured by NDCs.

Principles and Process of
Maritime Regulation
Maritime regulation involves a highly structured
and lengthy deliberative process aimed at
promoting universality of participation in the
maritime conventions and uniform implementation
of rules and standards. The process is not
necessarily exclusively technical and a degree
of politicization of some issues has occurred. As
mentioned earlier, in pursuit of global uniformity,
the basic policy underlying the application and
enforcement of IMO conventions is NMFT in
international shipping, whether the institution
concerned is a maritime administration or an
industry operator. When a maritime administration
does not possess the technical capabilities
needed to implement international rules and
standards, technical assistance is readily available
and provided. The usual regulatory process is
accompanied by capacity-building analysis.

210 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, “Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and
Empowerment” (1991) 16:3 Law & Soc Inquiry 435; Melissa Rorie,
“Responsive Regulation“ in Oxford Handbooks Online (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2015), online: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/
oxfordhb/9780199935383.013.109>.

International maritime regulation is also guided
by rationales of compelling necessity, functionality
and pragmatism. Regulation serves the need
to have the highest practicable standards to
ensure and facilitate maritime safety, marine
environment protection, security and ultimately
the flow of trade. The opening statement of the
organization’s Strategic Direction 14 provides that
“IMO will seek to ensure better regulation through
a systematic approach and that its instruments
are free from administrative requirements that
are disproportionate, obsolete or unnecessary.”212

211 For example, for an insight into the WWF’s influence in amending
guidelines on particularly sensitive sea areas, see Revision of Resolution
A.720(17), Report of the Drafting Group, IMO Doc MEPC 43/6
(3 December 1998). Other areas where environmental NGOs had
substantial influence include anti-fouling systems, underwater noise and
individual PSSA designations.

212 IMO Strategic Plan, supra note 197, SD 14.

209 See Environmental Protection in the Polar Code, Submitted by Friends of
the Earth International, World Wide Fund for Nature, Pacific Environment
and Clean Shipping Coalition, IMO Doc MEPC 68/INF.37 (6 March
2015).
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In 2015, the IMO Assembly further refined the
regulatory process through the adoption of six
basic principles to guide regulation making in a
systematic manner and to ensure consistency
throughout the organization.213 First, the regulation
must be necessary, i.e., there is an evidenced,
compelling need with respect to the operational,
technical and economic impacts and actual
benefits derived. The proposed regulation is not
or cannot be fully or partially addressed in an
existing instrument or by other means. Second,
the regulation must be consistent with other
existing maritime regulations. For example, the
proposed regulation should not contradict or
undermine an existing rule or standard. Third,
the proposed regulation must be proportionate
to the issue addressed. It must be balanced and
take into account its direct and indirect impacts.
Fourth, the proposed regulation must be fit for the
intended purpose so that it produces the expected
outcome. Fifth, the proposed regulation must be
resilient so that it is able to adapt to technological
change and capacities. Sixth, the proposed
regulation must be clear. It is to be drafted in
simple and unambiguous terms to facilitate its
implementation and enforcement. In recent years,
the general approach taken in maritime regulation
has been goal-based, aimed at achieving a specific
outcome rather than solely providing prescriptions
for specific standards or conduct. This approach
provides the persons addressed by the regulation a
measure of flexibility in the process of compliance,
while meeting the intended regulatory outcome.
Technical regulation with goal-based standards is
further supplemented by standards developed by
the International Standards Organization (ISO),214 in
particular by technical committee ISO/TC 8 focusing
on ship and marine technology.215 In addition to the
establishment of the goal, goal-based regulation
includes compliance with functional requirements
and verification of conformity. These standards
directly or indirectly support the development
and implementation of IMO regulations and assist
innovation. Standards developed to date include

vessel efficiency216 and standards for general GHG
emissions.217 The value of ISO standards is that
they enhance transparency of key processes,
such as reporting and verification, as well as
facilitating compliance with IMO regulations.
Each IMO committee has its own guidelines on
method of work. For example, the MEPC and
MSC have a well-defined process.218 Guided by
compelling need, the typical process provides
for three steps, namely, data gathering on an
issue proposed for regulation, analysis of the
data gathered, followed by decision making on
an appropriate rule and standard, if needed.
Recent submissions to the council have proposed
further structuring of the rule-making process to
ensure a higher level of scrutiny of the compelling
need and appropriateness of the proposed rule and
standard.219 While the proposed refinements have
not been adopted, they are expected to receive
further consideration in due course. The proposals
suggest that it would be useful to distinguish
between: the development of new codes or chapters
to an existing convention; amendments to existing
instruments; and amendments requiring minor
changes to existing instruments. The regulatory
process should consider the following factors:
Step 1 – gathering sources of reliable data
and collective experience that
could be used in the assessment
of the compelling need for IMO to
address an issue in its regulatory
framework, including such
aspects as availability, consistency
and accessibility of data; and
consideration on how other
industries address these issues,

216 In particular, the measurement of changes in hull and propeller
performance, which are important for determining vessel efficiency and
consequences for emissions, resulting to date in ISO 15016:2015: Ships
and Marine Technology — Guidelines for the assessment of speed and
power performance, usually applied during sea trials. Ibid.
217 For example, the ISO 14000 series aims to provide clarity and
consistency for quantifying, monitoring, reporting, validating or verifying
GHG emissions. Ibid.
218 Guidelines on the Organization and Method of Work of the Maritime
Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Committee and Their
Subsidiary Bodies, IMO Doc MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.4 (10 June 2015).

213 Principles to be Considered when Drafting IMO Instruments, IMO
Assembly Resolution A.1103(29) (26 November 2015), annex.
214 International Standards Organization, online: ISO <www.iso.org/home.
html>.
215 ISO TC 8: Ships and Marine Technology, online: ISO <www.iso.org/
committee/45776.html>.
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219 Principles to Be Considered in the Review of Existing Requirements and
the Development of New Requirements, Submitted by Jamaica, Liberia,
the Marshall Islands, Panama, the United Kingdom, BIMCO, IACS, ICS,
INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, IMO Doc C/ES.28/9/1 (20 October
2015) [IMO Doc C/ES.28/9/1]; Further Discussion of the Principles and
the Development of a Framework, Submitted by Greece, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, BIMCO, IACS, INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, IMO
Doc C 117/14 (4 November 2016).
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these technologies and a
realistic time frame for their
implementation, to reach the
required production volumes)
with possible contributions of
individual manufacturers and/
or manufacturer associations;

capture data and apply risk-based
methods in developing regulations;
Step 2 – considering whether IMO action
is necessary now, in particular
when issues are uncertain and
the impact of a new regulation
is difficult to estimate or when it
is known that other measures to
address the issue have already been
agreed or recently implemented
in the industry that address the
issue (for example, answering the
question whether action by IMO
is really needed and identifying
the scale of the problem that the
new regulation should solve);
Step 3 – using cost-effectiveness and
impact analyses to estimate
short-term and long-term benefits
due to the implementation of
the new regulation (for example,
in terms of enhancement of
safety of life at sea, or protection
of the marine environment)
and associated costs (including
potential negative consequential
impacts in other areas, difficulty
in practical application, legislative
and administrative burdens);
Step 4 – assessing the availability of
suitable technologies to be installed
on new and/or existing ships
and estimating a realistic time
frame for their implementation
to assess whether a system or
a technology will be available
to meet the objectives of a new
regulation, and available from a
commercially competitive market;
Step 5 – evaluating the transparency
and robustness of approval
procedures for possible new
equipment to ensure compliance
with both regulatory and
operational requirements;
Step 6 – considering the impact on
manufacturers to produce and
deliver the required systems
(for example, whether suitable
facilities are available to install

Step 7 – assessing the availability of
clear and unambiguous criteria
for surveying, inspecting and
testing new technologies on
board. The situation should be
avoided when properly used and
maintained type approved systems,
in accordance with requirement
of the new provisions, are found
non-compliant when examined
against the criteria of other
regulatory bodies or authorities,
including port state control;
Step 8 – considering an achievable time
frame to test and consolidate a
technology before deciding on
the implementation dates; and
Step 9 – evaluating potential conflicts of
benefits and detriments between
environmental, economic and
social issues, assuming safety
and security as paramount, by
applying risk-based approaches (for
example, Formal Safety Assessment,
Safety Level Approach), where
needed, performance-based
methods and/or other qualitative
or quantitative considerations.220
The proposals suggest that the assessment process
would be undertaken at three stages, namely,
when first submitted, at an intermediate stage
(when deliberations extend beyond a biennium),
and at final assessment of the proposed regulatory
package “to assist the committee in making a
final decision as to whether or not the regulatory
package is ‘fit for purpose’, proportionate and
without excessive burden on industry.”221 In the
final assessment, the criteria applied include
what ships will be subject to the requirement,
proposed date of application, whether there
are suitable technologies, and determining
220 IMO Doc C/ES.28/9/1, supra note 219, annex.
221 Ibid.
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that approval processes and implementation
guidelines are in place, that impacts on
manufacturers and operators are ascertained,
and that capacity-building needs are identified.

IMO Efforts in Developing
the Industry’s Contribution
to Mitigation
The issue of air pollution from ships was first
considered in the IMO in the 1980s, in connection
with the review of the quality of fuel oils, but it
was not until 1988 that air pollution was added
as an MEPC agenda item. Subsequent committee
discussions on fuel quality led, in 1990, to inclusion
of the issue in the long-term work plan, followed
in 1991 by a milestone assembly resolution on
prevention of air pollution and pollution from
garbage from ships,222 which paved the way for the
future adoption of Annex VI.223 The first regulations
appeared with MARPOL Annex VI, through the
Protocol of 1997 adopted at a diplomatic conference
on air pollution that year.224 By then, a number
of initiatives in other fora had already addressed
various forms of atmospheric emissions.225
The Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I state parties
to the UNFCCC to pursue, through the IMO, the
reduction of GHG emissions from marine bunker
fuels not addressed by the Montreal Protocol.226
In 1997, an IMO air pollution conference invited
the MEPC to consider what CO2 strategies might
be feasible in light of the relationship of that gas
with other atmospheric pollutants, citing the IMO’s

task under the Kyoto Protocol.227 Since MEPC 42,
there has been ongoing cooperation between the
Secretariats of the IMO and the UNFCCC, including
SBSTA,228 for example, through the provision of
information to the various sessions of the latter.229
In 2000, MEPC 45 agreed to discuss GHG emissions
after considering a study commissioned by MEPC
42230 and prepared by the IMO Secretariat (the
first GHG study),231 following further submissions
by Japan and the United Kingdom.232 MEPC 46
considered this issue and, following submissions
by Norway and the United Kingdom on the need
to develop an IMO GHG strategy, which received
broad support, it was agreed that a working group
would be established at MEPC 47.233 The working
group was to evaluate emissions reduction
proposals, receive proposals from member
states, identify appropriate IMO sub-committees
for the issue and prepare materials for a future
strategy.234 The focus was on CO2,235 although an
intersessional correspondence group felt such
an approach should be for the short term and
without limiting the future general strategy.236 To
facilitate discussion of the proposed assembly
resolution, the correspondence group considered
a base document exploring possible elements of
a future IMO strategy for GHGs.237 It proposed a
resolution on IMO Policies and Practices related
to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Ships,238 which was subsequently adopted

227 Resolution 8 of the 1997 Air Pollution Conference, referred to in Report
of the MEPC on its 45th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 45/20 (16 October
2000) at 55.
222 Resolution A.719(17), supra note 199.
223 The initial Annex VI set a general cap of 4.5 percent m/m on the sulphur
content of fuel (compared to 0.5 percent at this time), controls of nitrogen
oxides, prohibition of deliberate emission of ozone-depleting substances
(halons and chlorofluorocarbons [CFCs]) and prohibition of onboard
incineration of products containing contaminated packaging materials
and polychlorinated biphenyls. Annex VI also designated the Baltic
Sea as the first ECA with a higher standard for SOx (1.5 percent m/m,
compared to 4.5 percent).
224 Protocol of 1997, supra note 104.
225 See e.g. Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 13
November 1979, 1302 UNTS 217, 18 ILM 1442 (entered into force 16
March 1983), amended by protocols to address emissions of sulphur
(1985), nitrogen oxides (1988), volatile organic compounds (1991)
and further reducing sulphur emissions (1994); Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522
UNTS 3, 26 ILM 1550 (entered into force 1 January 1989), amended by
the protocol of 1990 phasing out halons and ozone-depleting CFCs by
2000, and by the protocol of 1992 accelerating phase-outs and adding
phase-out dates for hydrochlorofluorocarbons and methyl bromide.
226 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art 2(2).
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228 Following an initial request by MEPC 41. Report of the MEPC on its 42nd
Session, IMO Doc MEPC 42/22 (16 November 1998) at 32–33 [MEPC
42 Report].
229 See e.g. Report of the MEPC on its 44th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 44/20
(12 April 2000) at 39–40 [MEPC 44 Report].
230 MEPC 42 Report, supra note 228 at 35.
231 Report on the Outcome of the IMO Study on Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Ships, Submitted by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 45/8 (29 June
2000).
232 MEPC 44 Report, supra note 229 at 56.
233 Report of the MEPC at its 46th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 46/23 (16 May
2001) at 52–53.
234 Ibid at 53.
235 Report of the MEPC on its 47th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 47/20 (18
March 2002) at 24.
236 Report of the Correspondence Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Ships, Submitted by Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 48/4/1 (4 July 2002) at
2.
237 Ibid, annex 2.
238 Ibid, annex 1.
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by the assembly in 2003.239 The resolution urged
the MEPC to identify and develop the mechanisms
needed to enable limitation or reduction of GHG
emissions from international shipping and to
prioritize establishment of a GHG emissions
baseline, development of a methodology to
describe the GHG efficiency through an emissions
index, development of guidelines for application
and verification of a GHG emissions indexing
scheme, and evaluation of technical, operational
and market-based solutions. The MEPC was also
requested to consider methodological aspects of
GHG emissions reporting, develop a work plan with
a timetable and maintain the item under review. It
is important to note that the assembly resolution
proposed to address all ships, rather than simply
the states listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol,
although this would become a divisive matter.240
Chaired by Norway, the correspondence group’s
work, while important in advancing IMO efforts
on GHG, was characterized by increasingly
diverse views on what a future strategy should
accomplish. By MEPC 51, a growing minority of
developing countries vocalized their concern
that the organization’s GHG work should be
guided by UNFCCC principles and that Kyoto
Annex I countries should be taking the lead in
reducing emissions.241 These concerns required
additional work in the correspondence group. At
MEPC 52, the committee divided consideration
of the issue into two steps: the first to focus on
technical matters and the second to address
“political issues,” including NMFT and CBDR.242
With respect to the former, the committee
instructed the correspondence group to continue
technical work on guidelines for a CO2 indexing
scheme as a voluntary mechanism on the basis
of interim guidelines.243 In-depth work on CO2
indexing proceeded at the Technical Workshop
on GHG Indexing Scheme held at the IMO in
2005 on the basis of sea trials and studies by a
few volunteering flag states, industry actors and
239 Adopted first at MEPC 49: Report of the MEPC on its 49th Session, IMO
Doc MEPC 49/22/Add.1 (13 August 2003), annex 7. It was subsequently
adopted by Resolution A.963(23), 5 December 2003 (Agenda item 19),
IMO Doc A 23/Res.963 (4 March 2004) [Resolution A.963(23)].
240 This point was raised in the Report of the MEPC on its 49th Session, IMO
Doc MEPC 49/22 (8 August 2003) at 33–34.
241 Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Singapore and Saudi Arabia.
Report of the IMO on its 51st Session, IMO Doc MEPC 51/22 (22 April
2004) at 20.

the European Union.244 The conclusion was that
technical guidelines worked, but that a number
of issues needed to be addressed, including the
formula for calculation of indexing (specific to
fuels with different conversion factors), data
standardization and development of a method
for the index for new builds.245 As to the “political
issues,” the sharp division of views represented,
on the one hand, by Norway246 for NMFT and, on
the other, by China247 for CBDR led the chair to
conclude that “it would be advisable to continue
the common ground found on technical matters
and defer the application issue to a later stage when
an agreement had been reached elsewhere.”248
The Working Group on Air Pollution was
reconstituted at MEPC 54249 and its work led to
MEPC 55 deciding on an updated plan of work,
based on three main lines of action.250 First, with

244 Report of the One-day Technical Workshop on GHG Indexing Scheme
held at IMO Headquarters on Friday, 15 July 2005, IMO Doc MEPC 53/
WP.3 (15 July 2005).
245 Ibid at 8.
246 Norway’s position was summarized as “the tradition of IMO was to
develop mechanisms, either voluntary or mandatory, which apply equally
to each Member State. The IMO Convention article 1(b) on the purpose
of the Organization, the removal of discriminatory action was addressed,
and as such, the inclusion of the differentiated approach in any IMO GHG
mechanism to be developed would be in conflict with the purpose of the
Organization. Further, Norway referred to the well-established principle of
‘no more favourable treatment’ in IMO instruments. In conclusion, Norway
highlighted that the principle of equal application to IMO Member States
should also apply to the IMO work on GHG emissions from international
shipping.” MEPC 52 Report, supra note 242 at 27.
247 China’s position was summarized as “IMO was asked to deal with
limitation and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by the Kyoto
Protocol, which only obliges Annex I countries of UNFCCC to do so.
IMO Assembly resolution A.963(23) clearly acknowledged the relevant
provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. During the deliberation on the matter,
the recommendation of the MEPC that ‘the Assembly resolution on IMO
Policies and Practices related to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
from ships should be based on a common policy applicable to all ships,
rather than based on the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol which stated
that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is under the responsibility
of the Annex I countries of the Protocol’ was rejected by the IMO
Assembly. It proves that the above assertion was wrong. If the limitation
or reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is equally applied to both
developed and developing countries, the developing countries will be
discriminated for the following reasons: first, 79% of greenhouse gases
were emitted by the developed countries; second, the Kyoto Protocol
only obliges Annex I countries to pursue reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions through IMO; and thirdly, the developing countries are
technologically lagging behind. China also pointed out that the reason
why IMO did not apply the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’
principle when dealing with matters concerning the Montreal Protocol
and the Basel Convention is that these documents did not provide that
the developed countries should pursue limitation or reduction of related
materials through IMO. In conclusion, China stressed that the ‘common
but differentiated responsibility’ principle should be observed by IMO
when addressing greenhouse gas emissions from ships.” Ibid.
248 Ibid.

242 Report of the MEPC on its 52nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 52/24 (18
October 2004) at 26 [MEPC 52 Report].

249 To consider, among other things, the development of a draft framework
and work plan with timetable, including options for technical, operational
and/or market-based mechanisms. Report of the MEPC on its 54th
Session, IMO Doc MEPC 54/21 (27 March 2006) at 25–26.

243 MEPC Circular on the Interim Guidelines for Voluntary Ship CO2 Emission
Indexing for Use in Trials, IMO Doc MEPC/Circ.471 (29 July 2005).

250 Report of the MEPC on its 55th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 55/23 (16
October 2006) at 31–32, annex 9.
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respect to the CO2 Emission Indexing Scheme,
member states and industry were urged to continue
to carry out trials with a view to improving
the indexing method in the interim guidelines.
Second, work on the CO2 emission efficiency
baseline and methodology would continue, with
a view to drafting a proposal. Third, technical,
operational and market measures would be
considered. However, by MEPC 56, there was
growing concern in the IMO at the protracted
negotiations without tangible outcomes, and the
concern that lack of progress might encourage
unilateral national or regional initiatives.251 The
need for a new GHG study was agreed as an action
item.252 At this session, Norway fielded a proposal
that potentially simplified the development of
an IMO strategy by proposing a CO2 toll that
would apply to all international shipping, not
dependent on a baseline, and that would lead to
the establishment of an international fund.253 This
was the first proposal for an MBM and, in essence,
consisted of a uniform carbon tax. Views both
for and against the proposal were expressed, but
the committee agreed the working group should
consider all options for technical, operational
and market measures that may be submitted.254
Several member states submitted technical,
operational and MBM ideas to a correspondence
group, which were reported to MEPC 57.255 The
correspondence group undertook an in-depth
and systematic discussion of proposed measures
and their suitability for the short or long term,
including pros and cons. The group identified
policy issues, including the NMFT and CBDR
duet, the possibility that regional or national
approaches might arise if a global approach
was not feasible, and whether shipping could
be considered under the CDM of the Kyoto
Protocol.256 A collective submission by delegations
and industry organizations with consultative
status proposed that any future regulations
should be based on fundamental principles
that would inform the future IMO framework
251 Report of the MEPC on its 56th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 56/23 (30 July
2007) at 34–35 [MEPC 56 Report].

for GHG regulation.257 This was embraced by
MEPC 57, concluding that the framework:
a.

must be effective in contributing
to the reduction of total global
greenhouse gas emissions;

b.

binding and equally applicable to all
flag States in order to avoid evasion;

c.

cost-effective;

d.

able to limit, or at least, effectively
minimize competitive distortion;

e.

based on sustainable environmental
development without penalizing
global trade and growth;

f.

based on a goal-based approach and
not prescribe specific methods;

g.

supportive of promoting and
facilitating technical innovation and
R&D in the entire shipping sector;

h.

accommodating to leading
technologies in the field of
energy efficiency; and

i.

practical, transparent, fraud free and
easy to administer.258

The principles were adopted by a majority
vote called by the chair after a difficult debate.
The vote raised a fundamental question as to
whether the IMO will be able to adopt new
rules and standards for GHG regulation based
on the usual practice of consensus. Some
member states continued to be of the view that
developed states had a special responsibility
under the Kyoto Protocol, while the majority
placed faith in the culture of IMO regulation as
it applies to all ships. The vote reflected a deep
rift between developed and some developing
countries. China and Brazil reserved their
position on the principles, with Barbados, South
Africa and Venezuela sharing their concerns.259
India wanted to amend the first principle while

252 Ibid at 33–34, annex 9.
253 Elements of a Possible Market-based CO2 Emission Reduction Scheme,
Submitted by Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 56/4/9 (4 May 2007).
254 MEPC 56 Report, supra note 251 at 36.
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255 Report of the Intersessional Correspondence Group on Greenhouse Gas
Related Issues, Submitted by Australia and the Netherlands, IMO Doc
MEPC 57/4/5 (21 December 2007).

257 Future IMO Regulation Regarding Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
International Shipping, Submitted by Denmark, Marshall Islands, BIMCO,
ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/2
(21 December 2008).

256 Report of the MEPC on its 57th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (7 April
2008) at 46 [MEPC 57 Report].

259 Ibid at 48.

258 MEPC 57 Report, supra note 256 at 47.
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rejecting the second and was supported by
Barbados, Brazil, South Africa and Venezuela.260

general proposed completion of that task by MEPC
59 in 2009. Both suggestions were adopted.268

There was more unity in the various industry
sectors. Discussions in the Tripartite Working
Group, consisting of representatives of shipyards,
ship owners and classification societies, supported
a cross-industry-based goal.261 This, as well as other
proposals, including technical submissions and a
Danish proposal for a global levy on bunker fuel
as a short-term measure,262 were referred to the
working group. There was growing support for a
mandatory CO2 design index for new ships, which
was referred to the working group.263 In turn, during
MEPC 57, the Working Group on GHG Emissions
from Ships discussed the various submissions,
guided by the nine principles, although some
participating states reiterated their reservations on
the application of the second principle.264 Drawing
on its previous work, the working group focused
on a set of short-term and long-term measures,
with the former constituting the basis for new
energy efficiency regulations.265 It proceeded to
plan its prospective intersessional work for CO2
design and operational indices and MBMs.266

In June 2008, Norway hosted a major intersessional
working group that significantly advanced the
IMO’s work on GHG emissions and enabled
MEPC 58 to make progress.269 The MEPC formed
a working group to try to finalize work on the
CO2 emissions design and operational indices
(now renamed as EEDI and Energy Efficiency
Operational Indicator [EEOI], respectively, on
the basis of a proposal by Brazil) and considered
proposals for the Ship Efficiency Management
Plan.270 This time, the working group was tasked
with a GHG-specific mandate, rather than to
consider all air pollution issues within the MEPC’s
purview. A draft interim EEDI for new ships was
produced for trial purposes, but more work on
the operational index and management plan
was needed. A key issue was what form new
mandatory measures should take, i.e., whether they
should be developed as amendments to MARPOL
Annex VI, a new Annex VII, or even a new standalone instrument, but this was not resolved.271

The timing of MEPC 57 signified a sense of urgency
to progress on the GHG issue because of the need
to coordinate inputs concerning GHG emissions
reduction efforts in the maritime sector into the
UNFCCC process and the 2009 UN Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen. In essence, the MEPC
was tasked with developing the international
shipping industry’s commitment. The IMO
secretary-general proposed acceleration of work,
namely completing work on the CO2 Emission
Indexing Scheme and the CO2 emission baseline(s)
by MEPC 58.267 As for deliberations on the technical
and operational measures and MBMs, the secretary-

260 Ibid.
261 A Cross-industry Goal-based Approach to Reduction of GHG Emissions
from New Ships, Submitted by the ICS, BIMCO, CESA, IACS,
INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/8 (23
January 2008).
262 MEPC 57 Report, supra note 256 at 50–51.

The MEPC 58 deliberations on MBMs constituted
the first in-depth substantive discussion on such
measures. As such, the discussion was less fruitful
than on technical measures, in part because of
their controversy, and because not all submissions
were considered due to time constraints. Even so,
a range of ideas were acknowledged as interesting
and worth further study. Although some were
argued as reasonably straightforward to introduce,
there was considerable uncertainty as to how
they would work, and that consequently member
states needed more information.272 Fundamental
differences on principles remained, most especially
whether new emissions requirements should bind
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol Annex I states, a view
now shared by a growing number of developing
countries, or whether all states should be making
them applicable to all ships.273 The reality is that
international shipping emissions cannot easily be
attributed to any particular territory and if ships

268 MEPC 57 Report, supra note 256 at 51–52.

263 Ibid at 50.
264 Namely Brazil, China, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Venezuela.
Report of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships, IMO Doc
MEPC 57/WP.8 (3 April 2008).
265 Ibid, annex 1.
266 Ibid at 4–5, annex 3.
267 Possible Expediting of IMO’s Work on Reduction of GHG Emissions from
Ships, Note by the Secretary-General, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/7 (21
January 2008).

269 Report of the Outcome of the First Intersessional Meeting of the Working
Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Note by the Secretariat,
IMO Doc MEPC 58/4 (4 July 2008).
270 Report of the MEPC on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16
October 2008) at 36–37.
271 Ibid at 33–34.
272 Ibid at 37–39.
273 Ibid, annex 9.
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registered under the flags of developing states
were to be excluded or given preference, the whole
purpose of reducing emissions from international
shipping would be undermined. At MEPC 58, there
was a growing understanding that there could be
other ways to address CBDR, for example, through
technology transfer and funds generated from a
prospective MBM. However, the uncertainty around
MBMs did not generate confidence that the special
needs of developing countries would be addressed
in a satisfactory manner. At this point, debate
on the question of who should bear the bulk of
responsibility for GHG emissions reductions from
international shipping highlighted a profound
North-South divide. Moreover, there were other
divisions. For example, Greece, a major ship-owning
state, opposed MBMs until their added value to
the efficiency of shipping could be demonstrated,
and reiterated some views expressed at the
intersessional meeting hosted by Norway that the
Danish proposal for a fuel levy was essentially a
tax that would impede international trade.274
On the eve of UNFCCC COP 15 in December 2009
and the inception of its fifty-ninth session in July,
the MEPC had not yet met the secretary-general’s
expedited agenda. COP 15 was expected to adopt
a new post-2012 agreement to combat climate
change. The IMO had already submitted ideas for
international shipping to the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under
the Convention.275 The IMO was under pressure
to demonstrate commitment to the international
community, at least with respect to its work on
energy efficiency. There remained fundamental
differences on principles and concern over
insufficient information to deliberate on some
issues. Environmental NGOs added pressure by
indicating their readiness to call upon other fora,
such as the UNFCCC or the European Union, to
take timely and appropriate actions if MEPC 59 did
not produce agreement.276 Even so, MEPC 59 made
progress. The committee instructed the working
group to finalize work on the EEDI and the EEOI.277

Work on the SEMP as a fuel efficiency management
tool would continue in view of finalization
and a guidance document on best practices
for fuel-efficient operations was finalized.278
MEPC 59 resumed discussion of MBMs and new
proposals were submitted in addition to Denmark’s
earlier submission. These included an emission
trading scheme (cap and trade) applicable to all
ships proposed by France, Germany and Norway,279
and a leveraged incentive scheme proposed by
Japan.280 Although not advancing an MBM, the
United States proposed mandatory efficiency
standards for new and existing ships using the
EEDI that could accompany an MBM.281 These
and other proposals are further discussed later
in this report. Potential emissions reduction
scenarios from MBMs were considered, but there
was no agreement on whether targets should
also be set.282 It was noted that the discussion
was still conceptual at this stage and would
need to be continued through future sessions.283
Earlier concerns regarding their uncertain
impact, especially on developing countries,
were reiterated.284 A majority of delegations
agreed to continue consideration of MBMs.285
The second IMO GHG Study, commissioned at
MEPC 56, was completed.286 Among others, it
concluded that shipping emitted 3.3 percent of
global CO2 emissions in 2007, and international
shipping approximately 2.7 percent, mostly
through exhausts, with CO2 being the most
significant contributor. By 2050, and in a businessas-usual scenario, ship emissions could grow by
150 percent to 250 percent, commensurate with
growth in world trade. If technical and operational

278 Ibid at 43.
279 Positive Aspects of a Global Emission Trading Scheme for International
Shipping, Submitted by France, Germany and Norway, IMO Doc MEPC
59/4/25 (8 May 2009); Cornerstones for an Outline of a Convention of
a Global Emission Trading Scheme for International Shipping, Submitted
by France, Germany and Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/26 (8 May
2009).
280 Consideration of a Market-based Mechanism to Improve the Energy
Efficiency of Ships Based on the International GHG Fund, Submitted by
Japan, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/34 (8 May 2009).

274 Ibid, annex 10.
275 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
Shipping-relevant Ideas and Proposals to the UNFCCC Process in 2008,
Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 59/INF.29 (22 May 2009).
276 IMO Must Act Decisively to Reduce GHG Emissions from Shipping if it
is to Retain its Competence in Technical and Political Matters related
to Shipping and GHGs, Submitted by Friends of the Earth International,
Greenpeace International and World Wild Fund for Nature, IMO Doc
MEPC 59/4/47 (22 May 2009) at 5.
277 Report of the MEPC on its 59th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 59/24 (27 July
2009) at 42–44 [MEPC 59 Report].
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281 Comments on MEPC 59/4/2 and MEPC 59/4/4 and an Additional
Approach to Addressing Maritime GHG Emissions, Submitted by the
United States, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/48 (22 May 2009).
282 MEPC 59 Report, supra note 277 at 47.
283 Ibid at 48.
284 Ibid at 48–50.
285 Ibid at 50.
286 Second IMO GHG Study 2009: Update of the 2000 IMO GHG Study −
Status Report from the Steering Committee, Note by the Secretariat, IMO
Doc MEPC 59/4/4 (8 April 2009) [Second GHG Study].
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measures to enhance efficiency (for example,
EEDI), which were deemed cost-efficient, were
to be used, emissions could be reduced by 25
percent to 75 percent below these projections.
The report further “found that market-based
measures were cost-effective policy instruments
with a high environmental effectiveness.”287
Moreover, MBMs “captured the largest amount of
emissions under the scope, allowed both technical
and operational measures in the shipping sector
to be used, and could offset emissions in other
sectors.”288 The environmental benefit of EEDI
was limited because it only applied to new ships
and incentivized design improvements without
including operations. In a business-as-usual
scenario for the industry and an emissions scenario
where global temperatures stabilize at 2°C above
pre-industrial levels by 2100, ship emissions were
estimated to constitute 12 percent to 18 percent
of the global total CO2 emissions in 2050.
The 2009 Copenhagen conference failed to produce
the expected climate treaty, but this did not
eliminate pressure on the IMO. The Copenhagen
Accord did not expressly mention bunker fuels,
however, the reference to the need to reduce global
emissions to maintain global temperature to below
20C from pre-industrial levels nevertheless raised
the question, “What would be a fair contribution
for the international shipping sector to achieving
this long term goal?”289 MEPC 60 resumed this
task and had before it more than 100 documents
to consider. A significant breakthrough was a
proposal by Japan, Norway and the United States
to establish the EEDI for new ships and the SEEMP
for all ships in operation as a new mandatory part
in MARPOL Annex VI.290 MARPOL was already
addressing ozone-depleting substances, some
of which contributed to climate change, and
had a well-established survey and certification
system. The convention’s tacit acceptance
process for amendments provided a fast route
to implementation if Annex VI was used as the

vehicle.291 Not all delegations supported the Annex
VI route, as it was questioned whether CO2 was
in fact a pollutant within the meaning and intent
of the convention. Some preferred a stand-alone
instrument, similar to the International Convention
for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast
Water and Sediments (BWM Convention) and Hong
Kong Ship Recycling Convention. The organization’s
legal division advised that there were no legal
obstacles to using Annex VI for GHG regulation
and, on the contrary, this regulatory route was
consistent with the annex’s purposes.292 Others,
mostly developing countries, did not support
mandatory regulations, preferring to see further
development and trials first.293 The issue was
put to a vote and the majority supported using
Annex VI as the regulatory vehicle. The Working
Group on Energy Efficiency Measures for Ships,
tasked with the development of mandatory legal
text and consideration of related guidelines,
likewise did not find consensus,294 prompting
an intervention by the secretary-general.295 The
impasse was not only with respect to developingcountry concerns over mandatory measures,
but also with regard to convening a further
intersessional meeting of the working group to
complete its tasks. This decision was put to the
vote and the majority gave the working group
the green light to address outstanding tasks.
Consideration of how to move forward the
discussion on MBMs led MEPC 60 to establish
an expert group to undertake a feasibility study
291 MEPC 60 Report, supra note 289 at 25–29. The tacit acceptance
procedure is a technique for the adoption of amendments to the
international maritime conventions introduced to replace the need for
a formal diplomatic conference. The procedure is especially useful
for technical rules, such as those in annexes, that require frequent
amendment. Amendments are adopted by a resolution of a committee
responsible for the convention (such as the MSC for SOLAS and MEPC
for MARPOL) by a specified majority of voting state parties to the
amended instrument, although in practice most amendments are adopted
by consensus. The amendments enter into force following the expiry of
a designated period for the registration of objections. Unless there is
objection to amendments by a specified minority of state parties, the
amendments enter into force without further procedure. See MARPOL,
supra note 10, art 16.
292 MEPC 60 Report, supra note 289 at 28–39.
293 Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Peru, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Ibid at
30, 33.
294 Ibid at 30–31 for terms of reference and 31–32 for the working group’s
report.

287 MEPC 59 Report, supra note 277 at 38.
288 Ibid.
289 Report of the MEPC on its 60th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 60/22 (12 April
2010) at 22 [MEPC 60 Report].
290 Mandatory EEDI Requirements — Draft Text for Adding a New Part to
MARPOL Annex VI for Regulation of the Energy Efficiency of Ships,
Submitted by Japan, Norway and the United States, IMO Doc MEPC
60/4/35 (15 January 2010).

295 “In this Organization, we dislike taking a vote. Voting is divisive and one
would ask what chances of implementation have the technical standards
adopted in this Organization if the decision to introduce that standard
has been made on a 51 to 49 percent basis. Sometimes, the decision,
if consensus cannot be achieved, will have to be made in accordance
with the Organization’s well established and well-functioning Rules
of Procedure, meaning that decisions are made on a majority basis,
which leads to the conclusion that whatever people may think, this is a
democratically based Organization.” Ibid at 32.
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and impact assessment of MBMs and report to
the committee,296 while focusing on 10 specific
proposals and other submissions.297 The relevance
and application of the CBDR principle was
underscored, but, even so, several major developing
countries reserved their positions on the terms of
reference and the Expert Group on Feasibility Study
and Impact Assessment of possible Market-based
Measures was established by majority vote.298
Another subject of disagreement was whether the
international maritime sector should be subject
to an express emission cap or reduction target for
the world fleet. Norway submitted scenarios for
caps for 2020 and 2030.299 The industry response
preferred an approach that was consistent across
the entire global transportation sector and
aimed at improving efficiency of the global fleet
rather than imposing a cap.300 The International
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) argued
for an approach that integrates a proposed
rebate mechanism in the design of an MBM and
that this would help reconcile the principles
undergirding the IMO and UNFCCC regimes.301
Intersessional work on the details of the regulatory
text of the EEDI and SEEMP continued, identifying
several issues and possible approaches proposed
to MEPC 61. MEPC 61 was further informed by
important scientific documents that explored
scenarios of likely reductions in emissions by
296 Ibid at 37.
297 Specifically, on: An International Fund for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Ships (Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria and the
IPTA); Market-based Instruments: A Penalty on Trade and Development
(Bahamas); Further details on the United States Proposal to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping (United States);
A Further Outline of a Global Emission Trading System (ETS) for
International Shipping (Norway); A Global Emissions Trading System
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping (United
Kingdom); Consideration of a Market-based Mechanism: Leveraged
Incentive Scheme to Improve the Energy Efficiency for Ships Based on
the International GHG Fund (Japan); Proposal to Establish a Vessel
Efficiency System (VES) (World Shipping Council); Achieving Reduction in
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships through Port State Arrangements
Utilizing the Ship Traffic, Energy and Environment Model, STEEM
(Jamaica); Further Elements for the Development of an Emissions Trading
System for International Shipping (France); Impact Assessment of an
Emissions Trading Scheme with a Particular View on Developing Countries
(Germany); and A Rebate Mechanism for a Market-based Instrument for
International Shipping (International Union for Conservation of Nature).
Ibid at 37–38.
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employing technical and operational measures,302
using excess capacity in the shipping industry as
an opportunity to employ slow-speed regimes,303
and combining energy efficiency and a proposed
carbon credit trading scheme.304 Speed controls
could potentially generate substantial savings,
depending on the type of ship or voyage segment.
It was felt that no such new dedicated operational
rule was needed, as this measure would be
captured by the EEDI and SEEMP.305 However,
at a minimum, it was important to ensure that
sufficient reserve power was maintained to
retain full vessel manoeuvrability.306 Proposals for
introducing correction factors to the EEDI were
treated with caution, as it was important not to
create exceptions, other than for weather and
polar class.307 A proposal for relaxing standards
for remotely located states and SIDS was rejected
for several reasons, including that substandard
ships would be pushed into the trades of those
states.308 Similarly, differentiating between ship
construction in developed and developing states
was rejected.309 If EEDI and SEEMP were to be
made mandatory, regional and national capacity
building would be needed for implementation and
enforcement.310 MEPC 61 also considered the report
of the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact
Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures.
The report presented an analysis of the 10 proposals
submitted by member states aimed at targeting
GHG reductions through in-sector emissions
reductions or out-of-sector emissions reductions.311
The committee could not reach consensus on the
MBM to pursue and left further deliberation of

302 Marginal Abatement Costs and Cost-effectiveness of Energy-efficiency
Measures, Submitted by the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and
Technology (IMarEST), IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.18 (23 July 2010).
303 Going Slow to Reduce Emissions — Can the Current Surplus of Maritime
Transport Capacity be Turned into an Opportunity to Reduce GHG
Emissions?, Submitted by the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC), IMO Doc
MEPC 61/INF.22 (23 July 2010).
304 Further Details on the US Proposal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from International Shipping, Submitted by the United States, IMO Doc
MEPC 61/INF.24 (23 July 2010) [MEPC 61/INF.24].

298 Ibid at 40, annex 8. See annex 9 for statements by delegations.

305 Ibid at 29–30.

299 Alternative Emission Caps for Shipping in 2020 and 2030, Submitted by
Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/23 (15 January 2010).

306 Report of the MEPC on its 61st Session, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (6
October 2010) [MEPC 61 Report]. Proposal by IACS at 34–35.

300 Emission “Caps” and Reduction Targets, Submitted by the World Shipping
Council (WSC), IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/28 (15 January 2010).

307 Ibid at 34.

301 A Rebate Mechanism for a Market-based Instrument for International
Shipping, Submitted by IUCN, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/55 (29 January
2010) [MEPC 60/4/55]. The WWF has subsequently submitted follow-up
proposals that build on this approach. See e.g. Draft Legal Text on Uses
of Financing Generated from a Maritime MBM, Submitted by the World
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/10 (27 July 2012).

309 Proposed by China. Ibid at 38.

308 Proposed by Vanuatu. Ibid at 35–36.
310 Ibid at 28–29.
311 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility
Study and Impact Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures, Note
by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 August 2010).
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this issue to intersessional work,312 with some
delegations expressing strong reservations.313
At MEPC 62 in 2011, the Drafting Group on
Amendments to Mandatory Instruments (Part
II) completed final revisions for the proposed
amendments to MARPOL Annex VI.314 A new
Chapter 4 made the EEDI mandatory for new
ships and the SEEMP for all new and existing
ships, with entry into force on January 1, 2013.
Breaking with the culture of consensus on the
adoption of new rules and standards, the amending
resolution was forced to a vote and 49 out of the
59 (at the time) MARPOL Annex VI state parties
voted in favour, with Brazil, Chile, China, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia voting against. The remaining
five states abstained or did not vote.315 Further
work on capacity building, technical assistance
and transfer of technology, as well as finalization
of guidelines to accompany the EEDI and SEEMP,
was left to MEPC 63. The discussion on MBMs also
remained divisive and did not advance further.
MEPC 63 was similarly divided on the issue of
capacity building and technology transfer and
failed to adopt a resolution on the topic, despite
its significance and expectations that it would
accompany the Annex VI amendments.316 The EEDI
and SEEMP guidelines to facilitate implementation
were also not completed. There were several issues
related to both the EEDI and SEEMP that required
future MEPC attention. Discussion on MBMs
continued with respect to assessment of impacts
of such measures, possible consolidation of the
various proposals, climate finance and use of MBM
revenue, and relationship between MBMs and world
trade rules. A more in-depth understanding of the
direct and indirect impacts of MBMs on developing
countries was needed.317 A study conducted by
India suggested that fuel price increases as a result
of an MBM could have a substantial impact on

that country’s oil, iron ore and coal trades.318 Views
differed on whether MBMs were needed, whether
the various proposals should be consolidated
to enable focus, and whether the EEDI should
be used as a basis for an MBM. A working group
had identified several possible uses for MBM
revenues.319 However, there were widely divergent
views on how revenues from an MBM in shipping
might be used and whether there should be a
relationship to similar efforts under the UNFCCC,
even though international shipping had been listed
as one of the possible sources for climate finance.320
While some delegations saw no incompatibility
between an MBM and WTO rules, others expressed
caution as they perceived inconsistency issues.321
Discussions on a resolution on capacity building
and technology transfer continued, but were not
concluded at MEPC 64. In consequence, and at
the behest of states that felt further discussion
on MBMs could not progress before adoption
of the resolution, the committee postponed
further deliberation to MEPC 65.322 The progress
to be observed at MEPC 64 related to the
continued development of the guidelines for
the implementation of the EEDI and SEEMP.
MEPC 65 finally found consensus on a controversial
resolution — Promotion of Technical Cooperation and Transfer of Technology relating
to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of
Ships — but only after informal consultations
undertaken by the committee chair.323 The key
issues that needed to be addressed were CBDR,
transfer of technology and financing. Consensus
was reached without any mandatory stipulations
and essentially providing a framework for the
IMO to offer technical assistance and for member
states to promote support for other states.324 An
Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on Facilitation of
318 Market Based Measures — Impact on India’s Shipping Trade, Submitted
by India, IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/8 (23 December 2011) [MEPC 65/3/8].

312 MEPC 61 Report, supra note 306 at 48.
313 Ibid, annex 8. See also Market-Based Measures — Inequitable Burden on
Developing Countries, Submitted by India, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/19 (2
August 2010); Uncertainties and Problems in Market-based Measures,
Submitted by China and India, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/24 (5 August
2010).
314 Report of the Drafting Group on Amendments to Mandatory instruments
(Part II), IMO Doc MEPC 62/WP.11/Add.1 (15 July 2011).
315 Report of MEPC on its 62nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 62/24 (26
July 2011) at 57 [MEPC 62 Report]. Several states made statements,
reproduced in Report of the MEPC on its 62nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC
62/24/Add.1 (26 July 2011), annex 17.
316 Report of the MEPC on its 63rd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 63/23 (14
March 2012) at 32 [MEPC 63 Report].
317 Ibid at 36–38.

319 Namely: “(1) incentivizing shipping to achieve improved energy
efficiency; (2) offsetting – purchase of approved emission reduction
credits; (3) providing a rebate to developing countries; (4) financing
adaptation and mitigation activities in developing countries; (5) financing
improvement of maritime transport infrastructure in developing countries
(e.g., Africa); (6) supporting R&D to improve energy efficiency of
international shipping; and (7) supporting the Organization’s Integrated
Technical Co-operation Programme.” MEPC 63 Report, supra note 316 at
42.
320 Ibid at 41–42.
321 Ibid at 43.
322 Report of the MEPC on its 64th Session, IMO Doc 64/23 (11 October
2012) at 37–38 [MEPC 64 Report].
323 MEPC 65 Report, supra note 18 at 23, annex 4.
324 Ibid, annex 4.
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Transfer of Technology for Ships was established to
assess impacts of the implementation of the new
Chapter 4 of MARPOL Annex VI and to maintain
a list of green technologies and identify ways of
access.325 Developed states secured the protection
of intellectual property rights. Implementation
action would start at MEPC 66. This consensus
should have led to further deliberations on
MBMs, but that was not to be. Instead, MEPC
65 suspended further discussion on MBMs to
an undetermined future session.326 Perhaps this
decision was not a total surprise as the committee
remained divided on MBMs, even though there was
progress on technical and operational initiatives,
albeit not always on the basis of consensus.
In contrast, work on the finer details of the EEDI
and SEEMP continued in a productive manner
at MEPC 65. Through its working groups and
in plenary, the committee resolved numerous
outstanding technical issues, such as the
computation of the EEDI for different classes
of ships such as cruise ships, cargo ships, LNG
carriers, ro-ro (roll-on/roll-off) cargo ships and ro-ro
passenger ships, vehicle carriers and distinguished
vessels running dual fuel engines. Accordingly, the
guidelines to accompany the EEDI and SEEMP were
finally completed and readied for adoption at MEPC
65 and 66.327 Amendments to Chapter 4
were already needed, in particular to exempt
polar-class vessels with independent icebreaking
capability from EEDI because of their considerably
higher installed power and inability to meet that
standard.328 There were other proposals for further
action to enhance energy efficiency of ships, but the
committee left that discussion for the next session.
With debates on MBMs on hold and work on Annex
VI, Chapter 4, guidelines largely completed, the
MEPC 66’s attention turned to implementation of
the resolution on technology transfer and capacity
building, continued follow-up work on Chapter
4 guidelines and preparations for a third IMO
GHG study, and worked on the proposal to set up
an EEDI database. The Ad Hoc Expert Working
Group on Facilitation of Transfer of Technology
for Ships was established and its first meeting

convened.329 It was further able to report on its
initial activities at MEPC 67.330 MEPC 67 also
continued work on conceptualizing the database
and updating and reviewing EEDI guidelines.331
There was no progress on the discussion to
explore additional operational energy efficiency
standards for ships accompanied by metrics.332
The Third IMO GHG Study was completed in 2014
and presented at MEPC 67.333 The study noted
that CO2 emissions from shipping were projected
to increase significantly. The business-as-usual
scenarios projected an increase of between
50 percent and 250 percent by 2050, although
enhancement of energy efficiency and reduced
emissions had the potential to mitigate the
increase to some extent. Efficiency improvements
were important, but the study concluded that
“even modelled improvements with the greatest
energy savings could not yield a downward
trend. Compared to regulatory or market-driven
improvements in efficiency, changes in the fuel
mix have a limited impact on GHG emissions,
assuming fossil fuels remain dominant.”334
An ongoing key concern was the absence of reliable
ship emissions data to facilitate adoption of further
technical and operational measures to enhance
energy efficiency in international shipping. The data
issue was first flagged at MEPC 63,335 and at MEPC
66 it was agreed that a Ship Fuel Consumption
Database would assist the IMO in its future reviews
of technological developments and in determining
CO2 emissions. The debate was continued in
successive sessions because the information
required to determine energy efficiency could
be detailed with respect to the transport work
undertaken, rather than simply relate to the fuel
consumed. In turn, efficiency data potentially raised
sensitive issues of commercial competitiveness if
the raw data were to be made publicly available.336
Other issues included whether reporting should
be mandatory, vessel size for reporting, impact

329 MEPC 66 Report, supra note 327 at 26–28.
330 Report of the MEPC on its 67th Session, IMO Doc 67/20 (31 October
2014) at 25–26.
331 Ibid at 26, 29–30.
332 Ibid at 33.

325 Ibid.
326 Ibid at 44.
327 Ibid at 41–42. The 2014 Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of
the Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships were
adopted at MEPC 66: Report of the MEPC on its 66th Session, IMO Doc
66/21 (25 April 2014) at 25, annex 5 [MEPC 66 Report].
328 MEPC 65 Report, supra note 18 at 32. This was an issue flagged by
Canada, Finland and Sweden.
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333 Third IMO GHG Study 2014 — Executive Summary, Note by the
Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 67/6 (1 July 2014), annex [Third IMO GHG
Study].
334 Ibid, annex at 13.
335 MEPC 63 Report, supra note 316 at 46.
336 Report of the MEPC on its 68th Session, IMO Doc 68/21 (29 May 2015)
at 36–38 [MEPC 68 Report].

Special Report • Aldo Chircop, Meinhard Doelle and Ryan Gauvin

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274

on different cargoes carried, impact of change of
ship ownership or registration and responsibility
for transferring data to the flag state.337
As observed earlier, the slow pace of work on
GHG regulation at the IMO triggered EU pressure.
The European Union welcomed the EEDI and the
SEEMP, but considered these measures insufficient
because they would not lead to an absolute
emissions reduction of GHGs from international
shipping. 338 The European Union agreed that a
global CO2 data collection system for international
shipping was a necessary step, and had in fact
proceeded to adopt the EU MRV339 as an example
of what a global system could look like. The data
included detailed emission and transport efficiency,
with an effective enforcement date in European
ports of January 1, 2018. The European Union
is currently considering the appropriateness of
the alignment of its MRV scheme with the IMO
data collection system. The effect of the MRV
initiative was to exert regional pressure for global
action, which materialized at MEPC 70 by an
amendment to Annex VI introducing a mandatory
global data collection system for reporting data
on ships’ annual fuel consumption for ships of
5,000 GT and over.340 These ships are thought to
account for 85 percent of all GHG emissions from
international shipping.341 With entry into force
in 2018, reporting of data will start in 2020.342
On the eve of the Paris Climate Change Conference,
at MEPC 68, the Marshall Islands, both a SIDS
state and one of the largest open register states,
proposed that the IMO commence work to establish
a GHG emissions reduction target consistent
with keeping global warming below 1.5°C and to
337 Report of the Working Group, IMO Doc MEPC 68/WP.10 (13 May
2015).
338 Development of a Global Data Collection System for Maritime Transport,
submitted by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Commission, IMO Doc
MEPC 68/4/1 (3 March 2015) at 3.

agree on the measures necessary to reach that
target.343 The question whether emissions from
international shipping should have a defined
emissions reduction target has been an ongoing
issue in MEPC deliberations across sessions. The
ensuing debate reflected the broad diversity of
views that had characterized past GHG discussions
in the IMO.344 It was recognized that more could
be done at the IMO, because while substantial
efforts were invested into enhancing energy
efficiency to reduce emissions and establishing
a database, the Third IMO GHG Report did not
paint a rosy picture on the sufficiency of such
measures. The remaining issues concerning the
proposed mandatory data collection system for fuel
consumption of ships were resolved at MEPC 69
and amendments to integrate the system into the
new Chapter 4 of Annex VI approved, paving the
way for tacit acceptance.345 Guidelines to facilitate
administration of the database and implementation
of the regulation were adopted at MEPC 71.346
The Paris Climate Conference in December 2015 may
have provided the IMO a breath of relief by tacitly
leaving the determination of the international
shipping industry’s contribution to GHG emissions
reductions to the IMO for the time being. But it also
renewed debate in the IMO as to the organization’s
long-term GHG vision and how it should proceed
in developing the industry’s fair contribution. In
a post-conference debate at the IMO, it was clear
that although the IMO had for years worked on and
developed a framework for energy efficiency to
reduce CO2 emissions, much more was expected.347
The IMO would need to develop, and be seen
to adopt, meaningful measures that would be
periodically reviewable. That international trade
should not be undermined by new measures, and
the need for developing countries (especially SIDS
and LDCs) to have access to financial resources and
technology, were underscored. Reconciliation of
CBRD and NMFT had to be addressed. However,
there were those who felt the IMO should stay
its course on the database and, following its
operationalization, use its data to proceed with

339 EU MRV, supra note 148.
340 Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Data Collection System for Fuel
Oil Consumption of Ships), 28 October 2016, IMO Doc MEPC 70/18/
Add.1 (entered into force 1 March 2018), annex 3. The flag state has the
responsibility to monitor, report and issue a statement of compliance to its
ships and transfer the reported data to the IMO Ship Fuel Consumption
Database.
341 IMO, Press Briefing, “New Requirements for International Shipping as
UN Body Continues to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions” (28 October
2016), online: IMO <www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings>.
342 Consideration of the Report of the MEPC, Note by the SecretaryGeneral, IMO Doc C 117/7 (16 November 2016) [Council 117].
Reporting guidelines are in preparation.

343 Setting a Reduction Target and Agreeing Associated Measures for
International Shipping, Submitted by the Marshall Islands, IMO Doc
68/5/1 (20 March 2015).
344 MEPC 68 Report, supra note 336 at 41–44.
345 Report of the MEPC on its 69th Session, IMO Doc 69/21 (13 May 2016)
at 33 [MEPC 69 Report].
346 Resolution MEPC.292(71) — 2017 Guidelines for Administration
Verification of Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Data, in Report of the MEPC on
its 71st Session, IMO Doc MEPC 71/17 (24 July 2017), Annex 16.
347 MEPC 69 Report, supra note 345 at 35–38.
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analysis and eventual decision making on a
long-term plan. Industry interests felt the IMO
approach should retain flexibility and consider
aspirational rather than legally binding targets. It
was felt important to ensure the measures adopted
to date, such as the EEDI and technology transfer
and capacity- building measures, be implemented
first. Past differences of views persisted, but the
organization opted for a disciplined approach.
The discussion concluded by recognizing that
priority should continue to be given to the data
collection system and for further work to proceed
on the three-step approach of maritime regulation:
data collection; analysis; and decision making.
Convened in the wake of the Paris Agreement,
MEPC 70 was under pressure to demonstrate a
game plan for the orchestration of the international
shipping industry’s contribution to the global
response to climate change. An industry proposal348
was used as the basis for the committee’s adoption
of the Roadmap for Developing a Comprehensive
IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions
from Ships.349 The roadmap consists of further
GHG studies, intersessional work subject to
timelines, and ongoing committee work on ship
energy efficiency improvements. The initial GHG
reduction strategy will be adopted in 2018 and
will lead to a revised strategy in 2023 to include a
range of measures and implementation schedules
over the short, medium and long term.350 MEPC
70 also adopted the finalized mandatory data
collection system for fuel oil consumption of ships,
the 2014 guidelines were amended and guidelines
for calculation of the EEDI were updated.
For MEPC 71, the committee had before it
numerous new submissions by member states
and organizations with consultative status,
submitted to the committee directly, as well as to
ISWG-GHG 1. The ISWG-GHG 1 met in June 2017
for intensive discussions on the directions for
the strategy and work plan for consideration at
MEPC 71. Following consideration of submissions
and the ISWG-GHG 1 report, the committee
adopted the latter’s proposals, including the
outline proposed for the initial strategy developed
348 Development of a Road Map to Determine a Possible IMO Fair Share
Contribution, Submitted by BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO
and WSC, IMO Doc MEPC 70/7/8 (19 August 2016).
349 Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 70/18 (11
November 2016) at 50–51; Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session, IMO
Doc MEPC 70/18/Add.1 (11 November 2016), annex 11; see ISWGGHG 1 Report, supra note 19.
350 Council 117, supra note 342.
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at a parallel meeting during MEPC 71.351 The
proposed outline became the template of the
initial IMO strategy adopted by MEPC 72:
→→ preamble/introduction/context,
including emission scenarios;
→→ vision;
→→ levels of ambition;
→→ guiding principles;
→→ list of candidate short-, mid- and longterm further measures with possible
timelines and their impacts on states;
→→ barriers and supportive measures; capacity
building and technical cooperation;
→→ research and development (R&D);
→→ follow-up actions toward the development
of the revised strategy; and
→→ periodic review of the strategy.
In using this outline as a basis of work at
subsequent intersessional meetings (October 2017
and April 2018), the MEPC further instructed the
working group to consider the substantive issues
set out in submissions by various delegations
and organizations with consultative status and
to submit a progress report in 2018. The ISWGGHG 2 concluded its meeting in October 2017
and commenced to populate the strategy.352 The
importance of the issue was demonstrated by
the participation of 59 member state delegations
and other associate members and organizations
with consultative status. As before, the meeting
continued to evidence fundamental differences on
the core elements of the strategy, in particular on
vision, levels of ambitions and guiding principles.
The initial IMO strategy was adopted by MEPC 72 in
April 2018 as proposed by ISWG-GHG 3 on the basis
of overwhelming support from member states,
despite the continuing reservations expressed. The
strategy advances a long-term “best endeavours”
commitment with a vision statement that “IMO
remains committed to reducing GHG emissions
351 Report of the MEPC on its 71st Session, IMO Doc 71/17 (24 July 2017)
at 48–49 [MEPC 71 Report].
352 ISWG-GHG 2 Report, supra note 19. See also “Progress Made in
Developing GHG Strategy for International Shipping” IMO Briefing (30
October 2017) online: IMO <https://docs.imo.org/Common/NewsItem.
aspx?id=aa6bd907-2ab4-429a-82aa-b2208e44b212>.
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from international shipping and, as a matter of
urgency, aims to phase them out as soon as possible
in this century.”353 The accompanying objectives
include contribution to global mitigation efforts
under the climate regime and pursuit of SDG 13,
identification of actions to be implemented in
shipping while taking into consideration impacts
on states and the role of shipping in global trade,
and identification of related actions and measures,
including R&D and monitoring of GHG emissions.
The significant differences on levels of ambition
were bridged through the efforts of the ISWG chair.354
First, the expectation is that the carbon intensity of
ships would decline as a result of ratcheting up the
EEDI for new ships. Second, the carbon intensity of
shipping would decline to reduce average carbon
emissions across the transport industry by at least
40 percent by 2030 and aiming for 70 percent
by 2050, compared to the 2008 base year. Third,
GHG emissions would peak and decline to reduce
annual GHG emissions by at least 50 percent by
2050 compared to 2008, while pursuing further
efforts consistent with the Paris Agreement goals.
There was agreement on 2008 as the base year in
determining future emissions reductions and this
reflected the common understanding in the working
group.355 In comparing data between 2007 and
2012, the Third IMO GHG Study appeared to suggest
that 2008 was the peak year for CO2 emissions.356
The longstanding controversy concerning the
guiding principles was resolved by ensuring that
the strategy’s principles reflected both IMO and
UNFCCC principles, not a small achievement
considering the competing proposals.357 The

353 ISWG-GHG 2 Report, supra note 19, annex at 4; Initial IMO Strategy,
supra note 20 at para 2.
354 ISWG-GHG 2 Report, supra note 19, annex at 4–6; Initial IMO Strategy,
supra note 20 at para 3.1.
355 For example, Japan proposed short- to mid-term goals to improve energy
efficiency 40 percent over 2008 by 2030 and a long-term goal to reduce
net CO2 emissions by 50 percent over 2008 by 2060. Belgium and others
proposed a target of at least 70 percent while pursuing efforts to achieve
100 percent reduction by 2050, compared to 2008. Ibid at 9.
356 Third IMO GHG Study, supra note 333 at 1.
357 The first two competing options for principles were the nine MEPC 57
principles (ISWG-GHG 2 Report, supra note 19, annex at 7–8), and
10 separate principles submitted by Argentina, Brazil, China, Ecuador,
India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey at MEPC 71,
which included coherence with the UNFCCC regime, alignment with the
Sustainable Development Goals and no trade barriers (Ibid, annex at
8). The third option was the eight principles identified in ISWG-GHG,
namely: ambitious and evidence-based; ensure the sustainable growth of
the international shipping sector; avoid regional or unilateral measures;
inclusive in addressing member states’ concerns; flexible in accommodating
sectorial developments; supportive of innovation and R&D; cost-effective,
practical and easy to administer; and recognition of early actions (ISWGGHG 2 Report, supra note 19 at 8 and 19).

compromise includes both non-discrimination and
NMFT regardless of flag in the IMO conventions
and CBDR-RCNC in the climate regime.358 The
adopted principles further include impacts
on states, especially the LDCs and SIDS and
“the need for evidence-based decision-making
balanced with the precautionary approach.”359 The
discussion in the working group had considered
an articulation of the CBDR that would include
emphasis on developed country lead, geographical
considerations, low-value cargo, transportation
costs, routes, phasing-in and readiness, and this
is now reflected in parts of the strategy dedicated
to impacts on states and barriers.360 Discussion
on whether the strategy should be in-sector, so
that international shipping would not become
a source for general climate finance outside the
sector,361 was not reflected in the strategy.
Despite the substantial differences with respect to
measures, the strategy reflects convergence on a
range of measures for the short-, medium- and longterm periods.362 As adopted, the strategy includes
short-term measures finalized in the 2018–2023
period, followed by medium-term measures in
2023–2030 and long-term measures after 2030, with
the effective date of each measure to be determined
and while anticipating that some short- and
medium-term measures could commence prior to
2023. An initial and non-exhaustive list of measures
is set out in the strategy. Measures are conceived in
terms of their direct application to ships as distinct
from a supportive function they may play. Some
measures are based on enhancement of existing
regulation and practices (for example, ratcheting
up of the EEDI and SEEMP, other technical and
operational energy efficiency measures, existing
fleet improvement, speed management, and
management of methane and volatile organic
compound emissions). These measures are
familiar in the industry and therefore likely to
be implemented in the short term. Other shortterm measures can be described as facilitative to
enhance infrastructure and capacity to enable GHG
emissions reductions (for example, development of
national action plans, technical cooperation, port
measures, R&D, incentives for first movers, GHG/

358 Initial IMO Strategy, supra note 20 at para 3.2.
359 Ibid.
360 ISWG-GHG 2 Report, supra note 19, annex at 8–9; Initial IMO Strategy,
supra note 20, paras 4.10 and 5.
361 ISWG-GHG 2 Report, supra note 19, at 8.
362 Initial IMO Strategy, supra note 20 at para 4.1.
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carbon intensity guidelines, undertaking of studies
and better presentation of the IMO and its work on
this subject). The medium- and long-term measures
essentially build on the short-term measures and
the lessons learned while exploring new measures,
supported by technological developments.
These include low-carbon and zero carbon
fuels and “new/innovative emission reduction
mechanism(s), possibly including Market-based
Measures (MBMs), to incentivize GHG emission
reduction.”363 Considering the concerns expressed
in earlier MEPC deliberations, it is interesting to
observe that MBMs have been included as potential
measures to achieve significant GHG emissions
reductions in the event technical and operational
measures do not deliver sufficient reductions.
Of crucial importance, the revised strategy (to be
adopted in 2023) will be subject to periodic review
every five years after adoption.364 Ideally, such
reviews should coincide with the global stocktake to
ensure that efforts under IMO and the climate regime
are in synch. This may have to be determined in
the revised version of the strategy as the MEPC will
need to define the scope and terms of the review.
In the meantime, the IMO recognized that it was
necessary to continue its work on the initial strategy
to address the many concerns and reservations
expressed at MEPC 72. The MEPC agreed to convene
the fourth meeting of the ISWG-GHG to develop
a program of follow-up actions for the strategy,
consider how to advance GHG emissions reductions
and to report to MEPC 73 in October 2018.365
In summary, the substantive regulatory
achievements with respect to GHGs, and specifically
CO2, to date consist of 2011 amendments to MARPOL
Annex VI, introducing a new Chapter 4 setting out
the EEDI for mandatory new ships and the SEEMP
for all ships, and accompanied by guidelines,366
both of which are discussed further below, as well
as a mandatory data collection system for oil fuel
consumption. These measures are expected to render
all new ships 30 percent more energy efficient
by 2025 than those built in 2014, and mandatory
reporting for vessels of 5,000 GT or more of oil
fuel use to flag states and thereby to the IMO to
363 Ibid at para 4.8.
364 Ibid at para 7.

commence in 2020. Although not yet a regulatory
achievement, the initial IMO strategy sets out a
framework for a provisional pathway for potential
future regulation. Couched in compromise text, it
is short on detail and the task to develop specific
actions will be discharged by ISWG-GHG 4.

Range of Actual and Potential
Measures Considered
General
The categories of GHG emissions reduction measures
considered to date by the IMO for the maritime
sector consist of technological, operational and
MBMs. Technical and operational measures
provide an incentive for shipowners to comply
because of the greater operational efficiency likely
to be achieved. Enhanced efficiency translates
into lower fuel consumption and leads in turn
to lower operating costs. To some extent, this is
the “invisible hand” of the market at work, but
it is limited in its utility, as shipowners will only
invest voluntarily in technical and operational
measures to the extent that they expect to realize
a beneficial return. MBMs are different because
they attempt to internalize costs through various
tools, including levies, trading schemes and
offsets, to induce shipowners to reduce emissions
according to prescribed standards.367 By promoting
the internalization of costs, they constitute a
potentially useful tool for the implementation of the
“polluter pays” principle. Moreover, some MBMs,
such as levies, generate revenue, which may be
diverted by an administering body to further the
goals of the strategy. The work of the IMO with
respect to these measures is discussed next.

Technical and Operational Measures
Technical and operational measures are closely
interrelated. Generally, technical measures
relate to the standards of construction and
equipping of a ship and usually entail long-term
investments in the form of retrofitting and new
builds. Examples include new hull designs, new
propulsion machinery using cleaner fuels and
new propeller technology that enhances mobility
efficiency. Operational measures concern how a
vessel is in fact operated while trading or in port,

365 MEPC 72 Report, supra note 20 at 44.
366 2014 Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the Design Index (EEDI),
IMO Doc MEPC.1/Circ.855/Rev.1 (8 October 2015) and 2013 Interim
Guidelines for Determining Minimum Propulsion Power to Maintain the
Manoeuvrability of Ships in Adverse Conditions, IMO Doc MEPC.1/
Circ.850/Rev.1 (15 July 2015).
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367 For a more detailed technical discussion of MBMs and their interplay
with marginal abatement curves, see Harilaos N Psaraftis, “Market-based
Measures for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships: A Review” (2012)
11:2 WMU J Maritime Affairs 211 at 213–15.
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and can usually be implemented in the short term.
Examples include speed optimization, weather
routing and hull maintenance. MARPOL Annex
VI, Chapter 4, sets out technical and operational
measures for vessels of 400 GT, with an effective
date of January 1, 2013. The key regulations concern
the EEDI as a technical measure for new ships and
the SEEMP as an operational measure for existing
ships. Collectively, these measures seek to increase
the operating efficiency of ships on international
routes, thereby reducing fuel consumption
and overall GHG emissions in the sector.
In applying to new builds, the EEDI concerns
vessels ordered as of January 1, 2017, or those
to be delivered after July 1, 2019. The EEDI also
automatically applies to older ships that have
undergone major conversions from 2017 onward.368
The EEDI applies differently to the various classes
of vessels, namely bulk carriers, gas carriers,
tankers, container ships, general cargo ships,
refrigerated cargo carriers, combined carriers,
LNG carriers, ro-ro cargo ships (vehicle, general
carriers, passenger), cruise passenger ships and
non-conventional propulsion vessels, and in
accordance with transitional regulatory phasing set
out in a regulation.369 Every class of ship is assigned
an attained EEDI that indicates an estimate of
its real performance with regard to its required
EEDI. The required EEDI for a vessel is based on
a “reduction factor” as well as its reference line
value.370 Reduction factors vary with the type
and size of each vessel, becoming more stringent
over time with each five-year phase leading up
to 2025. Reference line values are based on ship
type and size. Both reduction factors and reference
line values are subject to amendment based on
technological developments. Changes in the
market, such as a surge or further decline in the
price of oil, are not explicitly contemplated by the
regulations. It is conceivable that market changes
might push shipowners to increase operating
efficiency beyond what is merely required of
them. The approach of the EEDI is non-prescriptive
and instead it embraces a performance-based
approach. Effectively, and flexibly, this approach
leaves the choice of technologies to achieve
stated efficiency goals to the shipowner.

The value of the SEEMP is that its scope of
application is all ships, therefore including
existing ships that are likely not as efficient as new
builds. The SEEMP requirement is accompanied
by guidelines to facilitate its implementation.371
All ships are required to have a plan to enhance
operational efficiency with respect to the particular
ship’s capabilities. It is understood that ships have
different classes and operate under a wide variety
of conditions. Through the SEEMP, the shipowner,
operator or charterer aim to improve a ship’s energy
efficiency through planning, implementation,
monitoring, and self-evaluation and improvement,
thus completing a feedback cycle.372
To facilitate proper functioning of the EEDI and
SEEMP models, MARPOL Annex VI incorporates a
mechanism to facilitate the collection and reporting
of fuel consumption data. Data is collected yearly
by the flag state and transmitted to the IMO, with
each ship’s performance anonymously catalogued
by the IMO and distributed among member
states for their consideration and analysis.373
The MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 4, includes
provision for promotion of technical cooperation
and transfer of technology relating to the
improvement of energy efficiency of ships, based
on state request.374 This provision was included to
address the concerns raised by developing countries
with respect to the need for capacity building. As
will be seen below, while this provision is built on
good intentions, it faces the challenge of intellectual
property rights, which are not readily transferred
by commercial actors seeking to maintain market
competitiveness. These issues have been the
focus of some of the efforts to address the role of
technology and technology transfer under the UN
climate regime. The technology mechanism was
first announced under the Copenhagen Accord, but
has since been brought under the Paris Agreement,
and work continues on the development and
dissemination of climate-related technologies.

MBMs
As discussed above, the decision to consider
MBMs as potential mechanisms for curbing GHG
emissions in the international shipping sector, in
371 Ibid, reg 22.3. See Guidance for the Development of a Ship Energy
Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), IMO Doc MEPC.1/Circ.683 (17
August 2009).

368 See MARPOL, supra note 10, annex VI, c 4, reg 19.5.

372 Ibid.

369 Ibid, annex VI, c 4, reg 21.

373 MARPOL, supra note 10, annex VI, c 4, reg 22A.

370 Ibid, annex VI, c 4, reg 21, tables 1 and 2.

374 Ibid, reg 23.
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addition to other measures, was first made in an
IMO Assembly resolution in 2003.375 Starting with
the fifty-fourth session, the MEPC considered MBMs
through its working groups until discussion of the
topic was suspended at MEPC 65. As observed in
the commentary above, the discussions revealed
significant divisions. While the majority agreed
on the merits of the concept, several delegations
expressed concerns with regard to uncertain or
adverse impacts on developing countries, fearing
that an MBM could adversely affect their trade
and development. The Bahamas, Brazil, China,
India, Peru, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, among
others, voiced concerns on these issues. Despite
the suspension of formal discussions, member
states made further proposals and in MEPC 72,
MBMs were included as conceivable measures
for the medium term in the initial IMO strategy.

→→ The United States proposed mandatory efficiency
standards for all ships, and an efficiency credit
trading program to induce compliance.378
→→ Norway proposed a cap-and-trade system
with a sector-wide cap on net emissions
and establishment of a global emissions
trading/auctioning system.379
→→ A UK proposal was similar to Norway’s, but was
based on a national rather than global auctioning
system and with a long-term decreasing cap.380
→→ France proposed an emissions trading
system similar to Norway’s, but with
some different elements.381
→→ Jamaica proposed a uniform consumed bunkerbased levy applied to ships on port calls.382

There are several options for MBMs.
Following the initial MBM proposal of the
United Kingdom at MEPC 55, several other
submissions that directly or indirectly supported
MBMs were made at MEPC 59 and 60:

→→ The World Shipping Council (WSC) proposed
incremental mandatory efficiency standards
for all new and existing ships according to their
class, and a fee per tonne of fuel consumed
would be levied from non-compliant ships.383

→→ Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria
and the International Parcel Tankers Association
(IPTA) proposed the establishment of an
“International Fund for GHG Emissions from
Ships,” based on a global reduction target for
international shipping.376 Emissions in excess
of the target would need to be offset through
purchased and approved emissions reduction
credits that would be based on a contribution
paid on every tonne of bunker fuel purchased.

→→ The IUCN and WWF called for a rebate
mechanism for a market-based instrument,
while compensating developing countries
for the MBM’s financial impact.384

→→ Japan proposed a “Leveraged Incentive
Scheme” based on contributions from bunker
fuel purchases made to a GHG fund.377 A ship’s
meeting or exceeding efficiency benchmarks
would be rewarded through partial refunds.

→→ Germany proposed a tool to assess MBM impacts
in the form of an “Impact Assessment of an
Emissions Trading Scheme,” paying attention
to impacts on developing countries.385

378 Further details on the United States Proposal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from International Shipping, Submitted by the United States of
America, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/12 (14 January 2010) [MEPC 60/4/12].
379 A Further Outline of a Global Emission Trading System (ETS) for
International Shipping, Submitted by Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/22
(15 January 2010) [MEPC 60/4/22].
380 A Global Emissions Trading System for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
International Shipping, Submitted by the United Kingdom, IMO Doc
MEPC 60/4/26 (15 January 2010) [MEPC 60/4/26].
381 Further Elements for the Development of an Emissions Trading System for
International Shipping, Submitted by France, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/41
(15 January 2010) [MEPC 60/4/41].

375 Resolution A.963(23), supra note 239 at para 1(d).
376 An International Fund for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships,
Submitted by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria and the
International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA), IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/8
(18 December 2009) [MEPC 60/4/8].
377 Consideration of a Market-based Mechanism: Leveraged Incentive
Scheme to Improve the Energy Efficiency of Ships Based on the
International GHG Fund, Submitted by Japan, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/37
(15 January 2010) [MEPC 60/4/37].
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382 Achieving Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships through
Port State Arrangements Utilizing the Ship Traffic, Energy and
Environment Model, STEEM, Submitted by Jamaica, IMO Doc MEPC
60/4/40 (15 January 2010) [MEPC 60/4/40].
383 Proposal to Establish a Vessel Efficiency System (VES), Submitted by the
World Shipping Council, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/39 (15 January 2010)
[MEPC 60/4/39].
384 MEPC 60/4/55, supra note 301.
385 Impact Assessment of an Emissions Trading Scheme with a Particular
View on Developing Countries, Submitted by Germany, IMO Doc MEPC
60/4/54 (29 January 2010) [MEPC 60/4/54].
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At MEPC 62, the third ISWG-GHG organized
the existing MBM proposals into two groups:
those focusing on in-sector maritime emissions
reductions; and those opting to focus on outof-sector reductions, or offsetting.386 The group
of MBMs focused on in-sector emissions
reductions will best serve to drive and incentivize
technological innovation by shipowners in order
to increase efficiency within the shipping sector.
Shipowners who fail to reach gradually increasing
standards would be liable to pay a penalty of
sorts, the proceeds of which would ultimately
be used for administrative purposes, R&D, or
mitigation of ill-effects on developing countries.
The group of MBMs focused on offsetting would,
to some extent, integrate international shipping
into the broader GHG emissions reduction effort.
Shipowners would either purchase or be allotted
emissions credits, which could be subsequently
used, traded or potentially banked for later use.
Additional credits would be available via outof-sector offset programs. The many detractors
of the out-of-sector model point out that while
such a scheme, if managed properly, would
ensure a net global reduction in GHG emissions,
it might allow the shipping sector to stagnate
technologically. Indeed, it gives shipowners
greater opportunity to use redirected capital in
the place of innovation. In principle, integration
with or at least derivation from existing landbased emissions reductions schemes might
serve to make a maritime solution easier to
adopt initially and administer as time goes on.

Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS);387 the second,
Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT).388 A
third proposal, the Port State Levy, proposed
by Jamaica,389 received less attention. The
Bahamas, concerned about harm to developing
countries and adamant that any MBM would
represent a penalty on international trade,
proposed non-intervention in the market,
preferring to let natural market forces incentivize
technological development and efficiency.390
The EIS imposes a baseline efficiency standard on
individual ships of each class and size. Japan’s view
is that a global industry-wide cap would cause an
outflow of money from the sector (more on this
below in the discussion of the GHG Fund proposal).
The baseline would increase in stringency over
time, and it could be tied to the existing EEDI. Any
ship not meeting its respective baseline would be
charged a flat rate per ton of bunker fuel purchased.
Thus, ships with an EEDI rating in compliance with
the scheme would not be penalized, whereas those
that underperformed would contribute to a global
GHG shipping fund, the proceeds of which would
be applied primarily to R&D. The SECT proposal
from the United States is almost identical to the
EIS, but differs in that it incorporates a credit

387 The EIS is a hybrid of a separate string of proposals, put forward by
Japan and the WSC respectively. Japan put forward the following
documents in support of its Leveraged Incentive Scheme: Consideration
of a Market-based Mechanism to Improve the Energy Efficiency of
Ships Based on the International GHG Fund, Submitted by Japan,
IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/35 (8 May 2009); MEPC 60/4/37, supra
note 377; Consideration of a Market-based Mechanism: Leveraged
Incentive Scheme to Improve the Energy Efficiency of Ships Based
on the International GHG Fund (Corrigendum), Submitted by Japan,
IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/37/Corr.1 (16 March 2010). In support of
its Vessel Efficiency System, the WSC submitted a proposal, MEPC
60/4/39, supra note 383. The two proposals were officially merged
by Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS), Submitted by Japan and the WSC,
IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/3 (25 November 2011). This unified proposal
was elaborated upon by the following documents: Cost Analysis on the
Application of Efficiency Improvement Measures in the Maritime Fleet,
Submitted by Japan, IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.13 (22 December 2011);
Draft Legal Text on the Modified Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS),
Submitted by Japan, IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/2 (28 June 2012); Schematic
Outline of the Modified Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS), Submitted by
Japan, IMO Doc MEPC 64/INF.15 (27 July 2012).

Focus on In-sector Reductions
This group of MBM proposals is dominated by
reliance on the EEDI. Two proposals that stand
out are the joint proposal from Japan and the
WSC, and the US proposal. The two proposals
are strikingly similar. The first is known as the

388 Comments on MEPC 59/4/2 and MEPC 59/4/4 and an Additional
Approach to Addressing Maritime GHG Emissions, Submitted by
the United States, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/48 (22 May 2009); MEPC
60/4/12, supra note 378; Further Details on the United States Proposal
to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping,
Submitted by the United States, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/16 (23 July 2010);
MEPC 61/INF.24, supra note 304.
389 MEPC 60/4/40, supra note 382; Elaboration on the Port State Levy
Proposal, Submitted by Jamaica, IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/4 (10 July 2012).

386 Report of the Third Meeting of the Intersessional Working Group on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Submitted by the Secretariat, IMO
Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011) at 16–17. See annex 3 of the same
document for the grouping of each proposed MBM.

390 Market-based Instruments: A Penalty on Trade and Development,
Submitted by the Bahamas, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/10 (13 January 2010);
Mandatory CO2 Emission Cut Targets through Technical and Operational
Measures, Submitted by the Bahamas, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/13 (6 May
2011); Draft Regulations to be Included in MARPOL Annex VI for the
Control of CO2 Emissions from Ships, Submitted by the Bahamas, IMO
Doc MEPC 63/5/1 (24 November 2011).
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trading system. In short, vessels that outperform
their respective baselines would sell emissions
credits to vessels that fail to reach theirs.
The US proposal incentivizes not only the achieving
of baselines, but also exceeding them. However,
a credit trading system will introduce inherent
complexities of its own; for example, the price
of credits will not necessarily remain stable or
predictable. Further, if credits are not available
in sufficient quantities, it is unclear what options
would be available for underperforming ships.
Reliance of an MBM on the EEDI could pose
an issue for older vessels, which may be
disproportionately penalized. A potential approach
to alleviate the issue would have to balance the
obvious desirability of existing ships serving out
their full intended service lives while still being
pushed to operate as efficiently as possible and
perhaps even being retrofitted to some degree. A
further issue is that, under the EEDI, underpowered
ships often achieve a high rating, whereas vessels
that rely on substantial power to operate are at
a disadvantage. A ship’s energy efficiency should
not be the sole criterion upon which to base an
MBM, as it could cause inequity in some trades. The
reality is that some routes are less profitable than
others. Narrow margins, coupled with a monetary
penalty, may thus reduce traffic to some regions.
The Jamaican proposal of a Port State Levy
appears as a decentralized MBM. It would involve
a uniform fee charged by individual port states
on ships entering their ports. This fee would be
based on fuel consumed during the inbound
voyage and could be structured toward global
emissions reduction targets, rewarding vessels
that exceed targets. The revenues from this
scheme could be applied to purchase out-of-sector
offsets for the shipping industry or may allow for
keeping revenues within the sector. While such a
system would arguably be simpler than a credit
trading system, it would also burden port states
and potentially result in uneven application.
Focus on Out-of-sector Reductions
Proposals in this category included the GHG Fund
proposed by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall

Islands, Nigeria and the IPTA,391 supported by South
Korea and Liberia,392 and the Global Emissions
Trading Scheme, proposed by France, Norway
and the United Kingdom.393 Germany released a
relatively favourable impact assessment of the
ETS on developing countries and recommended
that a portion of revenues be redistributed
among them to mitigate any negative effects.394
The GHG Fund would impose a levy on each ton
of bunker fuel and establish a global emissions
reduction target for the entire shipping sector.
Emissions beyond this cap would be offset by
a scheme in which emissions reduction credits
would be issued to shipowners who funded outof-sector GHG emissions reductions projects. The
levy could be adjusted regularly to ensure sufficient
funding for the payment of emissions reduction
credits to shipowners. Additional funds could be
allocated to mitigation of negative effects on the
developing world, R&D, adaptation and technical
cooperation. While the GHG Fund is preferable to
industry investors in that it would, to some extent,
ensure stability of fuel and carbon prices, problems
emerge when one considers how and where to
set the industry target. Furthermore, shipowners
are encouraged to spend money out-of-sector just
as readily as they are encouraged to spend it on
technological development and efficiency in-sector.

391 The Feasibility of an International Compensation Fund for GHG Emissions
from Ships, Submitted by Denmark, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/22 (14
August 2008); An International Fund for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Ships, Submitted by Denmark, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/5 (9 April 2009);
MEPC 60/4/8, supra note 376; Effects on Sea Transport Cost Due to an
International Fund for GHG Emission for Ships, Submitted by Denmark,
IMO Doc MEPC 60/INF.7 (18 December 2009).
392 The International Greenhouse Gas Fund — Strengths and Weaknesses,
Submitted by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Liberia, Nigeria,
the Republic of Korea and the International Parcel Tankers Association
(IPTA), IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/33 (20 May 2011).
393 The originating document for the ETS was: Comments on the Outcome of
GHG-WG 1 Regarding the Consideration of an Emission Trading Scheme
for International Shipping, Submitted by France, Germany and Norway,
IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/25 (15 August 2008). Norway and France both
returned with their own proposals at later sessions, with the United
Kingdom ultimately joining them: MEPC 60/4/22, supra note 379; MEPC
60/4/41, supra note 381; MEPC 60/4/26, supra note 380; Comment on
Document MEPC 62/5/15 on the Possible Use of Revenues Generated
by an Emissions Trading System, Submitted by France, IMO Doc MEPC
62/5/35 (20 May 2011). Given their similarity, the proposals of France,
Norway and the United Kingdom have been consistently lumped together
when considered and assessed by the committee.
394 MEPC 60/4/54, supra note 385; Possible Uses of Revenues Generated
by an Emissions Trading System, Submitted by Germany, IMO Doc MEPC
62/5/15 (6 May 2011); Design and Implementation of a Worldwide
Maritime Emission Trading Scheme: Results of a Scientific Study,
Submitted by Germany, IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/9 (23 December 2011);
Design and Implementation of a Worldwide Maritime Emission Trading
Scheme: Full Report, Submitted by Germany, IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.14
(23 December 2011).
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The ETS has received a great deal of attention and
enjoys formal support from a substantial number
of member states, all of which are European.
A relatively successful land-based ETS is in
effect in Europe, which has covered all flights
between member states since 2012, without any
discrimination based on nationality.395 In the
shipping context, an ETS would impose a global
cap on emissions and create an international
marketplace in which emissions credits would be
auctioned off. Unlike the SECT proposal, which
also involves a credit trading system, the global
ETS could incorporate credits from other sectors,
such as CDM credits, to allow shipowners to
better offset their emissions. Norway proposed
a limited exemption clause for voyages to
developing countries, while France supported
small, controlled side auctions to help facilitate the
participation of smaller shipowners. The carbon
cap would be certain (although perhaps not easy
to set), but the price of emissions may not be
predictable. This might deter investors and create
unwanted uncertainty in the shipping sector and
could interfere with operational planning for
shipowners. Finally, in comparison to the GHG
Fund, the ETS would be very costly and difficult
to administer and regulate. The potential for
fraud and abuse would need to be addressed.

Expressed Trade Law Concerns
with MBMs
During MEPC 62 deliberations with respect to
MBMs, the delegation of India raised the question
of possible incompatibility between proposed
shipping MBMs then under discussion and WTO
rules.396 While noting that other delegations
were of the view that the proposed MBMs were
compatible, India felt that such a conclusion
was premature, given that the proposals lacked
sufficient detail to enable such determination.
Instead, India proposed that the compatibility
of MBM proposals with international trade rules
should be examined before the MEPC decided
on the adoption of any such measures.397 Several

points of contention were enumerated,398 centring
on the GATS399 and GATT 1994.400 India reiterated
its concerns at MEPC 63, but this time also
questioning the validity of the mandatory EEDI
adopted under MARPOL Annex VI in the face
of the guiding UNFCCC principle of CBDR.401 In
response, the committee began by recalling the
remarks of a WTO representative at GHG-WG 3 to
the effect that the WTO could not challenge a global
agreement facilitated by the IMO and that the
WTO rules should not be invoked as a mechanism
for stalling progress on climate change action.
Because of the contingent of delegations that
remained concerned about a possible WTO conflict,
however, the committee agreed to continue the
debate at MEPC 64, inviting further submissions.402
A second document was put forward by India
at MEPC 64, this time with Saudi Arabia as cosponsor.403 The two member states reiterated
that, in their view, it was premature for the
IMO to conclude that all proposed MBMs were
theoretically implementable, in part because
“most of the MBM proposals lack sufficient details
and are not mature enough to lend support to
any such conclusion,” and also because none
had been satisfactorily assessed vis-à-vis WTO
rules.404 The two delegations addressed four key
principles of the WTO rules that they felt had been
threatened by one or all of the proposed MBMs.
First, the concept of MFN treatment, set out
in both GATT and GATS, was identified as a
potential problem, although it was admitted that
negotiations on maritime transport services under
GATS were still ongoing, and thus operation of
GATS in this area had been suspended unless
members had specifically opted for inclusion.405
In the WTO context, MFN treatment is designed
to counter discrimination (both de jure and
de facto) by ensuring that all like products

398 MEPC 62/5/27, supra note 396 at 2.
399 GATS, supra note 117.
400 GATT 1994, supra note 115.
395 David B Hunter & Nuno Lacasta, “Lessons Learned from the European
Union’s Climate Policy” (2009) 27 Wis Int LJ 575 at 583, 585–89.
See also Christian de Perthuis & Raphael Trotignon, “Governance of
CO2 Markets: Lessons from the EU ETS” (2014) 75 Energy Pol’y 100;
Beat Hintermann, “Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and
Evidence from the EU ETS” (2017) 66 Envtl & Resource Econ 89.
396 Possible Incompatibility between WTO Rules and a Market-based
Measure for International Shipping, Submitted by India, IMO Doc MEPC
62/5/27 (20 May 2011) [MEPC 62/5/27].
397 Ibid at 3; MEPC 62 Report, supra note 315, annex 8 at 2.

401 MEPC 65/3/8, supra note 318; Report of MEPC on its 63rd Session,
IMO Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 (14 March 2012), annex 14 at 2–4,
annex 17 at 1–4.
402 MEPC 63 Report, supra note 316 at 43.
403 Possible Incompatibility between the WTO rules and Market-based
Measures for International Shipping, Submitted by India and Saudi
Arabia, IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/3 (29 June 2012) [MEPC 64/5/3].
404 Ibid at 1.
405 Ibid at 2.
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(or services in the case of GATS) are treated
equally regardless of their nation of origin.406
Another feature of GATT 1994 addressed by the
two delegations was article V, which applies the
MFN principle to freedom of transit of goods
and vessels.407 While none of the proposed
MBMs would affect transit of goods per se,
the Indian and Saudi delegations cited this
provision to emphasize “that the MFN treatment
obligation applies to all ships and vessels with
regard to their entry, exit or departure at ports
irrespective of the origin or the flag.”408
Any MBM providing for port state detention of
foreign ships (namely, the GHG Fund and the ETS),
argued India and Saudi Arabia, would amount to
product discrimination and thus a violation of
the MFN principle. Of course, this interpretation
requires that ships be viewed as “products” under
GATT 1994.409 Another cited MBM that might run
afoul of the MFN principle was the Jamaican Port
State Levy proposal. The reasons here are difficult
to follow, but the crux of the reasoning seems
to be that “levying a uniform emissions charge
on all vessels, on a non-discriminatory basis,
would be administratively cumbersome.”410
The two delegations also addressed a broader
issue arising from the MFN principle: the expected
increase in freight costs resulting from the
adoption of any MBM. Such an increase would
disproportionately affect the competitiveness
of exports from the developing world, given
that developing economies export a substantial
share of freight with a low value-to-weight ratio.
This would result in destabilization of the world
markets and could lead to “like products being
treated in an unlike fashion,” which is prohibited
under WTO rules, subject to certain exceptions.
Finally, under any MBM, benefits would be
conferred upon any nation able to modernize
its shipping fleet. Since fleets from developing
countries are less likely to be modernized,
this would also result in discriminatory
treatment under the MFN principle.411

406 Ibid. The two delegations pointed to the framing MFN provisions in both
GATT 1994 and GATS: GATT 1994, supra note 115, art I.1; GATS, supra
note 117, art II.1.
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Second, the national treatment obligation
prohibiting discrimination of imported goods in
favour of domestic ones, enshrined in article III
of GATT 1994,412 was addressed.413 Invoking
unnamed WTO Appellate Body holdings, the
two delegations took the position that such
provisions are generally afforded a broad
interpretation, applying to a broad range of
discriminatory measures. As in article I, both de
jure and de facto discrimination are covered.414
In addition to an alleged MFN conflict, it was
argued that any MBM allowing for the detention
of non-complying foreign vessels might also run
afoul of the national treatment obligation because
it would have the potential effect of disadvantaging
imports in favour of domestic goods.415 Similarly,
with regard to the Port State Levy proposal, given
that domestic goods would not be subject to a levy
of any kind, and given the broad interpretation
afforded to article III of GATT 1994, a levy on foreign
shipping emissions imposed by port states, India
and Saudi Arabia have argued, might be seen as
undue discrimination favouring domestic goods.416
Third, the two delegations pointed to WTO
provisions respecting fees and charges on
imports and exports.417 Such provisions allow
member states to impose fees and charges, but
restrain their amounts to the “approximate cost
of services rendered” and explicitly prohibit
indirect protectionism or taxation of imports
for fiscal purposes.418 Given that the Jamaican
Port State Levy would exact a levy on incoming
foreign shipping while failing to render any
tangible service, the Indian and Saudi delegations
argued that this MBM amounts to a taxation of
imports for fiscal purposes, and thus constitutes
a violation of GATT 1994, article VIII.419
Fourth, India and Saudi Arabia raised the
general elimination of quantitative restrictions
on imports and exports as a potential issue.420
The relevant provisions in GATT 1994 cover
412 GATT 1994, supra note 115, arts III.2, III.4. See also GATS, supra note
117, art XVII, which extends similar protections to service sectors included
in each WTO member’s individual schedule.
413 MEPC 64/5/3, supra note 403 at 3.
414 Ibid at 2–3.
415 Ibid at 5.

407 GATT 1994, supra note 115, art V.2.

416 Ibid at 6.

408 MEPC 64/5/3, supra note 403 at 3.

417 Ibid at 4.

409 Ibid at 4–5.

418 GATT 1994, supra note 115, arts II.2(c), VIII.1(a).

410 Ibid at 6.

419 MEPC 64/5/3, supra note 403 at 6.

411 Ibid at 5.

420 Ibid at 4.
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any quantitative prohibition or restriction
“made effective through quotas, import or
export licenses or other measures.”421 Any MBM
giving port states the power to exclude noncomplying vessels, they argued, could be taken
to be in breach of the quantitative provisions
of WTO rules, given that the goods carried
aboard excluded vessels would be effectively
prohibited from importation. Furthermore, the
two delegations argued that the requirement for
a vessel to carry proof of compliance with any
MBM could be taken as a requirement to carry a
sort of import licence, which would violate the
afore-mentioned provision in GATT 1994.422
One final MBM characteristic worth noting is a
financial penalty imposed on a ship’s operator
as a result of non-compliance. With specific
reference to the UK version of the ETS proposal,
India and Saudi Arabia argued that “[L]evying a
penalty on the ship’s operator is…equivalent to
levying a penalty on the goods carried.”423 Such an
interpretation would allow for an argument to be
advanced that the imposition of penalties violates
each of the four enumerated WTO principles.
The Indian and Saudi delegations concluded
by arguing that “shipping is a servant of world
trade,” and that “the industry should not and
must not introduce measures which would
create complications for world trade and trigger
trade disputes.” Because the participation of the
developing world in international trade is essential
to the continued generation of wealth in those
nations, and because a continued generation of
wealth is required if those nations are to take
measures to combat global warming, the adoption
of any MBM in the shipping sector would only
prove counterproductive and exclusionary.424

submission by India and Saudi Arabia.426 While
the interpretation of WTO rules falls within the
exclusive purview of WTO members, rather
than that of its secretariat, it was noted that the
document submitted to the MEPC was of a neutral
character and meant to “flag out what could be
some of the main [WTO] disciplines to which
IMO member states would need to be alerted.”427
However, the WTO document stopped short of
providing substantive guidance and assistance
to further deliberations on MBMs. Perhaps, in
light of the observation with respect to the likely
difficult relationship between the international
trade and climate regimes noted earlier in this
report, it can be reasonably expected that the
above issues, and perhaps others, may again arise
in the event of further consideration of an MBM
for international shipping in the IMO strategy.
The above discussion again underscores the value
of coordination of the climate change regime and
WTO rules with respect to GHG emissions. The
ideal scenario for an MBM in the future revised
IMO strategy — the one least likely to generate
conflict with the WTO regimes — is one in which
the measure is the product of consensus, adopted
within the framework of an international maritime
convention, or an alternative instrument.

At MEPC 64, the committee again decided to
defer consideration of the potential WTO issue
to the following session, at which point an
impact assessment of the various MBMs would
be available.425 At MEPC 65, the secretary-general
produced a document outlining the views of
the WTO Secretariat on the previous session’s

421 GATT 1994, supra note 115, art XI.1.

424 Ibid.

426 World Trade Organization’s Views on Document MEPC 64/5/4
Submitted by India and Saudi Arabia, Note by the Secretary-General,
IMO Doc MEPC 65/INF.18 (21 February 2013). See especially
the attached annex, containing a copy of the letter from the WTO
Secretariat.

425 MEPC 64 Report, supra note 322 at 38.

427 Ibid at 2.

422 MEPC 64/5/3, supra note 403 at 6.
423 Ibid at 7.

Shipping and Climate Change: International Law and Policy Considerations

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274

55

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274

POSSIBLE LESSONS FROM
OTHER SECTORS
International Civil Aviation Sector
Not unlike other key contributors to global GHG emissions, the
aviation industry, which according to ICAO was responsible for
roughly two percent of global CO2 emissions in 2010 and various nonCO2 climate effects,428 has its own unique challenges. The two percent
figure requires explanation. International aviation accounts for 1.3
percent of actual emissions. The bulk of emissions from aircraft are
released at cruising altitude and their effects are thereby amplified.
Taking this effect into account, it has been estimated that aviation
generally may actually be responsible for as much as 3.5 percent of
global anthropogenic radiative forcing, a more precise measure of
climactic effects.429 Furthermore, the steady and rapid expansion of
the industry, coupled with the difficulties of introducing technological
and operational measures in aircraft to significantly increase
operating efficiency, have created unique challenges for the sector
to reduce emissions in the short to medium term. In other words,
growth in volume in the international aviation sector will make it
difficult for efficiency measures to stabilize and reduce GHG emissions
in the foreseeable future, let alone achieve full decarbonization of
the sector in the long term.430 The industry has therefore taken a
very modest approach to reducing its CO2 footprint by supporting an
out-of-sector approach of carbon offsetting, which enables industry
operators to purchase credits from the global carbon market.
In 2010, ICAO adopted two aspirational goals. First, the industry
committed to a two percent annual improvement in fuel efficiency for
commercial aircraft on international flights. This was to be achieved
via operational and technological measures. According to a report
issued in 2015, however, the industry is lagging seriously behind with

428 ICAO Environmental Report 2010 (Montreal: ICAO, 2010) at 38, online: ICAO <www.icao.int/
environmental-protection/Documents/EnvironmentReport-2010/ICAO_EnvReport10-Ch1_en.pdf>.
A different and more recent estimate reports that international marine and aviation bunkers
are together responsible for three percent of global CO2 emissions: Key CO2 Emissions Trends:
Excerpt from CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (2016) (Paris: International Energy Agency,
2016) at 9 [IEA 2016 Report], online: <www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
KeyCO2EmissionsTrends.pdf>.
429 Aviation and the Global Atmosphere: Summary for Policymakers (Geneva: IPCC, 1999) at 6–9.
430 See Markus Gehring & Freedom Kai-Phillips, “Intersections of the Paris Agreement and Carbon
Offsetting: Legal and Functional Considerations” CIGI, Policy Brief No 88, 15 September 2016 at 6.
Emissions increased by a factor of 95 percent between 1990 and 2014. The next two decades are
expected to see yet another doubling of emissions in the sector.
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respect to this first goal. Efficiency has improved
at approximately half the targeted annual rate.431
This is likely due in part to low fuel prices and
the resulting lack of economic motivation for
operators and manufacturers. The Thirty-eighth
Meeting of the ICAO Assembly saw the adoption of
a resolution for a “basket of measures” to facilitate
the transition of the aviation sector, including
aircraft technology CO2 standards; operational
measures; promotion of fuel efficiency and
alternative fuels; and establishment of an MBM for
emissions reductions of international aviation.432
The second goal committed the industry to
offsetting emissions above 2020 levels from
2020 onwards (“carbon-neutral growth”). This
differs from the approach to “carbon neutrality”
in the context of Airport Carbon Accreditation,
which means that “all the emissions under direct
control of these airports have been offset, on
top of the reductions that have been made.”433
With regard to this second goal, and in light of
the challenges mentioned at the outset, it was
clear that carbon offsetting was the preferred
path forward. To that end, ICAO agreed, at the
Thirty-ninth Meeting of the ICAO Assembly in
fall 2016, to adopt an assembly resolution to set
in place the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction
Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), a
global MBM scheme.434 Despite the industry’s
lacklustre performance since 2010 on the technical
and operational front, ICAO has maintained its
original goal of carbon-neutral growth from 2020.
As adopted, CORSIA consists of three distinct
phases. This phased approach recognizes the
differing capabilities of member states and seeks
to minimize market distortion. A pilot phase is
set to run from 2021 to 2023 and is completely
voluntary. There follows the first phase (2024–2026),
which is also voluntary, but will automatically
include any states that participated in the pilot

431 Anastasia Kharina & Daniel Rutherford, “Fuel Efficiency Trends for New
Commercial Jet Aircraft: 1960 to 2014” (August 2015) International
Council on Clean Transportation White Paper. This rate of efficiency
improvement puts the industry approximately 12 years behind its first
target.
432 ICAO, “Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and
Practices related to Environmental Protection — Climate Change”,
Resolution A38-18, i-68–i-77, online: ICAO <www.icao.int/environmentalprotection/Documents/A38-17_A38-18.pdf>.
433 Airport Carbon Accreditation — Annual Report 2016–17 (Airports Council
International, 2017) at 4, online: <www.airportcarbonaccreditation.org/
library/annual-reports.html>.
434 Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices
related to Environmental — Global Market-based Measure (MBM)
Scheme, ICAO Resolution A39-3 (October 2016).
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phase. Finally, participation in the second phase
(2027–2035) is intended to be mandatory for all
states whose 2018 revenue per tonne-kilometres
(RTKs) will exceed 0.5 percent of the industry
total. Further, any state whose cumulative
share of RTKs falls into the top 90 percent in the
industry should be included.435 The participation of
LDCs, SIDS and landlocked developing countries
(LLDCs) will be entirely voluntary. ICAO plans
to review CORSIA every three years from 2022
onward, thus allowing room for adjustments.
Although participation in the pilot and first phases
is voluntary, the response of member states has
been strong. As of August 23, 2017, 71 nations
representing 87.7 percent of RTKs had opted to
participate in CORSIA starting with the pilot
phase.436 This places state participation at a level
that is already very close to the level mandated
for the second phase beginning in 2027 and
appears to bode well for the implementation of the
program. It should be noted, however, that several
states have declined to sign on to the pilot phase.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia
and Venezuela objected to CORSIA for various
reasons, including their view that the measure will
not further carbon-neutral growth from 2020, and
that its implementation will disproportionately
burden developing countries.437 It will be recalled
that some of the developing states in this group
have taken similar positions at the IMO.
CORSIA has been designed to distort the market
as little as possible. To this end, ICAO has opted
for a route-based approach, which should
ensure that all operators on the same route are
treated in the same way. Only flights between
two participating CORSIA states are covered by
offsetting requirements. Operators are tasked with
estimating their annual CO2 emissions (based on
fuel consumption) on such routes and reporting
them to their respective national authorities.

435 See e.g. Study for the Directorate General Climate Action of the EU
Commission, Possible Legal Arrangements to Implement a Global Market
Based Measure for International Aviation Emissions (2 December 2015),
online: EC <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/transport/
aviation/docs/gmbm_legal_study_en.pdf>.
436 ICAO, “Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International
Aviation (CORSIA)”, online: ICAO <www.icao.int/environmentalprotection/Pages/market-based-measures.aspx>.
437 Jordan R Labkon, “ICAO Strikes Deal at 2016 Assembly to Create
the First Global Market-based Mechanism for International Aviation
Emissions” (20 December 2016), online: VedderPrice <www.lexology.
com/library/detail.aspx?g=2cbeeb2a-dba0-44ce-bc4e-454151b08dfd>.
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Every year, ICAO intends to calculate the sectoral
growth factor on CORSIA, which it will multiply by
each operator’s applicable emissions to calculate
required offsets. The use of overall sectoral growth
as the key metric was considered preferable, as it is
expected to be more stable than that of individual
operators, whose fortunes are far more diversified.
From 2030 onward, however, the emission
increases of individual operators will be taken
into account in calculating offsets.438 By 2033, each
operator will be responsible for offsets on a 70/30
basis, where a minimum of 70 percent of its offset
will be calculated using its own growth from 2020,
and a maximum of 30 percent of the offset will be
based on sectoral growth from 2020. This model is
particularly beneficial to established operators, and
harder on new operators and others who expect
to see a rapid rate of growth in the period before
2030. It reasonably assumes that 14 years’ warning
is sufficient for operators that might expect growth
higher than the overall industry rate after 2030.
In early 2017, ICAO announced the adoption of
an additional emissions reduction measure to
supplement CORSIA. This measure took the form
of an amendment to Annex 16 of the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation.439
The standards vary depending on aircraft size
and type, and will apply to all new aircraft as
of 2020. By 2023, all in-production aircraft will
be expected to conform to the standards, lest
they be forced out of production by 2028.
With all this in mind, a pressing question
emerges: what can the shipping sector learn
from the approach taken by ICAO? It is difficult
to assess the success or failure of a regulatory
mechanism for international aviation that does
not enter its pilot phase until 2021, making it
speculative to draw lessons for the international
shipping industry. At first blush there appears
to be some similarity in the measures
considered in the two industries. International
aviation embraced a technical measure as
well as an MBM, and international shipping
has, to date, used technical and operational
measures and may yet consider an MBM.

However, there are significant differences between
the two industries, potentially limiting the utility
of the experience of the international aviation
industry, most notably with respect to the issues
of nationality (ease of reflagging), jurisdiction and
port state control. The conventional wisdom is that
shipping has an advantage over aviation in that
technical and operational measures are more easily
adopted in the shipping sector. For example, the
practice of slow steaming alone can reduce bunker
consumption by up to 59 percent.440 There are
obvious logistical pitfalls inherent in slow steaming
practices, and the current low cost of fuel makes
it far less attractive; it would also appear that
commercial aviation has no operational emissions
reduction option that comes close. Furthermore,
shipping currently enjoys a wide variety of fuel
options, many of which produce far lower GHG
emissions than the traditional bunker C. Fuel
switching may be more difficult to implement for
aviation. Thus, operational and technical measures
in the initial IMO strategy appear to be more readily
available to the international shipping industry
than they are to the international civil aviation
industry. In consequence, the manner through
which ICAO and the IMO have engaged the GHG
discourse is different. ICAO has been more willing
to consider exemptions for operators from LDCs,
SIDS and LLDCs, which could be challenging in
the implementation of the IMO strategy because
reflagging is an option in international shipping.
Hence, the NMFT principle in the IMO has guided
discussions to date on technical, operational and
market measures, and will continue to apply to
measures adopted under the IMO strategy.
Given that CORSIA is years away from full
implementation, it is not possible to assess its
effectiveness with any certainty. Many of its
critics, however, have pointed out that there is
little incentive to reduce emissions in the short
term, and that offsetting carbon emissions from
commercial aviation is a way of externalizing
costs and therefore merely a licence for operators
to continue polluting.441 The fear is that offsetting
is an unreliable non-solution that ignores the
underlying problem (i.e., the need for all sectors
to substantially reduce emissions and set on a
path toward decarbonization) and encourages

438 Individual operator growth will be integrated progressively starting at 20
percent from 2030 to 2032 and increasing to 70 percent from 2033 to
2035. Ibid.
439 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS
295 at annex 16, vol III (entered into force 14 April 1947).

440 Andreas Wiesmann, “Slow steaming: A Viable Long-term Option?”
(2010) Wärtsilä Technical J 49 at 50.
441 Jonathan Frænkel-Eidse, “Will the Aviation Sector’s Planned Carbon
Offset Scheme Help Curb Emissions from Air Travel?” (28 September
2016) Earth Island J, online: EIJ <www.earthisland.org>.
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technological and operational stagnation while
emissions continue to rise within the sector. MBM
proposals in the shipping sector that rely heavily
on offsets have been similarly criticized. Obviously,
no matter what sector embraces an offsetting
scheme, it is essential to ensure the legitimacy and
carbon value equivalency of the projects receiving
funding. As far as technological and operational
stagnation is concerned, CORSIA could well run
into difficulty, given its early focus on sectoral
rather than individual growth. Not until operators
begin to be assessed by their own emissions
growth or reductions in 2030 will there be a
genuine incentive to make individual reductions
via technological or operational means. Arguably,
however, the 2017 amendment to Annex 16 of the
Chicago Convention mentioned above should be
expected to pick up some of the slack left by the
first decade of CORSIA. It is difficult to see how the
emissions path expected from full implementation
of the CORSIA would be in line with the goals of
the Paris Agreement unless there are convincing
reasons why the sectors fair share is considerably
less than the global average emissions reductions
needed to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Domestic Transportation
Sector
Domestic land-based transportation has been a
particularly challenging sector for jurisdictions
around the world. GHG emissions in this sector
have continued to rise, while other sectors, such as
the electricity sector discussed below, have been
able to achieve significant emissions reductions.
The domestic transportation sector has been
particularly challenging for several reasons.442
The challenges and potential solutions for
domestic transportation are quite diverse. The
challenges are different for freight than for
personal transportation. There are important
differences between urban and rural areas.
Potential solutions will be different for each of
these transportation sectors and contexts. They
will furthermore depend on regional differences
in population density, distances between and
442 For an overview of perspectives on the transportation challenge, see
e.g. Michael K Hidrue et al, “Willingness to Pay for Electric Vehicles
and their Attributes” (2011) 33:1 Resource & Energy Econ 686; Noel
Smith, Donald Hirsch & Abigail Davis, “Accessibility and Capability: The
Minimum Transport Needs and Costs of Rural Households” (2012) 21:1
J Transport Geog 93; Wolfgang Gruel & Frank Piller, “A New Vision for
Personal Transportation” (2016) 57:2 MIT Sloan Mgmt Rev 20.
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size of urban centres, existing infrastructure,
availability of alternatives, and willingness to
invest in alternatives, among other factors.443
Personal transportation offers a good illustration
of the challenge of selecting appropriate long-term
solutions for decarbonization in at least three
different categories: within urban centres; between
urban centres; and in rural areas. Within urban
centres, public transit and active transportation
offer the most sustainable alternatives to the
predominance of gasoline-powered cars. Both
active and public transportation, however, require
significant investment of infrastructure, further
technological innovation and depend on acceptance
by the population.444 At the same time, a number
of technologies, over the past decade or so, have
offered potential solutions that might not require
the same level of investment in public transit or
active transportation infrastructure, and would not
require the same level of behaviour change, but
would also be less optimal from a sustainability
perspective. They all focus on reducing emissions
from private vehicles rather than shifting from
private vehicles to other modes of transportation.
Options pursued have ranged from ethanol and
fuel cell vehicles to hybrid and electric vehicles.445
To date, there has not been a clear winner among
the technologies to reduce emissions from private
vehicles, with each potential alternative offering its
own advantages and challenges. Ethanol vehicles
would require the least change in infrastructure
or behaviour, but there are serious questions
about the environmental and GHG emissions
implications of this option. Fuel cell vehicles would
require significant new infrastructure and have
been plagued with delays in the development
of the technology. However, they would offer
the end user a product similar to their current
expectations, so would be likely to find broad
acceptance.446 Hybrid vehicles are perhaps most
similar to traditional gasoline vehicles, but do not
443 See e.g. Yan Song, Yanping Chen & Xiaohong Pan, “Polycentric Spatial
Structure and Travel Mode Choice: The Case of Shenzhen, China” (2012)
4:4 Regional Science Pol’y & Prac 479.
444 Maria Vittoria Corazza et al, “A European Vision for More
Environmentally Friendly Buses” (2016) 45:4 Transportation Research
Part D: Transport & Envt 48.
445 Commentators who do not consider the environmental consequences of
these choices tend to be inclined to advocate for a mix of public, active
and private transportation; see Gruel & Piller, supra note 442. The
challenge from a GHG emissions or sustainability perspective is how to
influence the path currently dominated by market forces and individual
preferences.
446 Thanh Hua et al, “Status of Hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric Buses Worldwide”
(2014) 269:1 J Power Sources 975 at 980.
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offer a complete solution. Finally, electric vehicles
hold much promise, but concerns over range,
availability of charging stations and cost remain,
and their sustainability depends in large part
on the ability to generate electricity sustainably,
which may differ from region to region.447
Partly resulting from this uncertainty within
the private vehicle sector, the relationship
between private vehicles and public and active
transportation in urban centres also remains
uncertain. Hesitancy to make infrastructure
and technology investments in public and
active transportation contributes to the
uncertainty. Solutions will vary between
jurisdictions, and will depend on further
technological and economic breakthroughs,
which in turn will depend on regulatory and
other measures taken by national and subnational
governments in the respective jurisdiction.
Personal transportation solutions between
urban centres would seem to involve a choice
between zero-emissions personal vehicles, rail,
bus services or air transport. Electric vehicles
currently face concerns over range constraints
and lack of charging stations. Rail infrastructure is
expensive, making it a high-risk option unless it is
clearly the mode of choice and has the population
density and support to warrant the investment.
Bus service tends to be more compatible with
existing infrastructure in many parts of the world,
but faces acceptance challenges, and would still
require technological advances to become truly
sustainable. Air transport seems the most difficult
to transition to sustainability, but is quickly
becoming the mode of choice for travel between
urban centres in many parts of the world.
For personal transportation in rural areas and
from rural areas to urban centres, low population
density and long distances create unique
challenges that often eliminate the otherwise most
promising options, such as active transportation,
public transit and often even rail and air. This
makes personal vehicles the most likely choice
for personal transportation in rural areas.448
The result is a situation where there is no single
mode of transportation that is the clear choice
in solving the personal transportation challenge
in all categories or subsectors. Which mode (or

combination of modes) offers the best hope of
moving personal transportation to GHG emissions
neutrality and sustainability will depend on local or
regional conditions, on existing infrastructure, on
personal choices and preferences of the population,
and on the willingness of the public and private
sector to invest in the infrastructure and R&D
needed to facilitate the transition. The multitude
of options and circumstances makes it less
likely that private or public actors will make the
investments needed to facilitate the transition.449
Questions about the role of self-driving vehicles,
car-sharing and “Uber-like” services have started
to raise some doubts about the future dominance
of public transportation in urban centres. Until
recently, it seemed clear that public and active
transportation would be essential for low GHG
emissions transportation in urban centres. There
is no doubt both still have an important role to
play, but it seems more likely, with the possible
emergence of self-driving electric vehicles, that
they will continue to compete with cars in many
urban centres. Some cities are clearly committed
to a combination of public transit and active
transportation as the solution to congestion and
pollution, but many others are still primarily
designed for road transportation, resulting in
difficult choices ahead as self-driving electric
vehicles, car sharing and Uber-like services
start to dominate road transportation.450
There are similar challenges with respect to
sustainable transportation between urban
centres. Does the answer lie in high-speed
trains, or can short-distance flights become a
sustainable option? Is the electric car a viable
solution, with improvements in technology and
more sustainable sources of electricity? Will
electric buses gain the acceptance needed to
become an important part of the solution?451
All these questions matter because some of
the most promising options require significant
investment in infrastructure, in the form of
charging stations for electric cars, or in the form
of rail infrastructure. All require further R&D to
become truly sustainable, but also critical choices
about the combination of options that offer the
best solutions in each context. One of the most

449 Gruel & Piller, supra note 442.
447 Hidrue et al, supra note 442.

450 Ibid.

448 Smith, Hirsch & Davis, supra note 442.

451 Song, Chen & Pan, supra note 443.
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challenging questions is when to decide on a
specific path to sustainable transportation, and
which path, and whether this is a decision for
governments or for the private sector. Until that
choice is made, there will be a tendency to continue
with the status quo, which means minimal
emissions reductions in the transportation sector.
Until there is an investment in the infrastructure
to offer viable and attractive alternatives, efforts
to reduce emissions from transportation from
vehicles running on combustion engines will
likely only yield modest results, based on marginal
changes in behaviour and improved fuel efficiency
of combustion engines. Making the choice too
late delays significant emissions reductions in the
sector; making the choice too early, in turn, risks
committing to an alternative that turns out to be
suboptimal financially and environmentally. Market
mechanisms alone will not be sufficient in driving
the transition to alternatives that require significant
infrastructure investment. What is required is
either a public investment in the infrastructure
necessary to make the alternative viable and
attractive, or a clear and sufficient commitment to
the alternative to motivate private investment.452
What lessons does the experience in transportation
offer for the challenge of regulating GHG emissions
from ships and the ultimate decarbonization of the
maritime transport sector? It seems clear from the
experience so far that economic incentives, such as
subsidies for electric vehicles or public transit, only
get you so far. Other key elements include clear
signals about the mix of modes that are considered
part of the solution in a particular jurisdiction,
investment in infrastructure, and incentives for the
investment in R&D to improve the sustainability
performance of key elements of the solution. The
transportation sector illustrates the need to find
effective ways to encourage research, development,
deployment and commercialization of technologies
that offer meaningful solutions in line with what is
needed. More generally, transportation may offer
lessons on the effectiveness and limitations of
MBMs or economic instruments more generally. The
experience suggests that economic incentives are
452 There has been considerable discussion in the literature on effective
mechanisms to facilitate the development and deployment of
technologies to achieve environmental and sustainability goals. See
e.g. Miranda Schreurs, “Breaking the Impasse in the International
Climate Negotiations: The Potential of Green Technologies” (2012)
48 Energy Pol’y 5; David Ockwell & Alexandra Mallett, eds, LowCarbon Technology Transfer: From Rhetoric to Reality (London, UK &
New York, NY: Routledge, 2012); Abbe EL Brown, ed, Environmental
Technologies, Intellectual Property and Climate Change (Cheltenham, UK
& Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2013).
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essential, but that a detailed understanding of the
sector is required to be able to assess what can and
cannot be achieved with economic instruments,
and what complementary measures are needed.
Efforts to deal with transportation on a voluntary
basis suggest limited effectiveness of bottom-up
approaches, voluntary measures or aspirational
goals. For example, voluntary efforts to encourage
improved fuel efficiency of vehicles have largely
failed, both at the manufacturing level and at the
consumer level.453 It is important to be realistic:
unless there is a clear economic motivation
to influence human behaviour, there is little
reason to expect voluntary measures to work,
especially when dealing with corporate actors
concerned about short-term economic returns
on investments. Voluntary measures can work,
however, in combination with economic incentives
and binding measures, if carefully designed.454
Finally, the transportation sector illustrates the
challenge of regulating the transition to GHG
neutrality when there are multiple possible paths,
and where the number of possible paths and their
relative merits may change over time. In such
circumstances, governments face difficult choices.
They can rely on market mechanisms to avoid
having to choose among the multiple paths, but risk
private actors reacting to the economic incentive
by choosing a suboptimal path. The alternative
is for government to choose among the possible
paths, and risk making the choice too early, with
government itself choosing a suboptimal path. A
mix of tools, based on a detailed understanding
of the current conditions in the sector, the local
circumstances and processes that are able to
identify and adjust to changing circumstances,
appear to be key ingredients of success.

453 Martin Olszynski et al, “From Smokes to Smokestack: Lessons from
Tobacco for the Future of Climate Change Liability” Geo Envtl L Rev
(forthcoming).
454 See e.g. Daniel J Fiorino, The New Environmental Regulation
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); David M Driesen, The Economic
Dynamics of Environmental Law (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
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Electricity Sector
In contrast to the transportation sector, the
electricity sector has been among the more
successful sectors in reducing GHG emissions
in many jurisdictions around the world. This is
in part because there are both new and wellestablished low-GHG sources of electricity that
have made significant technological and cost
breakthroughs over the past two decades, due in
large part to aggressive policies in European and
other countries that have spurred investment in
research and commercialization.455 Wind and solar
energy in particular, along with conservation and
efficiency programs, have contributed to significant
emissions reductions in the electricity sector in
jurisdictions in Europe, Asia and North America.456
The transition has not been without its challenges,
and in spite of all the progress to date, the path
to full decarbonization is far from clear. The
fundamental challenge is that existing electricity
systems are designed to meet demand rather
than to effectively manage demand to meet the
supply of less dispatchable power sources; their
design is also based on centralized production
of electricity. Fossil fuel-based production tends
to be more dispatchable than wind, solar, tidal,
wave and other low-GHG sources. In developed
countries, significant capital investments have
already been made in fossil fuel-based production
and in transmission and distribution based on
centralized production. This means that even
where low-GHG alternatives are competitive, a
switch to alternatives may require significant
infrastructure investment and may leave
stranded significant assets, such as fossil fuelbased electricity generation systems.457
As is the case with transportation, there are
challenges in identifying the most suitable
pathway to GHG neutrality. The state of electricity
infrastructure will vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, as does the mix of potential sources of

455 Schreurs, supra note 452.
456 See e.g. Atle Midttun, “The Greening of European Electricity Industry:
A Battle of Modernities” (2012) 48 Energy Pol’y 22; Thilo Grau, Molin
Huo & Karsten Neulhoff, “Survey of Photovoltaic Industry and Policy
in Germany and China” (2012) 51 Energy Pol’y 20; Uwe Büsgen &
Wolfhart Dürrschmidt, “The Expansion of Electricity Generation from
Renewable Energies in Germany: A Review Based on the Renewable
Energy Sources Act Progress Report 2007 and the New German Feed-in
Legislation” (2009) 37:7 Energy Pol’y 2536.
457 Melissa Harris, Marisa Beck & Ivetta Gerasimchuk, The End of Coal:
Ontario’s coal phase-out (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable
Development, 2015).

electricity. Population density, climate conditions
and differences in electricity demand for heating,
cooling and industrial use further complicate
matters. The potential to store energy in a manner
that is easy to access when electricity demand
exceeds production from low-GHG sources is also
quite variable from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
All this adds up to a complex picture, particularly
once the penetration of wind and solar threatens
the ability of current electricity systems to meet
electricity demand. Some jurisdictions may find
an energy mix that allows them to integrate
enough solar and wind to complete the transition
away from fossil fuels without fundamental
changes to their electricity systems. Jurisdictions
with access to dispatchable hydropower may be
able to phase out fossil fuels in this manner.
For most jurisdictions, attention to the energy
mix will not be enough. This leaves them with
three basic choices. They can invest in better
interconnection with other jurisdictions to balance
supply and demand. Alternatively, they can shift
from a focus on meeting demand to managing
demand to match the supply of electricity, using
some combination of smart-grid technology
and storage. Finally, they can try to implement
a combination of these basic approaches to
managing supply from renewable sources. As
is the case with transportation, the uncertainty
around the relative advantages and disadvantages
of these choices has slowed down progress. For
example, jurisdictions may be reluctant to invest in
transmission infrastructure to improve the ability
to integrate wind and solar into their electricity
system over concerns that the infrastructure
may become a stranded asset as smart grid and
storage technologies continue to develop and drop
in price. Uncertainty surrounding the respective
roles of the various levels of government and
private sector in deciding on the appropriate
path, and investing in making it work, further
adds to the complexity in many jurisdictions.458
A key lesson from electricity is that governments
struggle to take measures to internalize the cost
of GHG emissions from traditional sources of
electricity (i.e., coal and oil) because access to
electricity is considered an essential service, so that
governments tend to be sensitive to increases in

458 Jamshid Aghaei & Mohammad-Iman Alizadeh, “Demand Response in
Smart Electricity Grids Equipped with Renewable Energy Sources: A
Review” (2013) 18 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Rev 64.
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electricity prices. The end result is that electricity
generally continues to be subsidized in various
ways, making it harder for conservation, efficiency
and renewable energy initiatives to compete.
While there are those who would be unduly
harmed by increased electricity prices, most
citizens in developed countries are more likely
to be able to afford higher electricity prices and
would take measures to conserve electricity if the
price more accurately reflected the true cost of
generating and providing it. So far, the predominant
response to this dilemma in developed countries
has been to resist increases in electricity prices,
rather than allow prices to increase to encourage
conservation and efficiency and implement
measures to ensure those unable to pay the
increased cost of electricity are treated fairly.459
As stated at the outset, advances in technology
have been critical to the progress in reducing
GHG emissions in the electricity sector. Effective
regulation of the sector, in turn, has been critical in
ensuring the investment in R&D and in the scaling
up of key technologies. Initial leadership came
from Germany and other European countries.460
More recently, other countries, such as China
and the United States, encouraged growth
and advancements in these sectors through a
combination of subsidies and regulations. Similar
efforts are now under way in other key countries,
such as India.461 Ultimately, and looking back,
the leadership of developed countries with the
capacity to support the emergence of these
new industries was key. Developing countries
were then able to follow suit, once the price
of solar and wind had come down enough to
make investment feasible. The end result is
the penetration of new technologies and new
industries in both developed and developing
countries.462 Of course, all this has not happened
without friction. There have been trade disputes
over the implementation of measures to encourage
459 See Meinhard Doelle, “Toward a Principled Design of Provincial Cap &
Trade Systems: Lessons from Nova Scotia’s Proposal to Meet the Carbon
Pricing Requirement in the Pan-Canadian Framework for Climate Change”
(2018) J Envtl L & Prac [forthcoming].
460 See e.g. Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes, Sustainable Energy Policies for Europe:
Towards 100% Renewable Energy (Leiden: CRC Press, 2013); Allan
Mazur, Energy and Electricity in Industrial Nations: The Sociology and
Technology of Energy (London, UK & New York, NY: Routledge, 2013).
461 For an overview of progress in key developing countries over the past 20
years, see Patrick Bayer, Lindsay Dolan & Johannes Urpelainen, “Global
Patterns of Renewable Energy Innovation, 1990-2009” (2013) 17:3
Energy for Sustainable Dev 288.
462 Zachary D Liscow & Quentin C Karpilow, “Innovation Snowballing and
Climate Law” (4 May 2017) Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No
571, online: SSRN <ssrn.com/abstract=2927441>.
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renewable energy, including WTO challenges of
feed-in tariffs and local manufacturing rules in
Ontario, and solar policies in India and China.463
Another lesson from the electricity sector is that
regulatory and economic instruments, such as
cap-and-trade systems, carbon taxes, feed-in
tariffs and renewable portfolio standards, were
significant contributors to progress, although their
relative contribution can be debated. Concurrently,
more directed measures were often necessary to
ensure sustained progress.464 For example, the
phasing out of coal, where it has happened, has
not been achieved through the use of economic
instruments, but rather through top-down
regulation requiring the closure of coal plants.465
Similarly, investment in R&D and infrastructure
has generally been necessary as a complement to
economic instruments and renewable targets to
sustain efforts to transition to GHG neutrality.
The experience of the electricity sector suggests that
economic incentives are important instruments in
the tool box, but a detailed understanding of the
sector is required to be able to assess what can and
cannot be achieved with economic instruments,
and what other tools and efforts are needed for
an effective, efficient and fair transition. For
example, experience has shown that economic
incentives alone are unlikely to result in the
closure of existing coal plants, or in encouraging
investment in expensive infrastructure.

463 See e.g. Llewelyn Hughes & Jonas Meckling, “The Politics of Renewable
Energy Trade: The US-China solar dispute” (2017) 105 Energy Pol’y 256.
As the authors have suggested elsewhere in this report, ideally, IMO
and WTO measures would be mutually supportive in the global effort
to encourage fair trade while facilitating the full decarbonization of the
global economy in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. A more
modest goal would be to avoid conflict between the response developed
by the IMO and existing WTO rules discussed above.
464 David M Driesen, “Emissions Trading Versus Pollution Taxes: Playing
‘Nice’ With Other Instruments” (2017) Envtl Law [forthcoming]; Nicholas
Rivers & Mark Jaccard, “Intensity-Based Climate Change Policies in
Canada” (2010) 36:4 Can Pub Pol’y 409 at 411–13; Harris, Beck &
Gerasimchuk, supra note 457; David Houle, Carbon Pricing in Canadian
Provinces: from Early Experiments to Adoption (1995-2014) (PhD Thesis,
University of Toronto, 2015) at 25, 33.
465 Harris, Beck & Gerasimchuk, supra note 457.
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DETERMINATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING
INDUSTRY’S “FAIR SHARE” AND
POTENTIAL LEGAL PATHWAYS
The Challenge of Uncertainty
International maritime regulation has always had to deal with
complex issues and relationships accompanied by degrees of
uncertainty. The regulatory issues have tended to constitute a
complex mix of commercial, technological and political drivers. The
public and private actors in international marine transportation
have been guided by national interests, commercial underpinnings
and community concerns. Often, the issues have cut across various
international regimes, not just the IMO conventions. The vital
importance and dynamic nature of these factors have produced
complex multi-level relationships. The IMO has acted as a funnel
for these interests in its efforts to develop comprehensive and
viable regimes based on regulatory compromise and solutions to
problems. The IMO itself has undergone institutional evolution
to enable it to equip itself and adapt to new challenges.
It is likely that the IMO has never had to consider such a long-term
timeline, with such complexity and urgency, in the development
of regulatory strategy for a specific issue area. The organization’s
experience in the long process of understanding GHG emissions
from international shipping, and exploring a path to determine the
industry’s fair share to GHG emissions reduction, can be described as
a steep learning curve. While it is true that the regulation of air and
other sources of vessel-source pollution has been a labour of decades,
GHG regulation constitutes a much more complex mix of dynamic
factors and related uncertainties, over a much longer time frame,
indeed spanning the twenty-first century. The longer the timeline, the
greater the complexity of interacting variables and relationships (as
discussed in this report), the likelihood of less capacity to forecast
the full economic repercussions, and the consequent heightened
uncertainty. As MEPC deliberations have amply demonstrated, there
is genuine concern that GHG maritime regulation may produce
uncertain or unexpected direct and indirect impacts, as illustrated
during discussions on MBMs with respect to impacts on trade and
developing countries. Maritime regulation in response to climate
change can be expected to be shadowed not only by “knowns”
and “known unknowns,” but also by “unknown unknowns.” The
“knowns” have enabled the IMO to adopt important evidence-based
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amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 4. The
“known unknowns” have led to the establishment
of the fuel database to build understanding on fuel
use and energy efficiency for further regulation.
The “unknown unknowns” are off the radar screen,
and demand a flexible and adaptive approach
with periodic review of the IMO strategy.
Against this backdrop, the initial IMO strategy is a
framework for action and the pursuit of maritime
regulation will require the IMO (through its
member states) to clarify commitments. It will need
to position itself to be ambitious and nimble, able
to manage uncertainty, learn, review and respond
to or further anticipate changing variables and
potentially varying outcomes. Such an exercise
calls for a dynamic and complex application of
the multi-disciplinary strategy that will provide
directions for the organization, its membership and
the international maritime community to adapt to
a new energy environment — and consequently a
new business environment in search of constant
innovation. To do so, the organization will need
to conduct its work not only by employing the
traditional approach in developing technical
and operational rules and standards, for which
it has a well-established and largely successful
record. It will need to implement an ambitious,
integrated, systemic and reviewable approach to
GHG regulation as a long-term learning process
in the strategy, punctuated by periodic review to
take stock (and be part of the global GHG stocktake
within the Paris Agreement) and benefit from
feedback loops by adjusting its ambitions and
approach as appropriate. It will need to work
within its own treaty regimes, as well as interact
with other international regimes. It will need to
use its experience in pursuing inclusive processes
to produce largely consensus-based and ambitious
mandatory rules and standards, voluntary
standards and recommended practices, in concert
with efforts in combating climate change under
other regimes. Non-maritime regime rules may at
times facilitate and at other times constrain what
the IMO is able to do, hence the importance of
a systemic, integrated approach to the complex
global problem addressed by the strategy.
The actions needed cut across diverse economic
sectors at national, regional and global levels and
engage regulatory bodies at all those levels, within
the respective sector and at times in relationship to
other sectors and overseeing regulatory bodies. A
challenge for the IMO will be to define appropriate
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roles for member states and for private industry
actors in achieving emissions reductions in the
international shipping sector. In the process of
transition, it needs to maintain a level playing field
while sending a clear message to national maritime
administrations and the shipping industry.
In an emissions reduction strategy that is narrowly
focused on the shipping sector, it might be
somewhat easier than in a global climate regime
to anticipate links between commitments of
states and the expected behaviour of industry
actors in the shipping sector. Some of these
industry actors will be public, but most will be
private. While the actors responsible for meeting
emissions reduction commitments will be
predominantly private industry actors, changes
within the shipping sector will have broader
economic consequences, including consequences
for the development of economically vulnerable
states. The international shipping industry will
need to work with the IMO in lock-step, not only
because the IMO is the regulatory body, but also
as a matter of corporate social responsibility and
joining ranks with other non-maritime sectors
in the collective response to climate change.

Toward a Vision and Timeline
The Quest for the Vision
The action required of the global community to
respond to climate change is guided by the long-term
temperature goal adopted in the Paris Agreement.466
The agreement commits state parties to “strive to
formulate…long-term low greenhouse gas emission
development strategies” and to communicate
these to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC.467 The
long-term vision entails a range of long-term
actions, such as the technology development
and transfer framework and mechanism.468
As discussed above, the initial IMO strategy was
adopted with the stated vision that reflects the
international shipping industry’s commitment to
reducing GHG emissions and to phase them out
in this century. The IMO was under pressure to
develop a fair and meaningful international shipping
industry contribution to the global response to
466 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 2(1).
467 Ibid, art 4(19).
468 “Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing
technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to
climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” Ibid, art 10(1).
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climate change as defined in the Paris Agreement.469
This will require substantial commitment in the
implementation of the IMO strategy, not only to
reducing emissions significantly in the short and
medium term, even as global trade may continue
to grow, but also to pursue R&D and employ
technologies that will place the industry on the
path to eventual complete decarbonization. At this
time, the IMO strategy is pitched at a high level of
generality, without targets, specific measures and
related timelines. These will need further definition
and specific metrics to facilitate implementation,
monitoring and progress evaluation.
The Paris Agreement’s approach to setting targets,
the relationship between collective and individual
targets, and the process for reviewing progress and
ensuring compliance all offer potential guidance
for the IMO as it seeks to move forward with the
strategy with an effective approach to achieving
adequate emissions reductions in the international
shipping sector.470 At the same time, there are
important differences between the UN climate
regime and the IMO that have to be considered when
drawing lessons from the Paris Agreement. The Paris
Agreement is an agreement between states and it
creates obligations for states for GHG emissions
reductions across the economies of party states. The
IMO strategy does not establish legal obligations and
will focus on one sector, shipping, and it will target,
much more directly than the Paris Agreement, the
key industry actors involved in the sector. Careful
thought will have to be given to the applicability of
lessons from Paris in light of these key differences.

Development of the Long-term Goal
There is broad support for the proposition that
the international shipping sector should make
a fair contribution to the long-term goals of the
Paris Agreement. Ultimately, and as described
earlier, this means making a fair contribution to
the following goal set out in article 2(1)(a) of the
Paris Agreement: “holding the increase in the
global average temperature to well below 2°C
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above
pre-industrial levels.”471 There are a number of
challenges for the IMO member states to turn the
global goals in the Paris Agreement into a concrete

469 Ibid, art 2(1)(a).
470 Ibid, arts 2, 3, 4, 13, 14; Meinhard Doelle, “Chapter 22: Assessment of
Strengths and Weaknesses” in Klein et al, supra note 26 at 375.

emissions reduction target for international
shipping in the strategy, including the following.
→→ The IMO will have to resolve whether to
use 1.5oC or some other global average
temperature goal “well below 2 degrees”
as the starting point for its analysis.
→→ Current analysis, including analysis by the
IPCC, is focused on 2oC and therefore does not
accurately determine the global effort needed
to meet the article 2 goal. The IPCC’s work on
1.5oC is scheduled to be completed in 2018.
→→ Other key elements of the long-term goal in the
Paris Agreement, such as the goal to achieve
a balance of emissions and anthropogenic
removals in the second half of the century,
were inevitably based on the IPCC’s analysis
of 2oC and will require updating once the
IPCC concludes its analysis on 1.5oC.
→→ A determination will have to be made whether
international shipping’s fair contribution
would be similar to the average reductions
needed globally, whether there are reasons to
expect the sector to reduce emissions more
rapidly, or whether there are reasons to allow
the sector more time to reduce emissions.
→→ The elements that would go into such an
analysis have not been agreed upon either
within the UN climate regime or the IMO, and
some likely elements, such as the effort needed,
the technology options available or expected
to be developed, and the costs involved in the
shipping sector compared to other sectors,
are currently not all equally well understood,
hence the generality of the initial IMO strategy.
The success of states in implementing and
improving their NDCs over time may also
impact on what can be reasonably expected
from the international shipping sector.
→→ There is significant uncertainty about some
of the assumptions underlying the IPCC’s 2oC
scenario analysis, most notably with respect
to the role of future negative emissions in
keeping temperatures within 2oC. The same is
expected to be the case with the IPCC’s pending
analysis for 1.5oC, as these uncertainties are
not likely to be resolved for some time. This
does not mean the IPCC analysis should not
form the basis for setting a long-term goal
for the shipping sector, but it does suggest

471 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 2(1)(a).
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that adjustments may have to be made as
the IPCC refines and revises its analysis over
time. In other words, the initial IMO strategy
will have to be adjusted as circumstances
warrant, in view of adoption of the revised
strategy in 2023 and periodically thereafter.
The IMO strategy’s vision would benefit from
clarification of the underlying long-term goal for
international shipping. A long-term goal could be
based on the 2008 peak year in the strategy and the
average global effort, as confirmed or clarified by
the 1.5oC IPCC analysis to be completed in 2018, as
a starting point for the emissions reduction efforts
of the sector, and could be revised as circumstances
warrant. It would be important to be clear at
the outset about the factors that would warrant
adjustments to the long-term goal, and the process
involved. Having set the process for adjustments,
the sector would then be ready to synch its initial
long-term goal with the time frame identified by
the IPCC within which global emissions need to
equal emission removal, also referred to as the
GHG neutrality date. For a 1.5oC target, the global
GHG neutrality date can be expected to be some
time before 2050. GHG neutrality, in the context
of the Paris Agreement, means net zero emissions.
The maritime sector would have to decide whether
it will focus on the shipping sector in isolation
(referred to above as an “in-sector focus”) and turn
the neutrality goal into a decarbonization goal
for international shipping, or whether it wants
to work collaboratively with other sectors and
integrate its efforts into the global GHG neutrality
goal (referred to above as an “out-of-sector focus”).
Other key elements of a long-term goal for the
shipping sector include the rate of reduction from
peak emissions to full decarbonization or emission
neutrality. These elements of the initial long-term
goal could all be based on the IPCC’s analysis,
including in particular the 1.5oC scenario analysis
expected in 2018. This does, however, raise timing
challenges in light of the IMO strategy timeline.
This “approximation” or initial long-term goal
for the shipping industry could then be regularly
reviewed and updated as agreement is reached
on the elements to be considered and as more
detailed information is available on the chosen
elements. Adjustments to the long-term goal could
be made over time, based on clearly established
factors. Such factors could include changes to
the way parties to the Paris Agreement approach
and define the long-term goal in article 2, changes
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to the IPCC’s understanding of the potential
contribution of negative emissions, and actual
global progress toward the Paris article 2 goal.

Development of the Approach to
Meeting the Goal
Having clarified the long-term goal and a process
for updating and revising it, the IMO would then
be positioned to work back from the long-term
goal and develop steps toward meeting that goal.
There appear to be two sets of short-term goals
and steps in this process: the 2018 initial strategy
and agreement on the 2023 revised strategy. A
suitable medium-term target is 2030 (coinciding
with the end of the medium term in the strategy),
perhaps depending on whether the long-term GHG
neutrality goal is closer to 2040 or 2050, something
that should be better understood once the IPCC
releases its 1.5oC scenario analysis in October 2018.
The key elements for the initial IMO strategy and
its revision and adoption by 2023 are the following.
→→ A commitment to a clear and fair long-term goal
in the vision and a credible and transparent
process for reviewing and updating it.
→→ Medium-term goals that offer a credible
trajectory toward the long-term goal.
→→ A credible and transparent process for reviewing
progress toward the long-term and mediumterm goals, and a commitment and effective
processes to implement and adjust regulated
technical and operational measures necessary
to meet the long-term goal. This should
include commitments and effective processes
to regularly review and update technical
and operational measures to ensure best
practices to maximize efficiency at all times.
→→ Specific binding measures to aggressively
promote R&D and to implement and
continuously improve best available
technologies and operational practices to
reduce emissions in the short and medium
term, with an initial focus on operational
measures that are ready for immediate
implementation. Continuous attention to hull
design, propulsion systems and zero-carbon
fuels will be essential during all phases.
→→ Gradual ratcheting of technical and operational
measures, particularly through the EEDI
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and fuel measures, but also other measures
supported by new technological developments.
→→ It is conceivable that with technological
development, technical (ship design, propulsion
technology, and so forth), operational and
fuel measures could be sufficient in setting
international shipping on the path to
decarbonization. However, it is too early to
dispense with the possible need of an MBM,
hence its inclusion as a potential medium-term
measure in the initial strategy. As concluded by
the IMO’s Second GHG Study,472 a commitment
to adopt an effective MBM as part of the revised
strategy in 2023, with a commitment to design
and implement the mechanism to achieve the
long-term and medium-term goals, and review
its performance periodically remains advisable.
→→ A process of review and adjustment of the initial
and revised strategy and its implementation
that is effectively synchronized with the
global stocktake of the Paris Agreement, so
that information about progress in this sector
can feed into the five-year review cycles
under articles 13–15 of the Paris Agreement.
→→ Confirmation of 2008 as the appropriate
peak year for emissions from the sector.
The approach should recognize that efficiency gains
through improved ship design and operation have
multiple benefits in the short, medium and long
term, especially if the regulations have a built-in
mechanism for continuous improvement. In the
short term, they demonstrate that the sector is
taking the issue seriously, and they will be critical
to meeting the short-term goals of the strategy,
such as the goal of 2008 remaining the peak year
for emissions from the sector. They also help make
the medium- and long-term goals less daunting
and less challenging from a technical perspective.
The more the energy consumption of ships can be
reduced, the more likely it is that solutions using
alternative fuels such as electricity, hydrogen
fuel cells or biofuels can contribute to the full
decarbonization of the sector in the longer term. At
the same time, efficiency measures alone are clearly
insufficient to achieve full decarbonization within
a time frame that represents a fair contribution
from the sector. This means that progress in ship
technology and operation should be combined
with a clear strategy for achieving the technology

breakthroughs needed to fully decarbonize the
sector as soon as reasonably possible. This cannot
be achieved without effective measures to find
suitable fuel alternatives to hydrocarbon-based
bunkers, most likely through a combination of
regulated standards and other incentives.
Ports also have a potential role to play, as recognized
in the initial IMO strategy. In addition to performing
critical spot inspections under MARPOL and
regional memoranda of understanding (MoUs) to
ensure compliance with international standards,
ports are essential for bunkering and, assuming the
necessary infrastructure is in place, are in a position
to provide key services such as cold ironing (shoreto-ship power). Because they enjoy sovereignty
over internal waters, port states are able to tighten
emissions control requirements while the ship is in
port. Effectively, they determine whether a ship may
trade with their ports. However, it is advisable for
port state measures to be as consistent as possible
with international standards, rather than be imposed
unilaterally without reference to such standards,
because uniformity is important for maritime trade.
One way to conceive the overall challenge for the
sector would be in three phases: an initial efficiency
phase; a decarbonization phase; and a negative
emissions phase. In each phase, the implementation
of the strategy would focus on a combination of
achieving the primary goal of the phase, and at the
same time to prepare in a meaningful way for the
following phase. The first phase would start with the
initial strategy in 2018 and would retain the 2008
peak year for the industry and strive for further
emissions reductions, hopefully coinciding with
the revised strategy in 2023 or following shortly
thereafter. The second phase would start with the
implementation of the revised strategy in 2023,
which could include an effective MBM (as now
anticipated by the initial strategy), assuming it is
needed to supplement technical and operational
measures, designed to effectuate the decarbonization
of the sector within time frames consistent with
the long-term goal and with a clear understanding
of the rate of reductions needed to achieve the
goal. A pilot for the MBM could be implemented
toward the end of the initial efficiency phase, so
that the MBM is fully operational in the 2023–2030
period. Toward the end of the decarbonization
phase, as the sector gets closer to meeting its
decarbonization goal, the sector’s role in the negative
emissions phase would be clarified and facilitated.

472 Second GHG Study, supra note 286.
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The Role of International
Maritime Regulation
Choice of Instruments
The IMO instrument of choice for the initial
measures to regulate GHG emissions adopted
to date has been MARPOL Annex VI. Alternative
options included adoption of a new annex or
separate convention, the principal advantage
arguably being the ability to provide dedicated
treatment to a particularly complex problem that
may require more than technical and operational
measures usually employed to prevent vesselsource pollution. The prolonged IMO deliberation
on GHG emissions and the consideration that
technical and operational measures were practical
steps that could be adopted in the short term
likely favoured the use of an existing instrument
to the creation of a new one. The development of
a convention or protocol or a new annex would
have been a lengthy, multi-year process leading to
adoption at a diplomatic conference. In contrast,
amending an existing annex could be undertaken
using the much faster tacit acceptance process.
Moreover, a new annex would have had to be
optional and would have necessitated years to
secure broad support by a sufficient number
of state parties representing the bulk of global
tonnage. In comparison, although Annex VI does
not command the same high level of state parties
as other annexes, what really matters is that the
subscription rate and tonnage represented are very
high. Tacit acceptance of amendments has ushered
in (and will again in the future) new standards
with the usual period of a year, unless there is
substantial objection to the amendment during
the prescribed period for objections in accordance
with MARPOL’s amendment procedure.473
A further argument in support of Annex VI as
the regulatory vehicle is the desirable unity and
coherence of the pollution prevention system.
Characterizing GHG emissions as vessel-source
pollution facilitates coordination of the regulatory
requirements of the various types of pollution
from ships. There is likely to be greater consistency
among technical standards, reporting expectations
and enforcement across the MARPOL annexes.
As seen earlier, issues of potential consistency
across regulations and their purposes have
arisen, as in the case of fuel requirements for
473 MARPOL, supra note 10, art 66.
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controlling NOx and GHG emissions. Thus, with
respect to technical and operational measures,
the use of Annex VI facilitates an integrated and
systemic approach to pollution prevention.
The adoption of an MBM may raise additional
questions, such as whether placement of the
measure in MARPOL Annex VI, or a new annex, or
indeed in MARPOL itself, would be the appropriate
legal pathway. MARPOL’s strength is its design
as an instrument focusing on technical and
operational measures with an enforcement system
to match. It is appropriate to enquire whether
it would be a suitable vehicle for the adoption,
implementation, enforcement and periodical
review of market measures. The adoption of
market measures would be a novelty for the
IMO, whose work to date, although punctuated
by occasional political controversies, has been
essentially technical. Its focus on technical aspects
has generally enabled it to avoid or manage
differences and achieve regulatory consensus.
MBMs are economic instruments aimed at market
intervention or influence. MARPOL was not
designed to accommodate a framework for the
collection of levies or to enable the organization
to introduce market instruments. The IMO’s own
constitutive instrument, while clearly broad enough
to permit consideration of any issue concerning
international shipping and the environment, is
unclear with respect to whether the organization’s
power includes adoption of regulations concerning
a carbon levy and a related fund or establishing
a carbon credit system. Its express financial
powers are limited to budgetary matters and the
scale of assessment of membership dues.474
Accordingly, in the event an MBM is a desirable
component of the future strategy, the IMO will
need to consider how its constitutive instrument
will support such an initiative and what legal
pathway would be the most suitable and practical
for this purpose. It is useful to recall that the
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
was established by a separate treaty and has its
own secretariat and separate legal personality.475
However, on such a complex issue as market
measures, the option of developing a new maritime
convention could be undesirable because of the

474 IMO Convention, supra note 189, Part XII.
475 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, 1110
UNTS 57 (entered into force 16 October 1978).
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predictably lengthy process of development.
Much as MARPOL is essentially a technical
and operational standards instrument, as a
potential candidate host for an MBM in Annex VI
it carries the advantage of the tacit acceptance
procedure, which was designed precisely to avoid
cumbersome diplomatic processes in maintaining
the instrument up to date, as well as the substantial
tonnage subscription already in place.
Should MARPOL not be deemed the legal pathway,
another potential alternative and novel approach
for an MBM for international shipping is to consider
developing it in coordination with the UN climate
regime and perhaps even under article 6 of the
Paris Agreement. The feasibility of such an option
and its significance for the IMO mandate in its
constitutive instrument would need to be studied.
An additional question is whether it is desirable
to endow the IMO strategy with a legal status.
At this time, the initial IMO strategy is a political
document carrying no legal effect. This reflects the
pragmatism with which deliberations took place
in the MEPC. It is conceivable that aspects of a
future iteration of the strategy could be brought
under MARPOL Annex VI, thus scaling up the
status of the strategy. This has pros and cons. On
the one hand, it could cement its authoritative
status and enable its updating using the tacit
acceptance procedure. On the other hand, it
could add an additional layer of complexity to the
already complex deliberations, and in any case the
GHG regulatory measures already have a home
in Annex VI. Giving the strategy (or aspects of it)
a legal status might not necessarily carry much
advantage. The alternative and pragmatic approach
is simply to continue considering the strategy as
a “policy” document, perhaps akin to the IMO’s
own strategy, which is updated biennially and
adopted by an assembly resolution. This approach
has enabled the IMO to operationalize its mandate,
set specific regulatory targets and deadlines,
and update the document as a rolling plan.

Applying the IMO Regulatory Process
Over the many years of successful regulation,
the IMO’s culture of consensus has dominated
decisions, despite the rule on majority decision
making in its constitutive instrument, enabling
it to find common denominators for a wide suite
of decisions and ensuring broad support. The
next steps in adopting and implementing action
measures of the IMO strategy and prospective GHG

regulation will test the ability of the organization
to rely on consensus to achieve an outcome
that reflects a fair contribution from this sector.
The adoption of MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 4,
with a majority decision has now established a
precedent on this issue and, given the continuing
divisions on sharing of responsibilities and role
of market measures, it is conceivable that further
use of majority decision making is possible and
perhaps necessary to achieve adequacy. The
frequent concerns expressed by major developing
countries, most especially Brazil, China and India,
can be expected to resurface. These are points on
which compromise has to be reached, in particular
because they are large GHG emitters, are among
the largest economies and have high GDP growth
forecast.476 Out-voting major states does not bode
well for what is necessarily a complex long-term
regulatory process, both in terms of fostering the
organization’s culture of consensus and securing
the support of all member states, most especially
major economies engaged in maritime trade. The
global consensus reached in the Paris Agreement
climate regime should provide the momentum
and the substantive elements to aim for consensus
in the implementation of the IMO strategy.
As seen earlier, the IMO has a well-defined, threestep, linear approach to the development of
maritime regulation. The approach is motivated
by compelling necessity, guided by a goal-oriented
approach and employs a mix of mandatory
and recommended practices. Given the longterm goal of IMO’s GHG regulatory efforts and
the uncertainties that will serve as context and
drivers, it will be important for the three-step
approach to be complemented by a subsequent
step of regular review and adjustment to complete
the cycle so that GHG regulation will be seen
as cyclical and iterative rather than linear.
It will be recalled that the IMO Council has
considered a proposal from a group of member
states and industry bodies to further structure
and tighten the three-step approach, in particular
476 Among the largest GHG emitters in 2013, their rankings were: China
(first), India (fourth) and Brazil (seventh). Johannes Friedrich, Mengpin
Ge & Andrew Pickens, “This Interactive Chart Explains World’s Top
10 Emitters, and How They’ve Changed” (11 April 2017) World
Resources Institute, online: WRI <www.wri.org>. In 2016, the GDP
ranking was: China (second), India (seventh) and Brazil (ninth). “Gross
Domestic Product 2016” (17 April 2017), World Development Indicators
database, World Bank, online: World Bank <www.worldbank.org>.
The GDP forecast in 2017 is as follows (no numbers were presented for
Brazil): India (7.2 percent) and China (6.5 percent). Alex Gray, “These
Are the World’s Fastest-growing Economies in 2017” (9 June 2017) World
Economic Forum, online: WEF <www.weforum.org>.
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to address data gathering, consideration of the
necessity of a proposed new initiative, use of
cost-effectiveness and impact analysis for shortand long-term benefits, availability of suitable
technologies, transparency and robustness
of procedures, consideration of impacts on
manufacturers, criteria for assessing, surveying
and testing technologies, implementation dates
based on achievable timelines and consolidated
technology, and risk-based evaluation of potential
costs and benefits of environmental, economic
and social issues. This proposal could enhance
the process of future GHG regulation by building
on the learning needed to produce functional
and effective rules and standards. It entails a
higher level of structured scrutiny of regulatory
proposals than is the practice currently.
Experience shows that the regulatory process in the
IMO is not always purely technical and on occasion
has been politicized, for example with respect
to the development of guidelines and decisions
on the designation of particularly sensitive sea
areas477 and, within the context of this report, the
divisive debate on the application of the CBDR
and NMFT principles in GHG regulation. Arguably,
a better structured rule-making process would
help minimize the degree of issue politicization
by ensuring an in-depth technical assessment at
each stage of the rule-making process. It is also
possible that the proposed tightened process could
make it more challenging to adopt measures to
combat GHG emissions when the science does
not provide sufficient clarity, or the technology on
which the measures are based is not yet on the
market, or the long-term impacts of the proposed
regulatory outcome are not altogether clear. The
proposed process could potentially constrain
adoption of a precautionary approach to regulation
in the context of scientific and technological
uncertainty,478 unless flexibility is maintained.
While the IMO’s GHG regulation to date has been
largely top-down, the goal-oriented approach
provides a measure of flexibility to enhance
compliance. Annex VI’s Chapter 4 rules and

477 Julian Roberts et al, “The Western European PSSA Proposal: A ‘Politically
Sensitive Sea Area’” (2005) 29:5 Marine Pol’y 431.
478 In prescribing the precautionary approach to environment protection,
principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that where “there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.” Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, 14 June 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol I) (12 August
1992), 31 ILM 874 [Rio Declaration].
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standards have been legislated for implementation
and enforcement by state parties with respect
to ships registered under their flags. Energy
efficiency goals provide flexibility for shipowners
and operators to meet the standards through
various means. Goal-oriented regulation has
served the IMO well, especially with respect
to areas where a diversity of technologies
exists or further technological development is
expected, such as in ship design, propulsion
machinery, energy use monitoring and fuel
technologies. There is also a role for bottom-up
standard development, as the pioneering of new
technologies and practices in industry could
potentially serve as the basis for new GHG rules
and standards or for scaling up existing ones. The
use of industry practices or standards developed
by industry associations is not unprecedented.479

Applying the Principles of Maritime
Regulation
The difficult MEPC discussions identified several
issues concerning the principles and practice of
maritime regulation that will need resolution
or adaptation if the international maritime
community (both IMO member states and the
shipping industry) is to produce a meaningful and
realistic long-term collective response. The NMFT
principle has played a key role in the development
of all international maritime regulation and has
played no small role in building the IMO’s profile
as a successful regulatory body. This principle
has helped to raise the standards of shipping
around the globe and is foundational not only to
the international maritime conventions and their
subsidiary instruments, but is also central to the
operation of the global system of memoranda on
port state control. These regional arrangements are
increasingly coordinating practices and sharing
data on inspected ships to ensure compliance
with safety and environmental standards
and further discourage deviance through flag
hopping.480 Watering down the application of
the NMFT principle will be counter-productive
in maritime regulation because of the unique
characteristics of the mobility of ships.
The accommodation of the special needs of
developing countries as set out in the initial
479 See e.g. Requirements Concerning Polar Class, supra note 207.
480 IMO, Press Briefing, “Port State Control Regimes Move to Boost
Collaboration, Harmonization and Information Sharing” (6 November
2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/
Pages/30-PSC-workshop.aspx>.
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IMO strategy will need to be addressed in
ways that do not undermine the essence
of maritime regulation. The CBDR principle
emerged as an important equity principle in
international environmental law with respect to
the performance of environmental obligations
by states, and not with respect to individual
industry actors as is the case in international
shipping. The legitimate CBDR concerns of
developing countries need to be addressed in
meaningful ways that do not create winners and
losers within the international shipping sector.

accommodate technological change, the trepidation
to adopt standards that will stand the test of the
long term would be significantly alleviated by the
proposed periodical reviews. Finally, clarity in
GHG regulation will be vital, especially given the
concerns within the industry on how to adapt to
a changing regulatory and economic paradigm.

The principles for drafting maritime regulations
will play an important role in GHG regulation. There
is no question that effective GHG regulation is
necessary. What could be a potential issue, because
of the long-term technological uncertainty, is the
degree of reliance on the evidence-based approach.
GHG regulatory work will need to be undertaken
in the context of varying degrees of scientific
and technological uncertainties and will call for
the employment of a flexible, yet precautionary
approach.481 The principles of maritime regulation,
and in particular the first principle of compelling
necessity based on scientific evidence, may have
to be reconciled with the reality of the scientific
and technological uncertainties inherent in GHG
regulation. The precedent has now been set for new
GHG technical and operational standards to be
integrated into MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 4.
The location of MBM regulation has options,
as mentioned above. New GHG regulation will
need to be consistent with existing regulation
and avoid conflicting prescriptions or rules that
produce conflicting outcomes. Consistency can
be facilitated through an integrated approach
to new regulatory initiatives and assessment
of direct and indirect regulatory impacts. The
pursuit of proportionality and fitness for purpose
will be challenging, again because of scientific
and technological uncertainties. A pragmatic and
functional approach will be necessary. Periodic
regulatory reviews (for example, timed with the
global stocktake and parallel five-year reviews
within the IMO, proposed in this report) will be
helpful in ascertaining effectiveness of specific
rules and standards in producing the desired
outcomes. While clearly important for maritime
GHG regulation, in particular because of the need to

481 Rio Declaration, supra note 478, principle 15. It may be worth exploring
a possible role for the IPCC to offer a scientific basis for the regulatory
work of the IMO on GHG emissions.

The nine principles for GHG regulation adopted
by the MEPC 57 (discussed above) provide further
guidance as well as additional challenges. In
general, they represent a logical extension of
the three-step decision-making process and
six principles of general maritime regulation,
while further addressing the challenges of GHG
regulation. Logically, principle 1 proposes that
the regulation should be effective in reducing
emissions, which, after all, is the purpose of the
entire IMO effort. Further, principles concerning the
goal-oriented approach (6), support for technology
innovation and R&D (7), and accommodation
of leading technologies in energy efficiency (8)
strongly buttress the necessary technical means
and outcomes to achieve emissions reductions
for the short, medium and long term. Similarly,
the principles of cost effectiveness (3) and
minimization of competitive market distortions
(4) are aimed at ensuring the economic viability
of the proposed regulations. Principle 5 proposes
a sustainable approach to environmental
regulation without penalizing trade; again, a
desirable goal. In a similar spirit, principle 9
ensures the adoption of regulation which is
practical, transparent and easy to administer.
Principle 2 is a reason why this portfolio of
guiding concepts was not adopted by consensus.
The principle restates the NMFT application to
all flag states, which, as seen earlier, is central to
the international maritime law conventions. The
wording of the text is unfortunate, and perhaps
served to fuel dissent. The actual MARPOL wording
is that the convention applies to “(a) ships entitled
to fly the flag of a Party to the Convention; and
(b) ships not entitled to fly the flag of a Party but
which operate under the authority of a Party.”482
Through consistent text (“[W]ith respect to the
ships of non-Parties to the Convention, Parties shall
apply the requirements of the present Convention
as may be necessary to ensure that no more
favourable treatment is given to such ships”483), the

482 MARPOL, supra note 10, art 3.
483 Ibid, art 5(4).
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application and enforcement emphasis is on ships
rather than state parties. This approach is similar to
other maritime conventions. The purpose is to give
direct application of a particular rule to all ships
engaged in international shipping, no matter where
they are flagged or reflagged. This principle will be
critical for the effectiveness of GHG regulations in
international shipping. Of course, adherence to this
principle does not suggest that vulnerable states
who are particularly exposed to negative economic
consequences of GHG regulatory efforts should
not receive assistance. In other words, the NMFT
principle is of vital importance to ensure a level
playing field for all ships as private commercial
actors. On the other hand, the CBDR-RCNC principle
addresses the needs of particularly vulnerable
states, rather than the commercial actors.

Extent and Reach of GHG Technical
and Operational Regulation
For the shipping industry to maximize the
effectiveness of its fair contribution, it will be
important that GHG regulations apply to as much
of the world’s fleet as is reasonably possible, and
for domestic regulation to cover ships exempted
from those regulations. At this time, the IMO’s
regulation of GHG emissions from ships in MARPOL
Annex VI does not address all ships and those that
are covered are subject to a transition period.
The new Chapter 4 concerning the EEDI and SEEMP
rules applies to ships of 400 GT or more.484 This
rule immediately eliminates many small vessels,
such as numerous fishing and recreational vessels,
although a national maritime administration
retains the discretion to adopt measures to
ensure compliance by vessels less than 400 GT
with emission-control requirements of Annex VI
requirements.485 In 2012, the number of fishing
vessels was estimated at 4.72 million, 57 percent
of which were engine-operated.486 Fishing vessels
use energy intensively and are an obvious and
significant source of GHG emissions.487 Moreover,
the IMO’s regulatory focus in MARPOL and other
conventions is on ships engaged in international
voyages. This limitation excludes vessels engaged
in cabotage, unless a specific rule is extended

484 Ibid, annex VI, c 4, reg 19.1.
485 Ibid, annex VI, c 2, reg 5.2, c 4, reg 19(2).
486 FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2014 (Rome: FAO,
2014) at 32–33.
487 See James F Muir, Fuel and Energy Use in the Fisheries Sector:
Approaches, Inventories and Strategic Implications (Rome: FAO, 2015).
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to those ships or is expressly extended to apply
to domestic shipping by a state party. Annex VI,
Chapter 4, applies the exemption to domestic
shipping, but also stipulates that state parties
“should ensure, by the adoption of appropriate
measures, that such ships are constructed and
act in a manner consistent with Chapter 4, so
far as is reasonable and practicable.”488 Hence,
a lower-level duty (“should ensure,” compared
to the peremptory “shall”) applies to promote
consistency in cabotage to the extent possible.
Also excluded from application are offshore
platforms, regardless of their propulsion.489 Like
cabotage and most fishing and recreational vessels,
offshore platforms once stationery at the operation
site, are not engaged in international voyage and
rather are subject to the jurisdiction of the licensing
state. The offshore service vessels supporting them
are deemed to be on cabotage. Hence, because
the excluded vessels will tend to operate within
the territorial or resource-related jurisdiction of a
state party, in practice they will be expected to be
captured by the NDCs under the Paris Agreement.490
In addition to these exclusions, a state party
may waive compliance with the attained and
required EEDI for ships of 400 GT and above.491
Only existing ships may be granted the waiver,
and all other vessels are subject to the full EEDI
rules as of January 1, 2017.492 The intention was
to provide state parties with some flexibility
to waive the requirements in an exceptional
manner, when appropriate. When a waiver
is granted or withdrawn, the flag state is
required to report the action to the IMO for the
information of the general membership.493
Also of note is the exclusion of vessels with
a tonnage of 5,000 GT or less from reporting
488 MARPOL, supra note 10, annex VI, c 4, reg 19.2.1.
489 Ibid, annex VI, c 4, reg 19.2.2.
490 Many of these excluded sectors are covered under the NDCs under
the Paris Agreement. As a result, states should be motivated to extend
the application of these rules to their domestic shipping sector and
thus encourage as much consistency and effort at emissions reductions
across these subcategories of the shipping industry. The IMO can
potentially play a very constructive role in this process by encouraging
the application of best available technologies and operational
measures across the shipping sector, including subcategories regulated
domestically.
491 MARPOL, supra note 10, annex VI, c 4, reg 19.4.
492 The EEDI applies to vessels whose building contracts were placed on or
after January 1, 2017, or whose keels were laid on or after that date, or
with a July 1, 2019 delivery date, or in case of a major conversion of a
new or existing ship, on or after January 1, 2017. Ibid, annex VI, c 4, reg
19.5.
493 Ibid, annex VI, c 4, reg 19.6.
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fuel consumption to populate the IMO Ship
Fuel Oil Consumption Database as of March 1,
2018.494 While, as noted earlier, the adoption
of this tonnage threshold was motivated by
expedience and the fact that it captures 85 percent
of shipping responsible for GHG emissions,
the reporting omits a substantial amount of
small commercial shipping, in addition to the
smaller vessels not captured by Annex VI.

Regulatory Fairness and Consistency
Accompanying the reach of IMO regulation is the
challenge of achieving regulatory fairness and
consistency with respect to the wide range of
vessels engaged in international shipping and the
diversity of trades and functions they perform,
while minimizing waivers, especially with
respect to operational measures. As discussed,
some ships have unique build and operational
requirements that demand high energy use, and
this reality has already led to early amendment of
Annex VI, Chapter 4, to exclude the application
of EEDI to polar-class vessels. This could be
a potential long-term concern, as the fleet of
polar-class vessels grows in response to reduced
summer sea ice in the Arctic and the concomitant
increase in transit and destination shipping.
Other types of ships use energy differently
and navigate long distances without physical
constraints such as ice presence and the need
for ice-breaking, although when encountering
bad weather, energy consumption will tend to
increase for all ships. Yet other vessels carry
refrigerated or other temperature-controlled cargo,
which entails additional energy consumption,
while passenger vessels require the additional
energy to support hotel operations on board.
These examples highlight the importance for
the different approaches in the required EEDI
to account for the needs of different classes of
ships.495 The prescribed rules and standards for
ships will inevitably entail a mix of common
and differentiated rules. The future GHG
regulation of shipping will need to continue to
distinguish between different classes of ships
to ensure that while they meet increasingly
stringent efficiency requirements, they are able
to function safely and are fit for purpose.

494 Ibid, annex VI, c 4, reg 22A.1.
495 Ibid, annex VI, c 4, reg 21.

A more technically complex issue of consistency
is how to introduce measures meant to help
prevent GHG emissions without undermining
or contradicting rules intended to address other
types of vessel-source pollution, as in the case
of GHG measures that could conflict with air
pollution measures. Hence the earlier observation
in this report that adopting an integrated
approach and regulating GHG emissions in
the same convention facilitates coordination
to achieve the desired regulatory impact.
Another interesting angle on the invocation of
the CBDR principle in GHG regulation in shipping
raises an issue of potential lack of consistency
and fairness. The various types of vessel-source
pollution addressed by the MARPOL annexes
are all subject to the same NMFT principle. The
Annex VI rules concern NOx, SOx, particulate
matter (PM) and ozone-depleting substances,
some of which are related to GHG emissions.
The position advanced by some states — that
the distribution of the responsibility for GHG
emissions from shipping ought to be made
subject to the CBDR principle — is inconsistent
with the general and proven approach to the
prevention of vessel-source pollution, including
atmospheric pollution. As observed elsewhere in
this report, the CBDR principle, while critical for
the effectiveness and fairness of the IMO strategy,
needs to be approached in a manner that does not
limit the scope of application and effectiveness
of technical, operational and other future rules
for ships depending on the socio-economic status
of a state. The implementation of CBDR-RCNC
needs to target assistance to vulnerable states
more directly, while preserving the principle of
NMFT for industry actors, irrespective of flag.

The Potential Role of
Market Measures
Should the IMO proceed with this measure in the
medium term of the revised strategy, the design
of a suitable MBM will be a complex task that
will require consideration of many technical,
economic and political factors. There are, however,
some fundamental considerations in the design
of the MBM that can help shape the details of
the instrument. One is the choice of the tool.
The initial IMO strategy is silent on this matter.
The MEPC discussions to date have considered
a range of possible MBMs, including a carbon
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levy, a cap-and-trade system, and variations of
both, among others. Another consideration is
the need for clarity around the goals of the MBM.
The latter informs the former and is connected
to the previous discussion about the long-term
goal for the sector, so is considered first here.
The fundamental issue with respect to the goals
of the MBM is whether it is primarily intended
to internalize the costs of the international
shipping sector using up part of the remaining
global carbon budget, or primarily to incentivize
private actors involved in this industry sector
to facilitate the transition of the sector toward
decarbonization by creating economic incentives
for such actions. As mentioned earlier in this report,
the MEPC discussion on MBMs has progressed
to grouping MBMs as either in-sector or out-ofsector reductions, potentially indicating a choice.
This choice may depend, in part, on whether the
decarbonization of the international shipping
sector will be technically and economically
more feasible than the decarbonization of other
sectors, such as electricity generation, land-based
transportation, agriculture, manufacturing and the
built environment. This question may be difficult to
answer at this time, and that may attract different
answers as efforts to decarbonize various sectors
evolve over time. For example, as technological
breakthroughs are achieved in various sectors,
they may become more economically attractive
options for decarbonization than they were
before. The choice between internalizing the
cost versus decarbonizing the sector as the
primary goal of the MBM also depends on which
approach is more likely to achieve the level
of support within the IMO to ensure effective
global implementation. Clarity on the goals can
ensure that the discussion about the choice of
instruments and the measure’s detailed design is
a principled one, and that there is transparency
and accountability in the design of the MBM.
By way of example of issues for consideration
with respect to choice of an MBM, and assuming
for the purposes of this discussion that there is
a choice between a carbon levy and a cap-andtrade system, there are key design elements
that are common to these instruments, such
as the actors captured, the activities captured
and the use of any revenues generated. The
relative importance of revenue generation and
the selection of actors and activities targeted
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will vary with choice of instrument and detailed
design, in light of the overall goals of the MBM.
A carbon levy would most likely involve the
collection of fees attached either to specific
fuels or directly to emissions and usually would
involve a fixed price that treats all units equally,
although some differentiation is possible. A
primary benefit of a carbon levy is that the carbon
price is controlled and predictable, offering
certainty to investors considering investments in
emissions reduction solutions and allowing for
careful management of the economic impact of
the MBM on the entire sector and on individual
actors within the sector and beyond. An
effective carbon levy would generate substantial,
predictable revenues, so decisions would have to
be made on how to effectively use the revenues
generated to further the goals of the MBM and
to address legitimate equity concerns. The initial
levy should be set to an amount to influence
energy use, but will likely need to be adjusted
over time to meet its stated goals. The levy would
thus be phased in and adjusted over time.
Options on the allocation of revenues include using
revenues to address specified inequities associated
with the implementation of the carbon levy, to
further incentivize research, development and
dissemination of technologies seen as critical for
the decarbonization of the sector, and potentially to
support decarbonization outside the international
shipping sector (such as through the purchase
of credible offsets). At MEPC 63, the GHG-WG 3
identified a number of potential uses for MBM
revenues.496 At MEPC 61, it was reported that the
High-level Advisory Group of the United Nations
Secretary-General on Climate Change Financing
identified international shipping and aviation
as potential financial sources to aid mitigation
efforts and adaptation in developing countries.497
The contemplated sources included an emissions
trading scheme, a fuel levy and an aviation ticket
tax. More recently, the UN Secretary-General’s
496 See e.g. MEPC 63 Report, supra note 316 at 42:
1. incentivizing shipping to achieve improved energy efficiency;
2. offsetting – purchase of approved emission reduction credits;
3. providing a rebate to developing countries;
4. financing adaptation and mitigation activities in developing countries;
5. financing improvement of maritime transport infrastructure in developing
countries (e.g., Africa);
6. supporting R&D to improve energy efficiency of international shipping; and
7. supporting the Organization’s Integrated Technical Co-operation
Programme.
497 High-level Advisory Group of the United Nations Secretary-General on
Climate Change Financing, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC
61/5/18/Rev.1 (13 August 2010).
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High-Level Advisory Group on Sustainable
Transport recommended increasing international
development funding and climate funding for
sustainable transport.498 The more MBM revenues
are used to support decarbonization efforts
outside the international shipping sector, the more
compelling the case for considering the alternative
instrument, a cap-and-trade system, and linking
it with other existing cap-and-trade systems.
A cap-and-trade system is perhaps the most
obvious alternative to a carbon levy. A cap-andtrade system for international shipping could
involve setting limits for the GHG emissions
from the international shipping sector as a
whole, allocation of portions of the overall limit
to individual industry actors or subsectors
within the sector (either through auctioning,
sale of allowances at a fixed price or through
free allocations), combined with the right of
captured actors to trade allocations with other
captured actors.499 The most obvious candidates
for captured actors would be fuel suppliers and
vessel operators. With respect to fuel suppliers,
it would need to be determined whether they
would be captured by the international shipping
industry’s commitment or by NDCs. The choice
among free allocation, sale, or auction of credits
depends largely on the need to generate revenues
to deal either with equity considerations, to
achieve emissions reductions elsewhere, or to
incentivize R&D into decarbonization technologies.
Free allocation tends to reduce the short-term
economic impact of the MBM, but limit options
to achieve emissions reductions, deal with
inequities and incentivize the decarbonization of
the industry. Allocation at a fixed price mirrors
the carbon levy in the sense that it permits
the generation of revenues while carefully
controlling the economic impact of the MBM.
A cap-and-trade system could be implemented for
the international shipping sector only (in-sector,
as considered above), or it could be linked to
other sectors (through offsetting protocols) or to
existing cap-and-trade systems (out-of-sector, as
considered above). In principle, the cap-and-trade

498 Mobilizing for Development: Analysis and Policy Recommendations
from the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory
Group on Sustainable Transport (New York, NY: United Nations,
2016) at 8, online: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/
documents/2375Mobilizing%20Sustainable%20Transport.pdf>.
499 Of course, there are alternatives to the focus on GHG emissions, such
as the cap-and-trade proposals put forward in the MEPC process for
improved vessel energy efficiency.

system should be better able to directly control
the emissions reductions achieved through the
setting of the cap for the international shipping
industry sector. However, in practice, this very
much depends on the detailed design, as linking
and offsetting tend to lessen control over the
emissions reductions achieved and other design
features, such as price floors and ceilings. Free or
fixed price allocations tend to control the economic
impact of the MBM on the sector. Furthermore, a
carbon levy can be adjusted over time to control
the emissions reductions achieved by changing
the amount of the levy. With cap and trade, similar
outcomes can be achieved by adjusting the cap.
In short, the differences, in terms of the ability to
control emissions reductions and economic impact,
are more nuanced than they appear at first glance.
However, carbon levies tend to be more transparent
about the trade-offs inherent in their design.
If there is a clear preference within the IMO
to do everything possible to achieve the full
decarbonization of the international shipping sector
and for this purpose adopt the simplest approach,
a carbon levy would likely be the MBM of choice.
The levy itself would provide an incentive for a
wide range of actors in the industry, including
R&D institutions, naval architects, shipbuilders,
shipowners, charterers, ship managers, ship
financers, cargo owners, and so forth, to support
efforts to reduce emissions. The nature and extent
of the incentive would depend on the nature of
the levy (applied to volume of fuel, a percentage of
the cost of the fuel, or to each tonne of emission),
the amount of the levy and clarity on the longterm trajectory of the levy, among other factors.
If there is a clear preference for letting market
forces decide whether it is more cost-effective to
reduce emissions within the sector or support
reductions elsewhere, a cap-and-trade system is
more likely to be the MBM of choice. It is important
to recall, however, that the choice between a carbon
levy and a cap-and-trade system ultimately is not
as obvious as it may appear on the surface. Many
of the differences that may appear fundamental
are blurred in the detailed design. Ultimately,
either can be designed to effectively incentivize
the decarbonization of the international shipping
sector; either can be designed to address identified
inequities; and either can be designed to minimize
the economic impact on the sector. Badly designed,
either can be ineffective at reducing emissions.
More important than the choice between carbon
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levy and cap-and-trade system, therefore, is the
detailed design, and clarity and transparency
with respect to the relative priority allocated
to encouraging low-cost emissions reductions,
protecting the industry, protecting vulnerable
states from negative economic impacts, and
ensuring the decarbonization of the sector.
In theory and assuming political will, legitimate
concerns about the economic impact of the
decarbonization of the sector on the economies of
vulnerable states can be appropriately addressed
with either a cap-and-trade system or a carbon
levy. The main function of either MBM can include
the generation of revenues to address inequities.
In the case of the carbon levy, the generation of
revenues is a central feature of the MBM, so that
the main issue will be the allocation of revenues
to specified and demonstrated inequities. In the
case of a cap-and-trade system, the key will be
to avoid free allocation of allowances to ensure
sufficient revenues are generated to address any
specified and demonstrated inequities. In either
case, while the generation of revenues occurs on
the basis of the NMFT principle among industry
actors, the use of revenues generated from the
MBM allows for their equitable utilization in
addressing the needs of developing countries
adversely affected by the measures adopted.

Equity and Fair Sharing
of Responsibility
The nuanced Paris Agreement approach to
differentiation in the form of CBDR-RCNC and
accommodation of the principle in the initial IMO
strategy offer hope that the past controversy within
the IMO on the respective roles of CBDR and NMFT
has been largely resolved. It is important to recall
that the concept of CBDR has evolved significantly
under the UN climate regime. It started in the
form of CBDR-RC with a focus on responsibility
and capacity, and remained in this form from the
inception of the UNFCCC until the Paris Agreement
in 2015. In this form, it served as an important
principle for developing countries to push for
leadership from developed countries on a range of
issues, from mitigation to adaptation and finance.500

For a long time, CBDR-RC served to preserve
the binary view of states as either developed or
developing. All this changed in the Paris Agreement,
resolving a decade-long impasse in the climate
negotiations. First, the agreement alters the CBDRRC principle by adding the concept of national
circumstances to signal that state parties differ in a
range of relevant respects, not just with respect to
capacity and responsibility for climate change. As
importantly, the Paris Agreement puts this revised
version of the principle into practice with a very
nuanced and practical approach to differentiation.501
The Paris Agreement applies a variety of approaches
to differentiation, depending on the issue and
circumstances. For monitoring, reporting, review and
compliance, for example, differentiation is minimal,
and largely tied to capacity, encouraging state
parties seeking to avoid differentiation to invest in
capacity building to support other parties struggling
to meet monitoring and reporting requirements.502
Differentiation with respect to the substantive
emissions reduction commitments of parties
to the Paris Agreement is largely based on selfdifferentiation, but with some direction to narrow
the potential scope of differentiation. For example,
there is some explicit differentiation between
developed and developing states with respect
to economy-wide emissions reduction limits,
but this differentiation is expected to diminish
over time as developing countries are expected
to take on economy-wide targets. This is done in
full recognition that states have different levels
of capacity and responsibility, and that a range of
national circumstances will affect states’ abilities to
contribute to the global effort. There is no explicit
differentiation, in the Paris Agreement, of private
actors, although the impact of national efforts
may, of course, affect private actors differently.503
The main lesson from Paris in this regard is that
the answer to the longstanding disagreement
about differentiation in the IMO’s approach to
GHG emissions reductions may be found in a
nuanced and pragmatic approach to harmonizing
the application of the CBDR and NMFT principles.
The IMO approach that levels the playing field in
the treatment of industry actors can potentially be
accompanied by measures to protect vulnerable
501 Lavanya Rajamani & Emmanuel Guérin, “Chapter 4: Central Concepts in the
Paris Agreement and How They Evolved” in Klein et al, supra note 26 at 81.

500 Jane Bulmer, Meinhard Doelle & Daniel Klein, “Chapter 3: Negotiating
History of the Paris Agreement” in Klein et al, supra note 26 at 62.
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502 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 13, 15; Dagnet & Levin, supra note
51; Dagnet & Northrop, supra note 59.
503 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 4; Winkler, supra note 43.
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developing countries from negative economic
consequences of efforts to decarbonize the shipping
sector. The IMO’s technical cooperation program and
the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnerships
(GloMEEP) offer capacity building on technical
and operational measures. The potential impact
of a carbon levy can be mitigated by channelling
the accrued monies to assist developing countries
inordinately affected by the levy and enable them to
gradually transition to decarbonized transportation
services for their maritime trade. Other ideas for
mitigating the impact for a cap-and-trade system
have also been suggested (for example, IUCN, WWF).
Such a multi-layered approach is consistent with
the spirit of the Paris Agreement, and a pragmatic
way to avoid unfairness within the shipping sector
while being sensitive to the economies of vulnerable
countries. A key element of the solution will be
to make decisions based on evidence of impacts,
rather than based on uncertainty or fear.504
The regulation of shipping has relied heavily on
technology, both as a driver and as its promoter.
Indeed, the availability of technology is one of the
principles of maritime regulation. The promotional
dimension has not always produced immediate
satisfactory outcomes, as the BWM Convention
demonstrates,505 but it has laid the groundwork for
the forcing of technological development. A flexible,
systemic approach to dealing with uncertainty
should pay particular attention to enhancing the
environment for R&D by “stretching goals” and
through catalytic measures (already proposed by
industry actors) to enhance the design, powering
and operation of all classes of ships.506 Arguably, new
technologies and know-how are likely to provide a
greater measure of control over intended regulatory
outcomes and better manage particular uncertainties.
Enhancing the environment for technological
development raises a related difficult issue in terms
of access to technological breakthroughs. On the
one hand, open or fair access could significantly
accelerate dissemination of new technological

solutions in the shipping industry and among
regulators, while on the other hand, intellectual
property rights and the global competition in the
industry are factors that may militate against such
initiatives. However, there is concern that marine
technology developers may “have limited means
available to prevent unauthorized use of certain
types of inventions” and “this situation may reduce
the value of ‘maritime’ patents, leading to less
incentives to innovate and publish information
on new developments.”507 Efforts at levelling the
playing field in technology development and transfer
have long bedevilled international relations. The
LOSC attempted to address this sensitive matter by
developing a regime for technology co-development
and transfer in Part XIV.508 States “shall cooperate in
accordance with their capabilities to promote actively
the development and transfer of marine science and
marine technology on fair and reasonable terms and
conditions,” either directly or through a competent
international organization such as the IMO.509 The
technology mechanism, initially established under
the Copenhagen Accord and affirmed in article 10
of the Paris Agreement, is dealing with these issues
in the broader context of climate technologies. It
may offer avenues for cooperation and coordination
that would be valuable for the IMO to explore.
The LOSC technology cooperation duty includes
“the protection and preservation of the marine
environment…and other activities in the marine
environment,” thus including emissions from ships,
and “with a view to accelerating the social and
economic development of the developing States.”510
Clearly, the duty is not to transfer technology, but
rather to cooperate in promoting its development
and transfer. States have a further “best endeavours”
duty “to foster favourable economic and legal
conditions for the transfer of marine technology for
the benefit of all parties concerned on an equitable
basis.”511 The rights of technology developers are
further protected by a due regard duty toward “all
legitimate interests including, inter alia, the rights and
duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of marine
technology.”512 Other provisions in the LOSC set out

504 Shi, supra note 15 at 81
505 Paul Thomas, “Ballast water treatment, uncertainty and what to learn from
it all” (16 November 2017) Fairplay, online: Fairplay <https://fairplay.
ihs.com/safety-regulation/ballast-water-treatment-uncertainty-and-what-tolearn-from-it-all_20160705.html>. Rear Admiral Paul Thomas is assistant
commandant for prevention policy, US Coast Guard.
506 “Regulation can provide the critical forcing function that drives innovation and
encourages technological developments to meet the environmental challenges.
This occurs when regulations set ‘stretch’ goals and incentivise investment to
meet those goals. Regulations that embrace the status quo and codify existing
commercially-available technology only serve to stifle innovation and prevent
industry from meeting environmental challenges.” Ibid.

507 Rikard Mikalsen, Philipp Harlfinger & Anthony P Roskilly, “Patent
Protection in the Marine Industry: International Legal Framework and
Strategic Options” (2012) 225:3 Proceedings of the Institution of
Mechanical Engineers Part M: J Engineering for Maritime Envt 232.
508 LOSC, supra note 9, Part XIV.
509 Ibid, art 266.1.
510 Ibid, art 266.2.
511 Ibid, art 266.3.
512 Ibid, art 267.
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structures and processes for this type of cooperation,
including the establishment of national and regional
centres and duties for international organizations,
such as the IMO, to “take all appropriate measures
to ensure, either directly or in close cooperation
among themselves, the effective discharge of their
functions and responsibilities” with respect to
the convention’s provisions in this regime.513
From an IMO perspective, this duty buttresses the
technical assistance mandate in its constitutive
instrument514 and provides fiat to the work of
the organization’s Ad Hoc Expert Working Group
on Facilitation of Transfer of Technology for
Ships. MARPOL Annex VI now includes a specific
provision promoting technical cooperation and
technology transfer concerning improving the
energy efficiency of ships.515 In a similar spirit to
LOSC Part XIV and article 10 of the Paris Agreement,
state parties have a duty to promote and provide
support, and to cooperate in the promotion of
development and transfer of technology and
exchange of information to states that request
technical assistance. The caveat that states perform
this duty subject to their own laws enables them to
protect the rights of intellectual property holders.
Should an MBM be adopted by the IMO as a
medium-term measure of the revised strategy, it
will be important to provide the resources needed
to help make future technological developments
subject to open access. For example, if a levy
were to be instituted, some of the funding could
be directed toward R&D for the public domain.

Review, Monitoring
and Compliance
Another interesting question for the IMO is whether
the five-year review cycles contemplated under the
Paris Agreement could have potential application
to international shipping.516 Whatever the goals and
their legal status, there is clearly value in a process of
regular reviews of progress in the IMO strategy’s key
areas, such as overall emissions reductions achieved
in the shipping sector, progress in R&D on long-term
solutions, commercialization of key new technologies,
efforts to retrofit the existing fleet, reductions from

513 Ibid, art 278.
514 IMO Convention, supra note 189, arts 1(a), 2(e), 11, 15(k), 42–46.
515 MARPOL, supra note 10, annex VI, c 4, reg 23.
516 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 14; Friedrich, supra note 39.
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improvement in new vessel design, reductions from
operational measures, and so forth. A regular exercise
of gathering the latest information on progress, in
combination with the necessary analysis to determine
progress against stated goals and pathways, would
allow for regular adjustments to the overall approach
that would offer more certainty that collective goals for
the sector will be met. The performance of individual
actors — both industry actors and states — would also
be an important element of an effective review cycle.
Careful thought would have to be given to what
information should be gathered, who would provide
the information, what analysis is required, who
would carry out the analysis, and what decisions
are expected to be made based on the outcome of
the review. Important questions include: Under
what circumstances would the collective goal or
the expectations of individual state or industry
actors be adjusted? How should the review be
linked to regulatory adjustments? What would
be the consequences for individual actors of not
living up to their commitments or obligations?
Consistent methodologies supported by the IMO
and the UNFCCC would greatly facilitate this
level of cooperation and mutual support.
The recently adopted IMO Instruments
Implementation Code (III Code), effective as of 2016,
is important for enhancing the implementation of air
pollution and GHG regulations.517 Its significance lies
in the introduction of a mandatory audit scheme for
flag states, as well as port and coastal states. MARPOL
is one of the international conventions that has been
amended to provide a legal basis for the conduct of
mandatory audits.518 The IMO has a dedicated subcommittee (III Sub-committee) that assesses, monitors
and reviews implementation of IMO conventions
using port state control (PSC) reports and other data.
While it spotlights issues that a member state may
need to address, it also serves to inform the IMO
committees regarding the need for new mandatory or
voluntary measures. This arrangement is supported
by the IMO’s Integrated Technical Cooperation
Programme aimed at building capacity to facilitate
compliance with the maritime conventions and can
be expected to potentially play a key role in capacity
building in furtherance of GHG emissions reduction

517 IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code), Resolution A.1070(28),
4 December 2013 (Agenda item 10), IMO Doc A 28/Res.1070 (10
December 2013).
518 IMO, “IMO Member State Audit Scheme” (2017), online: IMO <www.
imo.org>.
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goals.519 A potential concern with mandatory audits
under the III Code is the confidential nature of the
audit process, effectively enabling member states to
shield their record on regulatory compliance.520 This
could be a concern in monitoring compliance with
measures to reduce GHG emissions and, accordingly,
it will be important for the implementation of the
IMO strategy to address this potential issue. Australia,
supported by several member states, recently
launched an initiative in the IMO Council to review the
governance of the organization and council has placed
the item on its agenda.521 This initiative could have farreaching implications for the implementation of the
IMO strategy.
At the company level, there are other instruments that
could be strengthened to encourage vessel operations
to minimize GHG emissions, such as the International
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and
for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code).522 Operating under
the International Convention on the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), the ISM Code is aimed at the promotion
of safety culture in international shipping and includes
an international standard for pollution prevention, as
well as for maritime safety. However, at this time, and
apart from generic statements concerning prevention
of pollution of the environment, the ISM Code and its
implementation guidelines do not contain express
provisions specific to air pollution, let alone energy
use and operations to reduce GHG emissions, although
it is conceivable to interpret appropriate measures
in this regard as implicit.523 This is an appropriate
instrument to include express terms to promote a
“GHG-reduction culture” in international shipping.
At the ship level, as in the case of other MARPOL
regulations, the Annex VI air pollution regulations
are subject to the convention’s port state inspection
regime and regional MoU system described earlier. In
2018, the Paris MoU, which is the oldest PSC regional
arrangement and possibly the most active, will launch

519 IMO, “Technical Cooperation” (2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org>.
520 Transparency International recently published a report arguing for
reform in IMO governance and identified the III Code as an issue.
Governance at the International Maritime Organisation: The Case for
Reform (Transparency International, 2018) at 2, online: Transparency
International <www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/
governance_international_maritime_organisation>.
521 “IMO Agrees to Explore Reforms”, Lloyds’ List (3 July 2018).
522 International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and
for Pollution Prevention: International Safety Management (ISM) Code,
Resolution A.741(18), Adopted on 4 November 1993, IMO Doc Res A
18/Res.741 (17 November 1993).
523 A company should establish procedures, plans and instructions for key
shipboard operations concerning the environment. Ibid, reg 7. Under this
regulation, a company could include slow steaming as an operational
measure to reduce GHG emissions on a voyage.

a Concerted Inspection Campaign for Annex VI and
will provide insights into levels of compliance with the
annex.524 In 2016, inspectors found 41,857 deficiencies,
3,769 of which were detainable, amounting to 3.83
percent of all inspected ships.525 These deficiencies
were serious enough that the vessels concerned
were detained in port until the deficiencies were
rectified. In the same year, 428 ships had Annex
VI deficiencies.526 These reports are potentially
important for a vessel’s insurance cover. Deficiencies
with respect to emissions could affect a vessel’s
seaworthiness.527 In addition to the implications for
port state inspection, the vessel’s insurance contract
invariably includes express and implied seaworthiness
warranties, as well as warranties of legality (i.e., the
assured undertakes to operate the insured subjectmatter in compliance with legal requirements).528
Finally, compliance could be further strengthened
by providing incentives for additional industry
initiatives that take early pioneering steps to
retrofit the existing fleet to enhance low-carbon
operations, to the extent this is technologically
and economically possible, or pioneer new
technologies that promise neutral or zero emissions,
such as electrical propulsion and wind energy.

Inter-regime Consistency
and Complementarity
Consistency and complementarity between
international regimes is an important consideration
in any global response to a planetary challenge
such as climate change. The LOSC anticipates a
complementary relationship with other conventions.
The LOSC does “not alter the rights and obligations
of States Parties which arise from other agreements
compatible with this Convention and which do
not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of
their rights or the performance of their obligations
under this Convention.”529 More specifically on
the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, article 237 states that the provisions
524 Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, 2016 Annual
Report at 10, online: Paris MoU <www.parismou.org/>.
525 Ibid at 23–24.
526 Ibid at 48.
527 For instance, this is the position taken by the IMO with respect to sulphur
emissions. See “Ships ‘Unseaworthy’ if they Don’t Meet Emissions Rules
— IM” (16 November 2017) Marine Link, online: Marine Link <www.
marinelink.com/news/unseaworthy-emissions431318>.
528 On warranties, see Baris Soyer, Warranties in Marine Insurance, 3rd ed
(London, UK & New York, NY: Routledge, 2016).
529 LOSC, supra note 9, art 311(2).
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on marine environment protection “are without
prejudice to the specific obligations assumed by
States under special conventions and agreements
concluded previously which relate to the protection
and preservation of the marine environment and to
agreements which may be concluded in furtherance of
the general principles set forth in this Convention.”530
For example, MARPOL, as a specialized instrument
on vessel-source pollution adopted prior to the LOSC,
and the Paris Agreement, as an instrument that
expands on the LOSC provisions on atmospheric
emissions adopted after the LOSC, are captured by
this provision. The article continues that specific
obligations under special conventions on the
marine environment “should be carried out in a
manner consistent with the general principles and
objectives” of the LOSC.531 One practical consequence
of this provision is that the obligations of states to
mitigate climate change impacts ought to be pursued
consistently with the principles of the LOSC.
Although pursued primarily by the MEPC and
within the framework of MARPOL, the IMO’s current
and prospective regulation of GHG emissions
from international shipping interacts with other
international regimes. The IMO’s constitutive
instrument equips it to coordinate with other
agreements and international organizations as needed,
and the organization has entered into cooperation
agreements.532 The actual or potential interactions
are frequently complementary and facilitative of
IMO work. Examples of facilitative interactions
are the LOSC provisions with respect to global and
regional protection and preservation of the marine
environment, atmospheric emissions from ships,
technology transfer and the role of the IMO. In
particular, the LOSC establishes a duty for state parties
to prevent and enforce atmospheric pollution from
ships and promotes technology transfer, as does the
UN climate regime. These provisions provide context
for the IMO’s efforts in developing the GHG strategy.
In other instances, the tasks assigned to the IMO
require active efforts at ensuring consistency
and coordination with other regimes. At the
level of overall goals, it is important for the IMO
strategy to be consistent with the overall goal and

governance processes of the Paris Agreement, such
as increasing levels of ambition, transparency in
reporting, five-year review cycle for the shipping
industry’s reported contribution aligned with the
global stocktake, and so on. The IPCC report on
1.5°C expected in October 2018, and the Talanoa
Dialogue, will provide further opportunities for the
IMO strategy to align with the climate regime.
Consistency between international regimes is
also important at the level of operating principles
and processes. Division in and protraction of the
GHG debate in the IMO was, in part, due to the
interpretation and weight given to the NMFT in
MARPOL and CBDR in the climate regime, even
though the approach to CBDR in the Paris Agreement
evolved from a list-based approach (as in the Kyoto
Protocol) to a more nuanced approach. As observed
earlier, a consensus-based harmonized interpretation
and application of the two principles is possible and
could assist harmonization between international legal
regimes without weakening either regime. Similarly,
the perceptions that have been expressed and
concerns raised by some delegations about potential
conflict of MBMs with the WTO regime will need to be
better understood so that the development of a future
market instrument, if feasible and desirable, will be
undertaken with a view to ensuring complementarity,
thus reassuring all IMO member states. The special
needs of developing countries could thus be addressed
by using the structures and processes available in the
regimes concerned, including the LOSC provisions
facilitating cooperation in technology co-development
and transfer, the IMO’s technical cooperation
program and revenues from a future MBM, the
climate regime structures and provisions in WTO
agreements designed to assist developing countries.
A potential interaction between the IMO and
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) may arise in the event
MBMs are adopted under the revised strategy. The
monitoring of MBM consequences for international
shipping could involve the efforts of UNCTAD in
its annual reporting on international shipping
and seaborne trade. If UNCTAD’s mandate is
engaged in this respect, it would provide a valuable
information service for IMO member states.

530 Ibid, art 237(1).
531 Ibid, art 237(2).
532 IMO Convention, supra note 189, art 25. An example of a cooperative
agreement is the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between
the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) (23 July 2002), online: WCO <www.wcoomd.org/en/aboutus/partners/~/media/887D44574CB0487582155BDE5E42388E.ashx>.
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If serious inter-regime issues of inconsistency or
conflict remain unresolved, there is a danger that some
IMO member states that are important for the IMO
collective effort at GHG reduction may object to future
amendments to MARPOL Annex VI. The IMO’s policy
and practice in developing the various conventions
and subsequently in facilitating their implementation
has been to ensure consistency with the LOSC.533 This
experience indicates that the IMO is conscious of and
well prepared to ensure inter-regime consistency.

Multilateralism and
IMO Leadership
Finally, the IMO strategy to respond to climate
change presents both opportunities and risks for
the organization and the maritime community it
serves. On the one hand, the adoption of credible
and effective action measures under the strategy
will significantly fortify faith in the organization’s
competence and effectiveness as an international
leader and global regulator. It is further conceivable
that its mandate, which to date has largely focused
on the regulation of international shipping from
technical and operational safety, environmental
and security perspectives, including accompanying
private and public law regimes, could evolve to
include the regulation of market measures. If the
latter occurs, GHG regulation potentially promises
to be a major milestone in the organization’s
institutional evolution. On the other hand, if it
fails to populate the strategy with action measures
that represent a fair and acceptable contribution
to the global response to climate change, there is
the danger that the organization’s credibility as
an effective regulator could suffer. It is imperative
that the organization develop a defensible,
principled approach to the implementation of
its strategy to respond to climate change.

approach and to always stress support for the
IMO as the leading global regulator and to
continue to seek effective regulation of the GHG
emissions from a global industry. Moreover, in
addition to the fundamental duty of good faith
in the LOSC, the legal reality under the LOSC
and the IMO Convention is that the IMO is the
competent international organization in the
convention. The European Union and IMO have,
at times, had convergent views with respect to
accelerating maritime regulation, as was the case
with phasing out of single hulls, and usually,
despite the tension, matters were resolved with
the European Union supporting global regulation
of shipping and the IMO’s lead role in that regard.
Even when the United States launched the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, it stressed its support for
the IMO as the leading global regulator and has
tended to participate in its work in a manner to
reinforce that position. Accordingly, the major
maritime nations have, despite periodic hiccups,
supported the key role of the IMO, even if they
are not parties to all its instruments. The hope
is that pressure and leadership from outside the
IMO will assist the IMO in its efforts to develop
and implement an effective strategy that is well
integrated globally, regionally and nationally, and
that ensures a fair contribution from international
shipping to the goals of the Paris Agreement.

As mentioned earlier, some NGOs expressed their
frustration with the slow process by suggesting
that the UNFCCC or the European Union be called
upon to take appropriate action. If this occurred,
it would be preferable to avoid a confrontational
533 The IMO Secretariat participated actively in the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea from its inception in 1973 until the adoption of the LOSC
in 1982. Its contributions ensured avoidance of overlaps, inconsistencies and
incompatibilities between the LOSC and the IMO conventions. This practice
continued with newer conventions through the inclusion of a provision that
interpretation should be without prejudice to the codification and development of
the law of the sea. See e.g. MARPOL, supra note 10, art 9(2); Implications of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime
Organization, Study by the Secretariat of the IMO, IMO Doc LEG/MISC.7 (19
January 2012) at 11.
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CONCLUSION
In investigating the international law and policy challenges
to the determination of the international shipping industry’s
contribution to climate change mitigation efforts through the
IMO, the authors offer concluding observations on general, policy
and legal considerations that have a bearing on the current and
possible future directions of the nascent IMO strategy and its
legal pathways. These concluding comments offer high-level
observations on the issues that are addressed in much more detail
throughout this report and in particular in the previous section.

General Considerations
for the IMO Strategy
As will have become apparent in this report, the development of
the international shipping industry’s fair share of GHG emissions
reductions through the IMO is an urgent matter. It is not a simple
regulatory matter that can be exclusively addressed through
maritime technical and operational rules and standards. The task
is characterized by urgency, complexity and uncertainty: urgency
because the current global response to climate change may be
significantly underestimating the process of change and that
decarbonization likely will have to occur at a much faster pace;
complexity because of the global and transnational nature of the
industry, ship technology and operations, and financing structures;
uncertainty because the reduction of GHG emissions must necessarily
be a long-term process spread across the rest of the century and with
highly dynamic climatic, technological and economic variables.
This calls for an implementation of the IMO strategy that is integrated:
systemic in scope, flexible in approach and adaptive in application.
Systemic in the sense of employing traditional mandatory IMO
regulatory tools, supported with voluntary measures as appropriate,
while also considering new mechanisms that could be created
or that are already available under other international regimes.
The Paris Agreement includes elements that offer important
opportunities for collaboration among the regimes (for example,
articles 6, 10 and 13–15). The approach will need to be flexible in
the sense that the strategy is not considered a static structure, but
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rather a dynamic process whose objectives and
measures will be periodically reviewed to respond
to the long-term learning curve. It will need to be
adaptive in the sense that, and in consequence
to flexibility, the strategy must not be rigid, but
should rather be considered a “rolling strategy”
and regularly ratcheting up ambitions to match
newer understandings of the climate change
challenge, future technological possibilities
and achieving effective long-term outcomes.
While it may be tempting to consider the measures
and progress achieved in the collective response
to climate change by other regimes and sectors
as potential models for international shipping,
the reality is that shipping is unique because
of its context, diversity and complex drivers.
While the experiences of others may inform, it is
unreasonable to expect transposition of solutions
from one sector to another. Each sector has its
own characteristics and what really matters
is not replication of any class of measures, but
rather that each sector is ambitious and bears
its fair share of the collective responsibility,
within the context, culture, principles and
processes of the industry concerned.
While progress has been achieved on GHG issues
in the IMO, a major concern in the discourse to
date has been the frequent lack of consensus or
expression of reservations. While the organization’s
majority decision-making rule ensures resolution
of major controversies, this procedure tends
to leave winners and losers in its wake. One of
the IMO’s traditional strengths is its culture of
consensus, which, while not always present in all
forms of decision making and has its own concerns
(for example, producing the lowest common
denominator), it helps to guide the discharge of
the organization’s functions and secures a high
degree of support and respect for its work and its
regulatory outcomes. Some of the most difficult
substantive and procedural decisions in the GHG
discourse to date have been taken by a majority
vote. The strategy was adopted with some states
expressing reservations. Given that the strategy and
its future action measures for GHG emissions will
become a long-term blueprint for IMO mitigation
efforts, adopting them by a vote rather than backing
them by consensus may not bode well for the longterm commitments needed from member states to
make the industry’s mitigation efforts effective.

88

Policy Considerations
for the Strategy
Now that the initial IMO strategy has been
adopted, it is important that the collective effort
in the organization not fall short so that leadership
of the issue is retained. The IMO has primary
competency over the sector, and the global nature
and complexity of the sector clearly warrants
a global approach. It also seems that there are
significant benefits of a cooperative approach
between the IMO and the UN climate regime.
There is much to be said for a synchronized
approach of state efforts in the IMO and under the
Paris Agreement, in particular with regard to the
vision of the IMO strategy, the level of ambition,
guiding principles, timelines, as well as review
of and adjustments to the strategy over time.
An essential element of a synchronized approach
to the issue between the IMO and the UN climate
regime is a common vision. The IMO strategy
clearly articulates its intention to ensure the
international shipping sector makes a fair
contribution to the goals of the Paris Agreement,
and that the strategy is generally in line and,
where appropriate, coordinated with the Paris
Agreement. While a global and consensusbased approach under the IMO is preferable,
the implementation of the strategy needs to be
adequately ambitious to ensure that the sector
makes a fair contribution to the climate problem.
IMO member states, who at the same time are
parties to the Paris Agreement, have a responsibility
to ensure an effective industry contribution.
Working out the details of a fair contribution
from the sector is complex. The answer to what
is a fair contribution can be expected to change
over time. Further work is needed to clarify the
action measures under the strategy that will
constitute an appropriate contribution from
the international shipping sector, based on its
unique circumstances, the likelihood and timing
of technological breakthroughs, and how the
circumstances compare to those in other key
sectors. However, debates over the details in
the strategy on what would amount to a fair
contribution should not delay action, as the basic
message from the Paris Agreement is that all sectors
must decarbonize as rapidly as reasonably possible,
and that, ultimately, all sectors need to make all
reasonable efforts to achieve full decarbonization.
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Until the strategy’s details of a fair contribution
from this sector are worked out, the strategy
should be implemented on the assumption that the
international shipping sector needs to decarbonize
at the same rate as other sectors. In other words,
the initial strategy should be implemented on the
assumption that the sector is neither required to
do more nor less than other sectors. This means the
rate of emissions reduction should be the same as
the rate of emissions reductions needed globally,
and that the dates for key milestones such as peak
emissions, GHG neutrality and full decarbonization
are the same as what is needed globally. These
starting assumptions can then be refined over time,
as the unique circumstances of the shipping sector,
and how they compare to the unique circumstances
of other sectors, are better understood.
The ultimate measure of what is needed globally
is the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement.
Unfortunately, much of the analysis currently
available on the global effort needed is based on the
pre-Paris goal of 2oC, not on the Paris goal of “well
below 2oC,” with efforts to “limit increases to 1.5oC.”
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report provides
key parameters on what is needed globally to stay
within 2oC, and the Paris Agreement itself sets a
long-term objective of reaching GHG emission
neutrality in the second half of the century that
appears to be based on the 2oC analysis of the IPCC.
Until the IPCC releases its report on 1.5oC, a
pragmatic approach would be to rely on the
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, but with a clear
understanding that the long-term goals will have
to be updated in light of the 2018 IPCC report on
1.5oC. The implementation of the IMO strategy’s
long-term vision and action measures should be
informed by the Paris Agreement goal and the
IPPC’s Fourth Assessment Report, using the 2008
peak year for the sector and working toward
rapid decline of emissions thereafter, thus leading
to GHG emissions neutrality by or before 2050,
with the details depending on the results of the
IPCC’s expected report on 1.5oC. The ultimate goal
would be the full decarbonization of the sector.
It is also clear that innovative solutions are needed
to implement the NMFT and CBDR principles in
the IMO strategy’s approach to GHG emissions
reductions from the international shipping sector.
The two principles now co-exist in the strategy.
Valid viewpoints have been expressed over the
years, both by developing countries concerned
about the economic impact of GHG emissions

reduction efforts and by others, concerned about
the differential treatment of private actors within
the industry. The separation of the treatment
of industry actors in the strategy from the
treatment of state parties offers an opportunity to
harmonize the application of the two principles
in the implementation of the IMO strategy.
Action measures should aim to preserve the
principle of NMFT for industry actors within
the international shipping sector while finding
ways to address legitimate concerns about
economic impacts on vulnerable developing
countries. Their concerns, and especially those
of the LDCs and SIDS, must be taken seriously
and measures in support must be properly
resourced. Such an approach would be in line
with the aspirations of the SDGs and the nuanced
and pragmatic approach to CBDR adopted in the
Paris Agreement, and may be key to overcoming
the impasse over the application of these
two principles. Cooperation between the UN
climate regime generally in the spirit of the Paris
Agreement, and utilization of the institutions
and mechanisms under the Paris Agreement
in particular, offer promising opportunities to
move forward constructively in this regard.
Key elements of the IMO strategy relate to
capacity building, technical cooperation and
technology access. Cooperation between the
IMO and the technology, capacity and funding
mechanisms under the Paris Agreement have
the potential to overcome barriers to effective
implementation of GHG reduction technologies in
key developing countries through proactive and
supportive measures. If an MBM is introduced,
consideration should be given to channelling
some of the funds generated to support R&D that
will produce innovations in the public domain.
Ultimately, a critical ingredient of any solution
is the commitment to ensure the international
shipping sector contributes its fair share to
addressing the climate crises in a manner that is
fair to vulnerable developing countries and fair
to the private actors involved in the industry.
The application of NMFT and CBDR principles
needs to be undertaken in a symbiotic manner
to serve the ultimate goal of a fair contribution.
This report has considered the efforts of the IMO
in three phases (short-, medium- and long-term),
following the approach taken in the organization’s
initial strategy. The strategy’s phased short term
(referring to the period between now and 2023),
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the medium term (from 2023 to 2030), and the
long term (from 2030 to full decarbonization),
while appropriate at this time, might need to
be reconsidered as the need for more ambitious
climate action becomes increasingly urgent. What
is needed in terms of specific measures to guide
parties through the three stages is the appropriate
combination of ambition, flexibility, adaptability,
and transparency to meet the goals of the strategy
in a timely, efficient, effective and fair manner.
A combination of technical and operational
standards, market-based instruments, other
measures and effective compliance and
enforcement will likely be needed to address the
challenge, carefully designed to motivate all key
actors to take effective and adequate measures
to decarbonize the international shipping sector.
The current technical measures offer an important
starting point and will require effective and timely
mechanisms to keep pushing for the development
and implementation of best available technology,
to update the requirements on a regular basis as
technological breakthroughs are achieved. The
EEDI, in particular, designed to be scaled up every
five years, will play a vital long-term role. Market
mechanisms or other novel effective measures
are needed, primarily to motivate and enable the
technological breakthroughs that can then be
implemented either through upgraded technical
standards or through the market mechanism itself
to achieve the full decarbonization of the sector.
If MBMs are utilized as part of the strategy, the
detailed design will matter more than the choice
of instrument, such as the choice between a
carbon levy or a cap-and-trade system. The most
fundamental question is whether the mechanism
will focus on in-sector emissions reductions or
offer (limited or broad) access to credible out-ofsector emissions reduction opportunities. It is
important to recognize that there are pros and cons
to both, and that the choice will have implications
for how the long-term goals are framed and for
the timelines. One implication of this choice,
for example, is the need and importance of the
technical and operational regulations. An in-sector
approach to a market mechanism may serve
to achieve full decarbonization of international
shipping, whereas an out-of-sector approach is
more likely to need an evolving and carefully
designed technology mechanism to ensure the
sector ultimately achieves full decarbonization.
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There are a number of elements of the IMO strategy
and its implementation that will require regular
review and adjustment to ensure the goals are met,
including the fair contribution from the sector, the
technical standards of vessels and their operation,
and any market-based or regulatory mechanisms
designed to motivate technological innovations and
their adoption. The five-year review cycles under
articles 13–15 of the Paris Agreement, built around
the global stocktake, offer a valuable structure and
timetable for reviews of progress and effectiveness
of the elements of the overall approach. A wellsynchronized review that both takes advantage of
the information gathered and feeds appropriate
information into the five-year review cycles
under the Paris Agreement would enhance
efficiency and effectiveness of the IMO strategy.
Other elements to consider include existing
efforts on transparency and review within
the shipping sector, including current efforts
under the IMO and include future changes to
its governance, but also efforts outside the IMO,
such as the EU MRV. Ultimately, for transparency
and effectiveness, regular reporting, review
and enhancement of the approach, in synch
with reporting and review under the Paris
Agreement and elsewhere, will be critical for the
effective implementation of the IMO strategy.

Legal Considerations
for the Strategy
While this report concludes that the general
approach to GHG emissions reductions from
ships in the IMO strategy should be integrated,
the implementation of the strategy will require
a combination of global maritime regulation
and other legal and policy measures. Regulatory
tools to assist emissions reductions are obviously
available to the IMO, but it likely will be necessary
to consider a basket of mechanisms (maritime and
other), especially with respect to a prospective
MBM. An MBM, if adopted to complement technical
and operational measures, will require legal
support. To date, IMO regulation has concerned
technical rules and standards for maritime
safety, environmental protection and security
concerns in shipping. The IMO convention most
directly relevant to the regulation of emissions
from ships is MARPOL, which, with its focus
on technical standards for technology and
operations, may need a novel addition, perhaps
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a new chapter in Annex VI, preferably through
the tacit acceptance procedure, to enable the
introduction of a market measure in a reasonably
timely manner. An MBM will require clear,
consistent and predictable requirements and
conditions for trading emission credits, and upon
which private legal transactions will be based.
Alternatively, the MBM could perhaps be
housed under article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
At a minimum, consistency between any MBM
developed under the IMO and the market
mechanisms developed under article 6 of the Paris
Agreement would be welcome. If IMO members
decide to explore an MBM that includes access
to out-of-sector reductions or offsets, it would be
helpful to seek consistency with the emerging
new Sustainable Development Mechanism
under article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement.
The IMO has a long and successful history of a
principled and structured approach to global
maritime regulation. This approach has usually
been evidence-based and pragmatic, has employed
both mandatory and voluntary approaches, and
has aspired to universalize its instruments and
facilitate uniformity in their implementation. While
the GHG strategy is expected to be guided by a
vision at a high level of generality, accompanied
by aspirational goals, the fulfilment of those goals
will require a mixture of mandatory (possibly
concerning the EEDI and fuel requirements) and
voluntary rules and standards, and would need to
be periodically reviewed and scaled up to enhance
their continued relevance and effectiveness. As
an instrument with a high degree of universal
support, MARPOL’s tacit acceptance procedure
will be important to enable the gradual scaling
up of the EEDI (in addition to the current fiveyear ratcheting cycle) and other standards.
A challenge for GHG regulation will be coherency
in maritime regulation. As observed in this report,
the pursuit of ship operation regulations in
various domains may potentially raise issues for
the regulation of GHG emissions, such as other
atmospheric emissions from ships (for example,
to control NOx, SOx and PM emissions), particular
technical and operational requirements for
environmental reasons (for example, ballast water
exchange operations), energy use by particular
ships (for example, polar-class vessels) and safety
concerns (for example, safe vessel speed). It is
possible that efforts to address GHG emissions
may conflict with other regulatory efforts. While

potentially adding more complexity to GHG
regulation, this concern calls for an integrated
approach to GHG regulation where impact on other
regulated matters will need to be addressed.
The integrated approach to maritime regulation also
calls for regulatory coherency and fairness across
the industry. Careful thought will have to be given
in the detailed design and implementation of the
strategy to the public and private law impacts on
the roles of the many actors in the industry, from
regulators and enforcers (flag states/maritime
administrations, port states), to ship operations
(shipowners, charterers, operators, managers),
to providers of services to ships (port services,
bunker suppliers, insurers). Ways of facilitating
universal acceptance and uniform implementation
need to be anticipated at the design stage.
Coherency in GHG regulation should also be
pursued across international and national
standards to maximize GHG emissions reduction
from all forms of shipping. As observed in
this report, the IMO efforts have focused on
international shipping. Typically, the regulation
of cabotage, fishing vessels, small recreational
craft and generally small tonnage is undertaken
at the national level and the regulating state
may choose to extend international standards
to domestic shipping or regulate it separately.
With respect to emissions of domestic shipping,
overlap is to be expected between the international
regime and domestic regimes. There is much to
be gained by encouraging IMO member states to
coordinate the regulation of GHG emissions from
all forms of shipping in a consistent manner to
enhance mitigation from this sector as a whole.
An interesting factor in the future implementation
of the IMO strategy is the relationship between the
IMO conventions and the UNFCCC, its subsidiary
agreements (Kyoto and Paris), as well as other
treaty regimes (such as the WTO). The IMO has
a legal mandate as the competent international
organization with respect to international shipping
matters, and this has been recognized by the
expectation that the organization will orchestrate
the industry’s fair share of emissions reductions.
The IMO has gone to great lengths in developing
and maintaining a constructive relationship with
the UNFCCC process (including the UNFCCC
Secretariat and SBSTA) and has provided regular
reports. A potential concern is the possibility that
the implementation of the IMO strategy does not
display sufficient ambition and does not deliver a
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substantial and effective contribution, especially
in comparison to NDC commitments and other
industries. If this scenario, however unlikely,
arises, there could be an issue between, on the one
hand, the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement mandate that
includes all GHG emissions (including shipping),
and, on the other hand, the IMO mandate as a
UN special agency and competent organization
under the IMO Convention and the LOSC. If a
future Paris Agreement COP were to engage more
closely with international shipping, they would
likely be able to do so only by establishing a
target, while the IMO would retain the maritime
regulatory capacity (technical and operational,
as expected because of its competence under its
constitutive instrument and the LOSC) to facilitate
the achievement of that target. In any event, it is
important to reiterate that IMO leadership at a
high level of ambition on this issue is critical.
There are opportunities for coordination of and
cooperation under different international regimes
to meet GHG emissions reductions. The LOSC has a
complementary relationship to the Paris Agreement
and IMO maritime conventions. Although some
IMO member states have expressed concern about
a potential conflict between MBMs and the WTO
rules, the potential interaction between GHG
emissions regulation from international shipping,
the formulation and implementation of NDCs,
and the WTO regime are deserving of further
study. The idea proposed in a recent CIGI special
report to create a “climate change waiver”534 to
the WTO rules is likely worth studying further.
In the meantime, measures should be taken to
avoid any perceived or real conflict with the WTO
rules, but this should not delay or undermine
the implementation of an effective approach to
GHG emissions reductions from international
shipping. From another perspective, bearing in
mind that state parties to the IMO conventions
are also member states of the WTO, an MBM
developed and adopted by consensus in the
IMO might also render the matter a non-issue.

Finally, the process to produce a revised IMO
strategy by 2023 will need to consider the approach
to promoting compliance. The initial IMO strategy
is essentially a framework for future action. The
vision is aspirational and the commitments nonbinding. At this time, the strategy does not address
compliance. This is a weakness and can be expected
to pose a challenge for encouraging conduct that
is consistent with the strategy, itself a legally
unenforceable instrument. The implementation of
the strategy relies on action measures as yet to be
adopted. Ideally, those measures should include
technical and operational rules, standards and
codes adopted under MARPOL Annex VI, especially
if mandatory. Flag states will continue to have
primary responsibilities for ensuring effective
jurisdiction and control with respect to GHG
regulation of their ships. Port state enforcement
will continue to play an important role and is likely
instrumental for the future success of the strategy.

534 Bacchus, supra note 138, 22–27.
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